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This is AV Super Friends Off the Rails,

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an almost regularly scheduled open

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discussion on audio and video in higher

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education.

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We'll sound off about our most brilliant

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ideas, our dumbest mistakes,

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and everything in between.

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And because this conversation will almost

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certainly go off the rails at some point,

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we'll end up covering just about

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everything else.

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And now, the AV Super Friends.

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For March twenty twenty twenty six,

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it's the best sounding and most secure

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podcast in higher ed.

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This is the super friends off the rails.

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Episode number one hundred and thirty

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four.

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Two good ones broadcasting live at the

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exact moment.

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Day and night finally agree on something.

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This is the spring equinox edition of

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super friends.

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The sun is rising.

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The semester is dragging in somewhere on

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campus.

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An unsecured device is still begging to be

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adopted by the nearest unmanaged switch.

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So lock down your ports and add one

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to all your passwords.

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We're talking network security today.

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I'm Chris Hector.

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You're tuned in for another Friday

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afternoon podcast adventure.

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And let's say hello to today's panel of

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AV Super Friends, which, as you see,

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is larger than normal.

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We'll get to that in a second here.

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Our first panelist oversees the—whoops.

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No, no, no, no, no.

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Hold on.

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We need music.

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Hold on.

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You can do this dry.

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Here we go.

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Hey.

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Well, I pushed it, but it didn't—hold on.

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Our first panelist oversees the delicate

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balance between open collaboration and

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absolutely not letting anyone plug random

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crap into the courtesy LAN port on the

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lectern.

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He's a director of endpoint risk

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mitigation from Kansas City.

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Say hello to Mr. Jamie Reinhart.

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That doesn't seem right.

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I plug everything in.

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Our next panelist designs secure AV

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ecosystems while quietly judging IT staff

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for every unmanaged switch ever hidden

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above a ceiling tile.

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He's a senior network AV security

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architect from Corvallis, Oregon.

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Say hello to Mr. Mark Kolowazinski.

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Senior.

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I love having to have ladders to manage

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my network.

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Sorry, that was a typo.

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Senior.

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Oh, senior.

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Sorry.

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Different.

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A whole different role.

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Our next panelist investigates mysterious

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audio traffic storms and explains,

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for the hundredth time,

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why the network is not the cloud.

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He's a principal analyst for Multicast

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Forensic from Greensboro, North Carolina,

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Salem, Mr. Larry Darling.

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All of my audio storms are on private

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islands.

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I don't know what this has to do

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with me.

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It's in the cloud.

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Island-like weather.

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Island clouds.

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Our next panelist leads enterprise

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strategy for protecting classroom

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technology from malware, misconfiguration,

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and faculty who somehow have admin

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privileges.

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He's a vice president for Zero Trust

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Infrastructure from Bowling Green,

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Kentucky.

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Say hello to Mr. Justin Rexing.

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I'm also running Network Island,

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so super secure, zero trust.

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Perfect.

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And we're joined by some special guest

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panelists.

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Our first guest panelist is brought in

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whenever a campus decides the only truly

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secure AV system is one nobody can

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actually use.

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He's a senior manager for AirGap

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Educational Operations from Indianapolis.

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Say hello to Mr. Doug Schaefer.

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It's audio, Doug.

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You got to say something.

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Oh, hi.

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Sorry.

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You can tell I'm the theater of the

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mind.

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He was just being super secure.

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Yes, super secure.

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There's also live video,

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so people are looking at you.

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Yeah, yeah.

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Our next guest, Panas,

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is dedicated to minimizing every possible

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vulnerability,

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including unsecured touch panels and that

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one projector that is still on a publicly

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accessible network.

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He's a director of AV threat reduction

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from Northern Virginia.

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Say hello to Mr. Colin Burney.

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Hello.

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I reduced all the threats by force.

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And our final special guest panelist

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focuses on protecting campuses from the

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terrifying intersection of enterprise

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networking, outdated AV control systems,

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and hardware that still uses admin as the

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password.

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He's a distinguished fellow in cyber

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physical defense from New York's ALM, Mr.

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Frank Patakala.

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Hey, how's it going?

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Look at this.

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And the song?

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for having three extra guests we got

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through that very fast i was pushing we

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planned it that way we had a rehearsal

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yesterday did we yeah on the live run

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through this went just fine so um so

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on today's show we're going to discuss av

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network security and the lack of av

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network security

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But first, a little bit of housekeeping.

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So if you're listening to this as a

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recorded MP three, remember,

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we do stream live on Fridays at about

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three fifteen Eastern or twelve fifteen

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Pacific or whenever Larry remembers which

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authenticator app is his two factor to

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join the show.

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You can join us live for that on

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YouTube, LinkedIn, Twitter,

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where the packets are mostly clean.

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The opinions are barely filtered and the

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firewall is really more of a suggestion.

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If you can't join us live,

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please keep your connection persistent.

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You can follow the AV Super Friends on

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Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, and Blue Sky.

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You can share the show with your

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coworkers, your campus IT folks,

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your least secure vendor in that one

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department still using the same password

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for every computer.

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Spread the word like an unpatched

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vulnerability.

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We'd appreciate it.

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Of course,

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if you'd like to support the show,

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please consider donating.

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Your contributions help us to keep the

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signal strong, our nonsense encrypted,

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and the content flowing like suspicious

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traffic from an unknown foreign IP that

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somehow shows up every now and then.

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This spring, clean out your closets,

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rotate your credentials,

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and for the love of all that is

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holy, please do not cross the VLANs.

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And finally,

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while you're listening to us on YouTube,

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Spotify, Apple Podcasts,

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or any other platform you're getting this,

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please rate and review us.

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Your feedback helps us grow and reach more

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listeners.

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Thank you for your support.

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We couldn't do this without you.

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purely stolen all right um and now I'm

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going to shoehorn this in because for

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those of you who missed the last episode

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or sixty seconds of what you missed Jamie

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give me that other slate a full minute

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If you missed the last episode of AV

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Super Friends Off the Rails,

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we did the hard work of discussing AV

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cybersecurity, design drawings,

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and the uniquely infuriating art of campus

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departments buying random gear and

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creating disasters for everyone else to

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clean up.

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It was the exact kind of episode people

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claim they want more of right before they

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skip it.

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We discussed AV trust and the fact that

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maybe, just maybe,

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leaving things plugged into the network

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for fifteen to twenty years with telnet

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hanging out is not a flawless long-term

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strategy.

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Then we wandered into schematics, CAD,

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napkin sketches, one-off room designs,

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and the eternal question of where a real

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AV design actually starts, which, frankly,

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is more useful than ninety percent of the

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thought leadership floating around this

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industry.

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So, if you missed the last episode,

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congratulations.

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You passed up security problems,

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design arguments,

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and real-world AV pain in favor of

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whatever else you were doing,

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which was almost certainly less

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informative and somehow dumber.

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Go fix that.

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We'll wait.

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Who was that?

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Was that Al?

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That's Al.

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That was Al, yeah.

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He sounds different.

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All right.

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And now,

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because everyone's waited for it all week,

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Justin, you ready to sing along live?

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Do, do.

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Here we go.

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Do it.

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Do, do, do.

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Do, do, do, do, do, do.

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Do, do, do, do, do, do.

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Time for the news.

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So this week's article comes to us from

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Ed Surge,

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which I gave our guest panelists the

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better part of four seconds to read.

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But sorry about that.

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It happens.

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Planning.

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So basically,

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the article is about a program dealing

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with K- Twelve kids,

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but getting them kind of

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trained up in cybersecurity while they're

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in high school.

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So they kind of hit the job market

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ready to jump right in.

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It focuses on kind of what partnership

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with with AV industry or with IT industry

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manufacturers to try to get that so they

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get real world training,

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real world hands on,

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and basically sets these kids up for

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success right out of the gate.

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So those of you who did skim the

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article, thoughts,

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I think it's the right direction.

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Absolutely.

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I would love to see the content because

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I bet you it's probably not

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incredibly relevant but awareness precedes

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control it's something it's a step in the

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right direction that's my take the one

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thing i did like about what they were

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doing where they were partnering with

285
00:07:55,701 --> 00:07:58,281
employers to develop the content and it

286
00:07:58,302 --> 00:08:01,622
was constantly evolving because that's in

287
00:08:01,682 --> 00:08:03,343
my history of working with computer

288
00:08:03,403 --> 00:08:05,584
science students that's one of the

289
00:08:05,624 --> 00:08:06,944
complaints i always hear

290
00:08:07,964 --> 00:08:09,665
is they're being taught stuff that's no

291
00:08:09,685 --> 00:08:12,206
longer relevant in the real world the

292
00:08:12,266 --> 00:08:14,887
closer you can get that gap i feel

293
00:08:14,908 --> 00:08:17,389
like the the better off you are larry

294
00:08:17,408 --> 00:08:19,610
does that class use books because if it

295
00:08:19,649 --> 00:08:22,071
does it's probably behind stone tablets

296
00:08:22,110 --> 00:08:24,012
brother that's all we have abacus teaching

297
00:08:24,031 --> 00:08:28,814
portrait and still out there yeah hey i

298
00:08:28,874 --> 00:08:31,295
i like this idea too um especially in

299
00:08:31,355 --> 00:08:32,215
this kind of field

300
00:08:33,070 --> 00:08:33,791
I,

301
00:08:34,051 --> 00:08:35,452
being with coaching and having a bunch of

302
00:08:35,493 --> 00:08:36,693
high school kids and everything,

303
00:08:36,833 --> 00:08:37,875
I talk to kids a lot all the

304
00:08:37,914 --> 00:08:39,277
time and they're like, well, what do you,

305
00:08:39,336 --> 00:08:40,037
Hey, what's your next step?

306
00:08:40,057 --> 00:08:40,717
What are you going to do?

307
00:08:40,778 --> 00:08:41,739
Hey, I'm going to go to college.

308
00:08:41,759 --> 00:08:43,600
I'm going to study cybersecurity.

309
00:08:43,721 --> 00:08:44,142
Oh really?

310
00:08:44,201 --> 00:08:44,981
How'd you get into that?

311
00:08:45,123 --> 00:08:46,484
Well, I just heard it pays well.

312
00:08:47,847 --> 00:08:48,568
Hold on.

313
00:08:48,889 --> 00:08:49,668
They're not wrong.

314
00:08:49,990 --> 00:08:52,010
Well, it may not.

315
00:08:52,331 --> 00:08:53,971
Isn't that the number one incentive for

316
00:08:54,052 --> 00:08:54,533
everything?

317
00:08:54,952 --> 00:08:55,572
Well, it is.

318
00:08:56,033 --> 00:08:57,153
But I feel like, you know,

319
00:08:57,193 --> 00:08:59,014
sometimes we tailor that like, well,

320
00:08:59,034 --> 00:08:59,995
I'm going to be a doctor.

321
00:09:00,096 --> 00:09:00,636
No, I'm not.

322
00:09:00,777 --> 00:09:01,557
I hate biology.

323
00:09:01,616 --> 00:09:01,817
Right.

324
00:09:02,378 --> 00:09:03,597
You know that by the end of high

325
00:09:03,639 --> 00:09:05,899
school that you're not doctor material.

326
00:09:05,940 --> 00:09:07,041
You're not whatever it is.

327
00:09:07,140 --> 00:09:08,481
But you can be a doctor in a

328
00:09:08,522 --> 00:09:09,341
lot of different things, though.

329
00:09:09,361 --> 00:09:10,523
I don't know.

330
00:09:10,923 --> 00:09:13,644
I think in this I like this because

331
00:09:13,705 --> 00:09:14,566
it is kind of that.

332
00:09:15,726 --> 00:09:19,327
um that merger like trade schools but it's

333
00:09:19,368 --> 00:09:22,729
very it's tactical yes and and set these

334
00:09:22,749 --> 00:09:24,710
kids up to on the right pathway now

335
00:09:25,110 --> 00:09:27,210
to you guys's point usually the content's

336
00:09:27,230 --> 00:09:29,230
a little behind but that's fine i mean

337
00:09:29,250 --> 00:09:30,750
they'll catch up as they go it's more

338
00:09:30,770 --> 00:09:31,871
of the exposure it's the awareness

339
00:09:33,251 --> 00:09:34,972
I think the exposure is the important part

340
00:09:35,013 --> 00:09:35,653
because there's a lot,

341
00:09:36,592 --> 00:09:38,634
there's a certain level of risk that you

342
00:09:38,653 --> 00:09:40,433
have to be comfortable with to work in

343
00:09:40,494 --> 00:09:41,995
cybersecurity.

344
00:09:42,514 --> 00:09:43,274
And I, for one,

345
00:09:43,315 --> 00:09:44,456
am not comfortable with that.

346
00:09:44,475 --> 00:09:44,916
So like.

347
00:09:45,076 --> 00:09:46,336
Well, you have insurance for that.

348
00:09:46,515 --> 00:09:47,076
You're fine.

349
00:09:47,116 --> 00:09:48,476
It's like you make a mistake,

350
00:09:48,496 --> 00:09:48,996
you're covered.

351
00:09:49,277 --> 00:09:51,658
I have been places where the network has

352
00:09:51,738 --> 00:09:52,898
been compromised.

353
00:09:53,619 --> 00:09:55,719
Insurance does not keep your job.

354
00:09:56,139 --> 00:09:57,460
Cybersecurity insurance.

355
00:09:57,480 --> 00:09:59,941
So out of curiosity, you know,

356
00:10:01,282 --> 00:10:03,429
As you were teenagers learning technology,

357
00:10:03,971 --> 00:10:05,417
you were the ones testing the boundaries

358
00:10:05,456 --> 00:10:06,200
anyway, right?

359
00:10:07,331 --> 00:10:08,731
I mean, I guess.

360
00:10:08,751 --> 00:10:09,932
I mean, we got three experts on here.

361
00:10:09,993 --> 00:10:11,472
I'm pretty sure that you guys were,

362
00:10:11,493 --> 00:10:14,413
I might've been the guy putting the blue

363
00:10:14,453 --> 00:10:16,254
screen of death as the screensaver on all

364
00:10:16,274 --> 00:10:17,575
the lab computers so that we didn't have

365
00:10:17,595 --> 00:10:19,696
to have class because the teacher didn't

366
00:10:19,716 --> 00:10:21,196
know how to do it, right?

367
00:10:21,255 --> 00:10:22,395
That might've been this guy.

368
00:10:23,057 --> 00:10:24,256
So maybe this is right up some of

369
00:10:24,277 --> 00:10:25,096
these kids' alleys.

370
00:10:25,136 --> 00:10:26,398
Like if they're playing around here

371
00:10:26,457 --> 00:10:27,317
anyway, maybe.

372
00:10:27,518 --> 00:10:27,597
Yeah,

373
00:10:27,618 --> 00:10:30,019
you give them something that's practical

374
00:10:30,119 --> 00:10:31,418
that they can kind of use that

375
00:10:31,438 --> 00:10:33,659
discretionary energy on versus using it

376
00:10:33,679 --> 00:10:33,820
for,

377
00:10:36,279 --> 00:10:39,541
now teaching them how to be malicious but

378
00:10:39,561 --> 00:10:41,121
there's also two but there's also that

379
00:10:41,182 --> 00:10:43,422
element of like danger just like you

380
00:10:43,481 --> 00:10:45,121
mentioned right they're like oh this this

381
00:10:45,201 --> 00:10:46,442
is working with like a bit of that

382
00:10:46,503 --> 00:10:48,283
dark side so there there may be a

383
00:10:48,342 --> 00:10:50,104
natural kind of leaning element is to know

384
00:10:50,124 --> 00:10:53,163
what is their curiosity because this can

385
00:10:53,203 --> 00:10:55,605
be this can go in a different direction

386
00:10:55,644 --> 00:10:57,105
right i think there's there is some

387
00:10:57,144 --> 00:10:58,424
element of that maybe it's a different

388
00:10:58,466 --> 00:11:00,225
crowd than our traditional i.t

389
00:11:00,605 --> 00:11:01,505
I don't know.

390
00:11:01,566 --> 00:11:03,226
I think it's good to expose more kids

391
00:11:03,267 --> 00:11:05,187
to potentially this avenue.

392
00:11:05,206 --> 00:11:08,268
And it also don't think cybersecurity is

393
00:11:08,327 --> 00:11:11,808
necessarily like a singular thing, right?

394
00:11:12,068 --> 00:11:13,589
There's a lot of overlap and you can

395
00:11:14,208 --> 00:11:15,729
it's I guess one of those things that's

396
00:11:15,749 --> 00:11:17,309
very cross-functional.

397
00:11:17,330 --> 00:11:19,070
You can take the cybersecurity skills and

398
00:11:19,110 --> 00:11:20,149
apply it almost anywhere.

399
00:11:20,169 --> 00:11:20,330
I mean,

400
00:11:20,389 --> 00:11:22,171
here we are talking about security.

401
00:11:22,791 --> 00:11:24,111
Most of us know each other from our

402
00:11:24,231 --> 00:11:26,874
AV backgrounds and our IT chops.

403
00:11:26,894 --> 00:11:27,494
And here we are,

404
00:11:27,514 --> 00:11:29,096
we're moving into cybersecurity.

405
00:11:29,115 --> 00:11:31,116
The fact that it is essentially a part

406
00:11:31,157 --> 00:11:32,298
of our conversation today.

407
00:11:32,317 --> 00:11:35,360
So I think it's great that schools are

408
00:11:35,399 --> 00:11:36,301
investing in that.

409
00:11:36,441 --> 00:11:39,163
And I don't think any educational program

410
00:11:39,182 --> 00:11:41,543
will ever equip you to do a job.

411
00:11:41,563 --> 00:11:42,384
I mean, to be honest,

412
00:11:42,404 --> 00:11:43,765
because it doesn't give you,

413
00:11:44,046 --> 00:11:46,268
it gives you the skills to learn, right?

414
00:11:46,288 --> 00:11:47,589
It teaches you how to learn.

415
00:11:48,168 --> 00:11:49,950
And when they go into their first jobs,

416
00:11:50,009 --> 00:11:51,030
I think what they've learned,

417
00:11:51,071 --> 00:11:51,731
they'll be able to

418
00:11:52,371 --> 00:11:54,153
probably apply it somewhere and just grow

419
00:11:54,173 --> 00:11:56,833
with it it and cyber security so it's

420
00:11:56,874 --> 00:11:59,674
so it's volatile it's dynamic it's

421
00:11:59,715 --> 00:12:01,255
changing all the time there's no way you

422
00:12:01,275 --> 00:12:02,535
can keep up so you got to be

423
00:12:02,556 --> 00:12:04,557
in a job to get the bleeding edge

424
00:12:04,576 --> 00:12:06,937
thing so if nothing else it's about giving

425
00:12:06,957 --> 00:12:08,578
the exposure like do you want to learn

426
00:12:08,619 --> 00:12:10,779
something new every single day then this

427
00:12:10,820 --> 00:12:13,039
is a path for you exactly yeah yeah

428
00:12:13,059 --> 00:12:14,140
and i think that's that's the thing that

429
00:12:14,160 --> 00:12:15,562
struck me about this is that uh i

430
00:12:15,581 --> 00:12:17,522
don't know there's two things that kind of

431
00:12:17,542 --> 00:12:19,562
struck me about one is it almost feels

432
00:12:19,582 --> 00:12:21,203
a little bit like the uh

433
00:12:21,840 --> 00:12:23,302
know the after-school programs where

434
00:12:23,322 --> 00:12:25,163
you're like hey come play basketball

435
00:12:25,183 --> 00:12:27,846
instead of doing something else like they

436
00:12:27,866 --> 00:12:29,688
found the kids that are you know because

437
00:12:29,708 --> 00:12:31,650
we talk about money as a motivator you

438
00:12:31,671 --> 00:12:34,193
know what pays really well too ransomware

439
00:12:34,333 --> 00:12:39,720
pays real good that is a huge industry

440
00:12:39,820 --> 00:12:42,562
and if you're glad that's not offered in

441
00:12:42,623 --> 00:12:43,083
our school

442
00:12:43,744 --> 00:12:45,785
Right, but it's offered online.

443
00:12:47,025 --> 00:12:48,586
The other thing that I like about it,

444
00:12:48,626 --> 00:12:50,107
as I said, credentials matter.

445
00:12:51,129 --> 00:12:52,649
They only tell part of the story.

446
00:12:52,730 --> 00:12:54,350
And I like that because it sounds like

447
00:12:54,370 --> 00:12:56,152
this program is giving people, it's like,

448
00:12:56,172 --> 00:12:56,451
yeah,

449
00:12:56,673 --> 00:12:59,254
you can go get a CISSP or Security

450
00:12:59,293 --> 00:13:00,174
Plus or whatever.

451
00:13:00,235 --> 00:13:01,456
You can get those certifications.

452
00:13:01,475 --> 00:13:04,518
But unless you've actually sat down and

453
00:13:04,638 --> 00:13:06,479
dealt with this, that's an issue.

454
00:13:06,599 --> 00:13:07,639
And I'm hoping that...

455
00:13:08,581 --> 00:13:10,741
This gives them a couple years of

456
00:13:10,802 --> 00:13:12,443
experience because the thing that we found

457
00:13:13,364 --> 00:13:15,144
is that like every tech industry,

458
00:13:15,806 --> 00:13:18,668
there are about fifty percent too many

459
00:13:18,908 --> 00:13:21,068
entry level people for entry level jobs

460
00:13:22,009 --> 00:13:26,793
and about ninety percent too few for any

461
00:13:26,832 --> 00:13:27,594
level above that.

462
00:13:27,614 --> 00:13:29,495
Like if you can break through that three

463
00:13:29,534 --> 00:13:30,414
year barrier,

464
00:13:31,056 --> 00:13:32,636
suddenly you just have jobs aplenty.

465
00:13:32,657 --> 00:13:34,238
And so if they can kind of get

466
00:13:34,258 --> 00:13:35,379
them to do that little hop

467
00:13:36,099 --> 00:13:38,480
out of that entry level piece,

468
00:13:38,600 --> 00:13:41,663
that is a valuable, that's valuable.

469
00:13:41,743 --> 00:13:43,683
And I think that that's the issue with

470
00:13:43,803 --> 00:13:45,245
with what we're dealing with in the

471
00:13:45,284 --> 00:13:46,546
industry is that we have to figure out

472
00:13:46,566 --> 00:13:47,726
how to get people past entry level

473
00:13:47,746 --> 00:13:48,447
because, yeah,

474
00:13:48,466 --> 00:13:49,347
you're going to get burned out and

475
00:13:49,528 --> 00:13:51,948
disappointed and frustrated because no one

476
00:13:51,989 --> 00:13:52,570
wants to hire you.

477
00:13:52,590 --> 00:13:53,549
And we talk to people, you know,

478
00:13:53,809 --> 00:13:54,490
AV in general,

479
00:13:54,510 --> 00:13:55,511
it's like we talk to people all the

480
00:13:55,532 --> 00:13:56,672
time that they're trying to get their

481
00:13:56,711 --> 00:13:57,592
first AV job

482
00:13:58,779 --> 00:14:00,561
And even though there's this huge need,

483
00:14:00,640 --> 00:14:02,741
everyone wants an installer who already

484
00:14:02,782 --> 00:14:04,003
knows something.

485
00:14:04,102 --> 00:14:05,543
They don't have to reinvent and rebuild.

486
00:14:06,043 --> 00:14:08,005
I think just any level of experience is

487
00:14:08,025 --> 00:14:08,605
good experience.

488
00:14:08,966 --> 00:14:09,105
Right.

489
00:14:09,145 --> 00:14:12,028
And so getting people curious and not

490
00:14:12,087 --> 00:14:14,149
making it seem like the first thing you

491
00:14:14,188 --> 00:14:16,029
need for success is to go past this

492
00:14:16,270 --> 00:14:17,831
massive exam somewhere.

493
00:14:18,011 --> 00:14:18,211
Right.

494
00:14:18,231 --> 00:14:18,611
Like that's,

495
00:14:18,652 --> 00:14:20,192
that's not going to get a workforce that's

496
00:14:20,232 --> 00:14:20,633
ready to go.

497
00:14:20,692 --> 00:14:22,975
So show them a path to immediate placement

498
00:14:22,995 --> 00:14:23,294
and get,

499
00:14:23,634 --> 00:14:26,596
get them moving as fast as possible.

500
00:14:26,697 --> 00:14:26,777
Yep.

501
00:14:28,609 --> 00:14:29,309
I also like,

502
00:14:29,389 --> 00:14:31,032
I like the premise at least of giving

503
00:14:31,072 --> 00:14:32,874
people exposure to cybersecurity without

504
00:14:32,933 --> 00:14:34,975
the stress, right?

505
00:14:35,015 --> 00:14:36,238
Like teaching people about it as a

506
00:14:36,278 --> 00:14:37,960
discipline and like being able to learn

507
00:14:37,980 --> 00:14:38,559
some of the skills,

508
00:14:38,600 --> 00:14:41,243
but not immediately be also, you know,

509
00:14:41,423 --> 00:14:42,945
stressed out all the time about securing

510
00:14:43,004 --> 00:14:44,726
an environment that's your responsibility

511
00:14:44,746 --> 00:14:45,248
to take care of.

512
00:14:46,269 --> 00:14:47,090
I think that's a good way to kind

513
00:14:47,110 --> 00:14:48,389
of ease people into it a little bit

514
00:14:48,750 --> 00:14:50,312
because some of that anxiety sometimes

515
00:14:50,331 --> 00:14:51,873
comes from lack of education.

516
00:14:52,393 --> 00:14:53,553
So having the knowledge and then being

517
00:14:53,594 --> 00:14:54,955
able to kind of deal with the real

518
00:14:54,975 --> 00:14:57,035
world problems afterwards,

519
00:14:57,216 --> 00:14:58,797
it feels like it's the right order.

520
00:14:59,417 --> 00:15:01,057
So I hope that works out.

521
00:15:01,138 --> 00:15:01,879
I think that'd be really cool.

522
00:15:04,041 --> 00:15:04,581
Or if nothing else,

523
00:15:04,621 --> 00:15:06,982
this is going to generate an entire cadre

524
00:15:07,023 --> 00:15:09,923
of awesome hackers who just start getting

525
00:15:09,943 --> 00:15:10,984
into all our systems.

526
00:15:11,985 --> 00:15:14,024
Which will then in turn create another

527
00:15:14,085 --> 00:15:16,605
training profile for more.

528
00:15:16,725 --> 00:15:17,886
It's the cycle of life.

529
00:15:18,647 --> 00:15:18,886
Yeah,

530
00:15:18,907 --> 00:15:20,408
the AV equipment will be first on their

531
00:15:20,467 --> 00:15:20,927
list.

532
00:15:20,967 --> 00:15:25,370
It's the easiest.

533
00:15:25,389 --> 00:15:28,150
This certificate expired ten years ago.

534
00:15:28,451 --> 00:15:29,311
Speaking of,

535
00:15:29,350 --> 00:15:30,711
isn't that what we're talking about today?

536
00:15:31,948 --> 00:15:34,052
We are, but first... Just wait a minute.

537
00:15:34,072 --> 00:15:35,232
We've got to pay some bills.

538
00:15:35,472 --> 00:15:36,774
We're going to take a quick break.

539
00:15:37,535 --> 00:15:39,097
Jamie's going to go find that other thing,

540
00:15:39,217 --> 00:15:40,239
and then we'll come back and we're going

541
00:15:40,259 --> 00:15:42,201
to talk with Doug and Frank and Colin

542
00:15:42,241 --> 00:15:44,625
about how we can fix this mess.

543
00:15:44,884 --> 00:15:45,586
Hopefully.

544
00:15:45,625 --> 00:15:46,046
Possibly.

545
00:15:46,307 --> 00:15:47,368
It's like a thirty-year plan.

546
00:15:47,528 --> 00:15:47,908
We're good.

547
00:15:48,369 --> 00:15:49,129
Yeah.

548
00:15:49,190 --> 00:15:49,490
Fifty.

549
00:15:50,071 --> 00:15:50,392
Fifty years.

550
00:15:50,412 --> 00:15:51,153
Do it.

551
00:15:51,273 --> 00:15:51,432
Alright.

552
00:15:53,442 --> 00:15:55,163
The AV Superfriends are supported by

553
00:15:55,222 --> 00:15:56,004
Computer Comforts,

554
00:15:56,144 --> 00:15:57,544
and they've got a brand new product

555
00:15:57,585 --> 00:15:58,144
hitting the lineup.

556
00:15:58,446 --> 00:15:58,946
Last year,

557
00:15:59,005 --> 00:16:01,067
CCI's Evolve lectern was a big hit,

558
00:16:01,408 --> 00:16:03,168
a push-button power table combined with a

559
00:16:03,328 --> 00:16:04,710
super flexible AV cabinet.

560
00:16:05,070 --> 00:16:05,850
But let's be honest,

561
00:16:06,150 --> 00:16:07,871
not every room needs twenty-four units of

562
00:16:07,932 --> 00:16:08,493
rack space.

563
00:16:08,852 --> 00:16:09,852
Shocking, I know.

564
00:16:10,394 --> 00:16:12,235
And that's where the new AV Hub comes

565
00:16:12,315 --> 00:16:12,414
in.

566
00:16:12,615 --> 00:16:13,176
It's a lighter,

567
00:16:13,336 --> 00:16:15,157
more space-efficient solution for

568
00:16:15,197 --> 00:16:16,878
classrooms that still need real AV

569
00:16:16,918 --> 00:16:17,458
infrastructure.

570
00:16:17,839 --> 00:16:19,458
you get eight units of rack space and

571
00:16:19,479 --> 00:16:20,960
the whole thing sits only about ten inches

572
00:16:21,019 --> 00:16:22,580
off the wall which makes it a great

573
00:16:22,620 --> 00:16:23,600
fit when you're pairing it with a

574
00:16:23,679 --> 00:16:25,380
sit-stand power table instead of building

575
00:16:25,421 --> 00:16:27,260
a massive lectern footprint into the room

576
00:16:27,780 --> 00:16:29,721
and this wasn't designed in isolation the

577
00:16:29,861 --> 00:16:31,662
av hub was developed in collaboration with

578
00:16:31,701 --> 00:16:33,582
texas state university so it's built

579
00:16:33,602 --> 00:16:35,623
around real higher ed classrooms and real

580
00:16:35,643 --> 00:16:37,543
deployment needs and that means fewer

581
00:16:37,563 --> 00:16:40,004
compromises cleaner installs and way less

582
00:16:40,264 --> 00:16:41,624
why is this furniture the size of a

583
00:16:41,663 --> 00:16:43,625
refrigerator if you want to see photos

584
00:16:43,804 --> 00:16:43,965
spec

585
00:16:44,466 --> 00:16:45,226
and all the details,

586
00:16:45,567 --> 00:16:47,610
head over to computercomforts.com slash

587
00:16:47,769 --> 00:16:48,792
av-hub.

588
00:16:49,091 --> 00:16:50,715
That's the new AV Hub from Computer

589
00:16:50,754 --> 00:16:51,134
Comforts.

590
00:16:51,655 --> 00:16:53,138
Purpose built, space efficient,

591
00:16:53,278 --> 00:16:54,921
and designed for how classrooms actually

592
00:16:54,961 --> 00:16:55,181
work.

593
00:16:55,520 --> 00:16:57,004
And thanks again to Computer Comforts for

594
00:16:57,043 --> 00:16:58,466
supporting the AV Super Friends.

595
00:17:02,773 --> 00:17:04,193
All righty.

596
00:17:04,233 --> 00:17:05,673
Security, big stuff.

597
00:17:06,193 --> 00:17:09,536
Lots of good things with no actual plan

598
00:17:10,155 --> 00:17:11,656
and no provisions, no capability.

599
00:17:11,676 --> 00:17:12,477
Well, good show, guys.

600
00:17:12,497 --> 00:17:13,057
Good show, yeah.

601
00:17:13,257 --> 00:17:15,018
So who are these gentlemen on this show

602
00:17:15,038 --> 00:17:16,419
with us, Chris?

603
00:17:16,439 --> 00:17:17,519
Three people right up here.

604
00:17:17,558 --> 00:17:19,019
So Colin, Doug, and Frank.

605
00:17:19,640 --> 00:17:21,641
We teased this three weeks ago,

606
00:17:21,661 --> 00:17:22,101
two weeks ago,

607
00:17:23,061 --> 00:17:25,342
about the announcement about AV Trust.

608
00:17:25,462 --> 00:17:27,163
And you guys came a couple weeks ago.

609
00:17:27,182 --> 00:17:30,023
You announced the AV Trust as a nonprofit

610
00:17:30,044 --> 00:17:30,505
to kind of,

611
00:17:31,837 --> 00:17:33,397
get the industry moving forward to at

612
00:17:33,417 --> 00:17:34,419
least, hey,

613
00:17:34,439 --> 00:17:35,338
you guys don't need to be pointing in

614
00:17:35,358 --> 00:17:37,940
the same direction about securing your

615
00:17:37,980 --> 00:17:39,339
stuff because we want all the stuff on

616
00:17:39,359 --> 00:17:39,759
the network.

617
00:17:39,799 --> 00:17:41,099
We want our single panes of glass.

618
00:17:41,119 --> 00:17:42,080
We want all the monitoring.

619
00:17:42,641 --> 00:17:44,141
I'm just plugging a cable into the wall

620
00:17:44,221 --> 00:17:45,020
and walking away.

621
00:17:45,141 --> 00:17:46,602
And let's be honest,

622
00:17:46,922 --> 00:17:48,582
I don't have any plans to touch, replace,

623
00:17:48,662 --> 00:17:49,102
maintain,

624
00:17:49,163 --> 00:17:50,682
or configure that device for fifteen

625
00:17:50,702 --> 00:17:50,982
years,

626
00:17:51,762 --> 00:17:53,304
which is not a good place to be.

627
00:17:53,364 --> 00:17:55,203
So I'm kind of curious.

628
00:17:55,864 --> 00:17:56,523
Let me finish.

629
00:18:00,125 --> 00:18:02,307
So, yeah, I'll throw it to you guys.

630
00:18:02,326 --> 00:18:03,748
Why don't you give us a quick overview

631
00:18:03,788 --> 00:18:04,347
of AV Trust,

632
00:18:04,367 --> 00:18:05,268
kind of how it came to be and

633
00:18:05,288 --> 00:18:05,909
kind of your plan.

634
00:18:05,929 --> 00:18:07,410
And then we've got a whole list of

635
00:18:07,450 --> 00:18:08,369
topics, except for Justin,

636
00:18:08,390 --> 00:18:09,211
who couldn't wait.

637
00:18:09,250 --> 00:18:09,931
Justin, what?

638
00:18:11,211 --> 00:18:13,373
No, I was just making comments.

639
00:18:13,413 --> 00:18:14,192
He's excited.

640
00:18:14,432 --> 00:18:14,833
Grunting noises.

641
00:18:14,854 --> 00:18:15,294
He's excited.

642
00:18:15,314 --> 00:18:15,513
Yeah.

643
00:18:16,708 --> 00:18:18,228
I'm thrilled that you already talked about

644
00:18:18,268 --> 00:18:18,347
us.

645
00:18:19,068 --> 00:18:21,888
That's pretty exciting.

646
00:18:21,949 --> 00:18:22,429
I think we can.

647
00:18:22,509 --> 00:18:23,970
When you guys dropped the press release,

648
00:18:24,569 --> 00:18:26,430
I think all of us went to our

649
00:18:26,470 --> 00:18:27,010
back channel.

650
00:18:27,030 --> 00:18:28,671
We're like, holy cow, what is this?

651
00:18:29,191 --> 00:18:30,510
We actually know these guys,

652
00:18:30,652 --> 00:18:31,892
and they're talking about things that are

653
00:18:31,912 --> 00:18:34,332
important.

654
00:18:34,352 --> 00:18:36,073
So we thought, hey, it's good show fodder.

655
00:18:36,093 --> 00:18:38,173
Let's bring them on because we've said it

656
00:18:38,212 --> 00:18:40,574
all individually, but we're not experts.

657
00:18:41,967 --> 00:18:43,347
I mean, I guess my first question is,

658
00:18:43,387 --> 00:18:45,269
you all realize how big this mountain is

659
00:18:45,288 --> 00:18:46,009
to climb, right?

660
00:18:46,308 --> 00:18:47,750
I mean, I'm pretty sure you know.

661
00:18:47,890 --> 00:18:49,270
Ain't no mountain high enough.

662
00:18:49,931 --> 00:18:51,912
So how, yeah, you probably recognize that.

663
00:18:51,971 --> 00:18:53,472
How did you get this started?

664
00:18:53,573 --> 00:18:54,453
Why are we doing,

665
00:18:54,574 --> 00:18:55,513
why are you doing this?

666
00:18:55,554 --> 00:18:56,335
Not we, you.

667
00:18:56,414 --> 00:18:57,134
You're doing the hard work.

668
00:18:59,461 --> 00:19:00,061
I got phished.

669
00:19:00,201 --> 00:19:05,326
I had no idea what I was saying.

670
00:19:08,950 --> 00:19:11,231
This has been bothering me for a while.

671
00:19:11,271 --> 00:19:13,473
Security as a topic has been frustrating.

672
00:19:13,493 --> 00:19:14,894
And like anything in the industry,

673
00:19:15,375 --> 00:19:21,560
I think if you want to find a

674
00:19:21,621 --> 00:19:22,061
solution,

675
00:19:22,082 --> 00:19:23,021
you kind of have to start doing it

676
00:19:23,041 --> 00:19:23,343
yourself.

677
00:19:23,903 --> 00:19:25,044
we've talked in the past about like

678
00:19:25,064 --> 00:19:27,205
creating communities and spaces and you

679
00:19:27,226 --> 00:19:28,465
know places where we can have honest

680
00:19:28,506 --> 00:19:30,127
conversation and this is another space

681
00:19:30,167 --> 00:19:32,348
that i think at the core is about

682
00:19:32,588 --> 00:19:35,171
honest conversation because this

683
00:19:35,431 --> 00:19:38,173
potentially involves a lot of negativity

684
00:19:38,554 --> 00:19:41,675
and i tested the waters last infocomm by

685
00:19:41,715 --> 00:19:43,797
talking to a whole bunch of manufacturers

686
00:19:43,836 --> 00:19:44,317
it's like hey

687
00:19:46,201 --> 00:19:48,722
We, you know, do you do security?

688
00:19:48,762 --> 00:19:49,763
And they're like, yeah, very secure.

689
00:19:49,784 --> 00:19:50,704
And it's like, cool.

690
00:19:52,826 --> 00:19:54,448
That's not true.

691
00:19:54,528 --> 00:19:55,669
No, it's not true.

692
00:19:55,950 --> 00:19:56,410
Right.

693
00:19:56,430 --> 00:19:56,809
It's like, well,

694
00:19:56,829 --> 00:19:59,211
you donate some gear for a hackathon.

695
00:19:59,291 --> 00:20:01,233
And they're like, no.

696
00:20:01,493 --> 00:20:03,155
We don't need that kind of publicity.

697
00:20:04,237 --> 00:20:05,397
Colin, they're already secure.

698
00:20:05,417 --> 00:20:06,618
They don't need you to be messing with

699
00:20:06,659 --> 00:20:06,759
it.

700
00:20:06,959 --> 00:20:07,398
It's secure.

701
00:20:07,459 --> 00:20:07,920
Right.

702
00:20:08,619 --> 00:20:09,800
You can't stop me,

703
00:20:09,961 --> 00:20:12,041
but I'd love for you to participate.

704
00:20:12,981 --> 00:20:14,343
After scaring everyone,

705
00:20:14,663 --> 00:20:17,884
I had some conversations with Doug and

706
00:20:17,983 --> 00:20:19,045
with a few other folks,

707
00:20:19,224 --> 00:20:20,184
and we talked about,

708
00:20:21,766 --> 00:20:22,866
how do we make this a reality?

709
00:20:22,886 --> 00:20:24,406
One of the big gaps that Doug brought

710
00:20:24,507 --> 00:20:25,788
up that I thought was really important is

711
00:20:25,807 --> 00:20:27,929
that there's no secretariat council for

712
00:20:28,548 --> 00:20:29,049
what we do.

713
00:20:29,789 --> 00:20:33,451
There has been a history of researchers

714
00:20:33,471 --> 00:20:35,192
finding vulnerabilities, reaching out,

715
00:20:35,231 --> 00:20:36,232
and then getting threatened.

716
00:20:37,411 --> 00:20:39,192
That was number one on our list to

717
00:20:39,212 --> 00:20:39,712
say, hey,

718
00:20:39,772 --> 00:20:42,655
we'll create a buffer of communication,

719
00:20:42,816 --> 00:20:43,676
a legal buffer,

720
00:20:44,257 --> 00:20:46,999
and allow a safe way for research to

721
00:20:47,038 --> 00:20:47,819
interface with us.

722
00:20:47,839 --> 00:20:50,602
Because if we start exposing the industry

723
00:20:50,702 --> 00:20:54,566
to more of the broader security community,

724
00:20:55,026 --> 00:20:56,626
they're going to get curious and they're

725
00:20:56,647 --> 00:20:58,009
going to start poking on stuff and they're

726
00:20:58,028 --> 00:21:00,029
going to find out some information.

727
00:21:00,790 --> 00:21:03,212
We put the brakes on going straight to

728
00:21:03,492 --> 00:21:04,054
hackathon,

729
00:21:05,075 --> 00:21:07,416
And Doug said, let's start a nonprofit.

730
00:21:09,179 --> 00:21:10,921
So we are the founding board of the

731
00:21:10,961 --> 00:21:11,480
nonprofit.

732
00:21:11,601 --> 00:21:13,063
I am the vice president and treasurer.

733
00:21:13,583 --> 00:21:14,403
Doug is the president.

734
00:21:14,805 --> 00:21:15,925
Frank is the secretary.

735
00:21:16,445 --> 00:21:17,627
And so that's sort of how this was

736
00:21:17,667 --> 00:21:18,307
born is like, well,

737
00:21:18,327 --> 00:21:20,810
we need some way to funnel people into

738
00:21:21,111 --> 00:21:21,511
something.

739
00:21:21,991 --> 00:21:24,093
You know, we're still figuring this out.

740
00:21:24,373 --> 00:21:28,175
I think we have some good plans and

741
00:21:28,215 --> 00:21:29,817
we have some good people joining in.

742
00:21:29,856 --> 00:21:31,137
But this really needs to be a

743
00:21:31,198 --> 00:21:32,657
collaborative effort or it's not going to

744
00:21:32,738 --> 00:21:33,019
work.

745
00:21:33,058 --> 00:21:34,358
And so, you know, thankfully,

746
00:21:34,378 --> 00:21:35,059
with that press release,

747
00:21:35,079 --> 00:21:36,780
we've gotten a lot of manufacturers

748
00:21:36,800 --> 00:21:37,580
reaching out to us.

749
00:21:37,621 --> 00:21:39,702
We've had a lot of individuals reaching

750
00:21:39,782 --> 00:21:41,163
out saying, Oh, finally,

751
00:21:41,223 --> 00:21:42,564
someone doing this.

752
00:21:43,184 --> 00:21:44,605
We're still I'm still working.

753
00:21:44,625 --> 00:21:47,527
There's a few key security folks I'd

754
00:21:47,547 --> 00:21:49,087
really like to be involved who are like

755
00:21:49,188 --> 00:21:50,048
hardcore

756
00:21:50,828 --> 00:21:52,890
IoT security researchers that we would

757
00:21:52,930 --> 00:21:54,530
like to have on board.

758
00:21:54,590 --> 00:21:56,132
I think that's the direction.

759
00:21:56,172 --> 00:21:58,073
It's like there's a multi-pronged way to

760
00:21:58,133 --> 00:21:58,772
deal with this.

761
00:21:59,314 --> 00:22:00,534
I think our first push right now is

762
00:22:00,594 --> 00:22:02,015
education.

763
00:22:02,154 --> 00:22:05,017
I think we were talking to a manufacturer.

764
00:22:05,037 --> 00:22:05,676
I was like, yeah,

765
00:22:05,737 --> 00:22:07,557
I don't want to be the person that

766
00:22:07,577 --> 00:22:09,199
comes in and starts flipping tables and

767
00:22:09,239 --> 00:22:10,199
slapping people saying,

768
00:22:10,239 --> 00:22:10,920
what's wrong with you?

769
00:22:11,759 --> 00:22:16,701
Because I think most people know people

770
00:22:16,740 --> 00:22:20,182
don't think about it like if I'm and

771
00:22:20,221 --> 00:22:21,541
I'm told to plug that thing in I

772
00:22:21,561 --> 00:22:23,603
plug it in I turn it on and

773
00:22:23,663 --> 00:22:26,262
I leave and I'm not gonna like it's

774
00:22:26,303 --> 00:22:28,604
not gonna be Beneficial or productive to

775
00:22:28,644 --> 00:22:30,304
be mad at everyone right off the gate.

776
00:22:30,663 --> 00:22:31,864
I think after a while we have to

777
00:22:31,903 --> 00:22:34,045
go Hey What are we doing here?

778
00:22:35,351 --> 00:22:36,471
We've talked about this.

779
00:22:36,633 --> 00:22:37,272
Are you serious?

780
00:22:37,292 --> 00:22:38,193
We're still doing this.

781
00:22:39,214 --> 00:22:40,316
But I think right now it's like, okay,

782
00:22:40,476 --> 00:22:42,057
now we have a platform to start saying

783
00:22:42,097 --> 00:22:42,657
that, to start saying,

784
00:22:43,118 --> 00:22:44,000
these are standards.

785
00:22:44,380 --> 00:22:46,301
You must meet these minimum standards or

786
00:22:46,923 --> 00:22:48,784
it doesn't work for us as an industry.

787
00:22:48,864 --> 00:22:49,986
It exposes us to risk.

788
00:22:50,871 --> 00:22:52,171
It exposes customers at risk.

789
00:22:52,250 --> 00:22:53,372
It makes everyone upset.

790
00:22:53,731 --> 00:22:54,471
You gotta stop.

791
00:22:54,791 --> 00:22:57,492
So that's where we're at.

792
00:22:57,573 --> 00:22:58,373
It's really simple.

793
00:22:58,472 --> 00:22:58,732
I mean,

794
00:22:59,472 --> 00:23:01,913
either we could do it or somebody else

795
00:23:01,933 --> 00:23:05,295
could expose us and hold us responsible

796
00:23:05,355 --> 00:23:05,714
for it.

797
00:23:06,355 --> 00:23:06,615
I mean,

798
00:23:06,674 --> 00:23:08,756
the options are pretty much pretty simple

799
00:23:08,796 --> 00:23:09,175
right there.

800
00:23:09,816 --> 00:23:12,419
And I think all of us, Colin,

801
00:23:12,459 --> 00:23:13,239
Doug and myself,

802
00:23:13,579 --> 00:23:14,921
I've spent a better part of my career

803
00:23:14,961 --> 00:23:16,461
just talking about security.

804
00:23:16,502 --> 00:23:18,203
My background is in cybersecurity.

805
00:23:18,744 --> 00:23:22,107
I use that cybersecurity knowledge to be

806
00:23:22,468 --> 00:23:23,990
useful in my job every day.

807
00:23:24,109 --> 00:23:24,309
I mean,

808
00:23:24,329 --> 00:23:25,851
so that's that's kind of been my niche.

809
00:23:26,392 --> 00:23:27,913
And when this came along,

810
00:23:28,453 --> 00:23:29,255
I was like all in.

811
00:23:29,355 --> 00:23:30,496
And the reason is like

812
00:23:30,996 --> 00:23:32,576
Education is very important.

813
00:23:32,936 --> 00:23:33,557
But I also,

814
00:23:33,978 --> 00:23:35,598
I want to start this off by saying

815
00:23:36,679 --> 00:23:38,000
we're not the doom and gloom people,

816
00:23:38,019 --> 00:23:38,440
right?

817
00:23:38,660 --> 00:23:41,040
Security never has to be painful.

818
00:23:41,121 --> 00:23:42,602
It doesn't have to be challenging.

819
00:23:42,902 --> 00:23:43,942
There's a better way to do it.

820
00:23:44,063 --> 00:23:46,463
And the reason why anything is challenging

821
00:23:47,184 --> 00:23:50,185
is a lack of awareness and most

822
00:23:50,226 --> 00:23:50,606
importantly,

823
00:23:50,686 --> 00:23:53,067
lack of the language and how to speak

824
00:23:53,147 --> 00:23:55,088
it and how to communicate security.

825
00:23:55,669 --> 00:23:56,730
The fact of the matter is

826
00:23:57,410 --> 00:23:58,791
I feel AV has come a long way.

827
00:23:58,912 --> 00:23:59,071
I mean,

828
00:23:59,092 --> 00:24:00,313
there's a lot of people who are doing

829
00:24:00,373 --> 00:24:01,453
security practices,

830
00:24:01,755 --> 00:24:03,576
but just don't know what they're doing.

831
00:24:03,856 --> 00:24:05,459
They change their password.

832
00:24:05,519 --> 00:24:05,959
The thing is,

833
00:24:06,500 --> 00:24:08,642
security as an industry has existed for a

834
00:24:08,741 --> 00:24:09,363
long time,

835
00:24:09,403 --> 00:24:11,545
probably longer than AV in itself.

836
00:24:11,944 --> 00:24:13,467
And what it has done is given us

837
00:24:13,586 --> 00:24:14,508
plenty of standards,

838
00:24:14,587 --> 00:24:16,069
plenty of ways of communicating these

839
00:24:16,089 --> 00:24:16,309
things.

840
00:24:16,710 --> 00:24:18,089
and the hope is that we can kind

841
00:24:18,150 --> 00:24:20,050
of make this popular make it common

842
00:24:20,070 --> 00:24:22,431
knowledge i mean av needs to be integrated

843
00:24:22,451 --> 00:24:25,451
with security the the next generation of

844
00:24:25,531 --> 00:24:26,951
integrators the next generation of

845
00:24:27,011 --> 00:24:28,992
manufacturers the next generation of av

846
00:24:29,012 --> 00:24:32,094
designers need to have a security first

847
00:24:32,153 --> 00:24:34,054
mindset and that's that's just the way it

848
00:24:34,094 --> 00:24:36,034
is as long as you plan on existing

849
00:24:36,414 --> 00:24:37,994
on a shared infrastructure

850
00:24:38,714 --> 00:24:40,096
As long as you're not going to pull

851
00:24:40,435 --> 00:24:42,278
your own cables.

852
00:24:42,298 --> 00:24:44,680
That didn't exist.

853
00:24:44,799 --> 00:24:46,300
I don't know who.

854
00:24:46,340 --> 00:24:47,080
It's my pet peeve.

855
00:24:47,662 --> 00:24:48,542
When I hear island,

856
00:24:48,923 --> 00:24:50,844
I don't think there's ever been an island.

857
00:24:50,903 --> 00:24:52,506
There's no such thing as an island.

858
00:24:55,468 --> 00:24:55,748
Yes!

859
00:24:55,867 --> 00:24:56,228
Yes!

860
00:24:56,888 --> 00:24:58,009
That's a whole other show.

861
00:24:58,130 --> 00:24:59,951
Jamie and Mark are on Frank's team.

862
00:24:59,971 --> 00:25:01,412
We're on Frank's team.

863
00:25:01,451 --> 00:25:03,554
Pick me, pick me.

864
00:25:03,574 --> 00:25:04,054
The network.

865
00:25:04,114 --> 00:25:06,635
The network.

866
00:25:08,086 --> 00:25:08,886
Yes.

867
00:25:09,166 --> 00:25:09,247
Yeah.

868
00:25:09,346 --> 00:25:12,368
I think we've kind of defaulted to a

869
00:25:12,409 --> 00:25:14,230
very simple way of approaching AV

870
00:25:14,250 --> 00:25:15,550
deployments by saying, yeah,

871
00:25:15,810 --> 00:25:17,231
we're isolated, we're segregated.

872
00:25:17,592 --> 00:25:19,673
And you go into network teams and say,

873
00:25:19,693 --> 00:25:19,814
hey,

874
00:25:19,854 --> 00:25:21,394
can I have a VLAN that has fifty

875
00:25:21,434 --> 00:25:21,894
devices?

876
00:25:22,694 --> 00:25:25,156
You have no idea the challenges involved

877
00:25:25,176 --> 00:25:27,038
with some of these things and how security

878
00:25:27,117 --> 00:25:29,299
operates and how networking teams operate.

879
00:25:29,339 --> 00:25:30,840
And so what do you do?

880
00:25:30,921 --> 00:25:32,942
You're antagonizing the people who are

881
00:25:32,981 --> 00:25:34,022
supposed to be friends with.

882
00:25:34,742 --> 00:25:36,743
And then I think there's an entire group

883
00:25:36,784 --> 00:25:37,223
of people.

884
00:25:38,064 --> 00:25:40,144
I think the AV's IT argument that was

885
00:25:40,163 --> 00:25:41,005
like, I guess,

886
00:25:41,105 --> 00:25:43,204
every day in the Twitter spheres for a

887
00:25:43,224 --> 00:25:43,585
long time.

888
00:25:43,605 --> 00:25:45,125
That is so old at this point.

889
00:25:45,685 --> 00:25:46,605
I know, but the thing is,

890
00:25:47,165 --> 00:25:49,926
we try to paint ourselves as something

891
00:25:49,967 --> 00:25:50,386
we're not.

892
00:25:51,267 --> 00:25:53,366
Yes, AV is all about the experiences.

893
00:25:53,626 --> 00:25:53,967
Yes,

894
00:25:54,107 --> 00:25:56,367
AV is all about the visual and the

895
00:25:56,468 --> 00:25:58,387
experiential impact that we give.

896
00:25:58,429 --> 00:25:59,769
But at the end of the day,

897
00:26:00,749 --> 00:26:02,010
are you saying that we don't need

898
00:26:02,070 --> 00:26:04,432
electricity or we do we not need the

899
00:26:04,492 --> 00:26:05,815
infrastructure do we not need the

900
00:26:05,855 --> 00:26:07,977
resources yeah and we have to play by

901
00:26:08,017 --> 00:26:09,939
their rules right you can create your own

902
00:26:09,979 --> 00:26:12,381
rules by saying i'll bring my own switch

903
00:26:12,582 --> 00:26:13,982
and i'll create my own network you're

904
00:26:14,022 --> 00:26:16,144
saying i will do this whole thing by

905
00:26:16,205 --> 00:26:17,747
myself and they're like no you can't

906
00:26:17,787 --> 00:26:20,069
because you're in my space you're in my

907
00:26:20,089 --> 00:26:21,330
building you're in my facility

908
00:26:21,431 --> 00:26:23,271
And that's basically what security has

909
00:26:23,332 --> 00:26:23,692
become.

910
00:26:24,252 --> 00:26:26,913
And we're hoping that by creating a space

911
00:26:26,933 --> 00:26:29,215
where people can come in and contribute

912
00:26:29,576 --> 00:26:33,419
and build that next standard future of AV,

913
00:26:34,239 --> 00:26:35,640
we'll give people the voice to do that.

914
00:26:35,660 --> 00:26:37,921
And that's practically the hope behind

915
00:26:37,941 --> 00:26:38,642
this nonprofit.

916
00:26:39,121 --> 00:26:40,362
And I know there's people that are

917
00:26:40,382 --> 00:26:40,942
listening right now.

918
00:26:40,981 --> 00:26:42,442
Their blood is just like boiling.

919
00:26:43,542 --> 00:26:46,005
And because there's like the path of

920
00:26:46,065 --> 00:26:48,066
getting something done versus the path of

921
00:26:48,086 --> 00:26:49,526
getting something done correctly.

922
00:26:49,926 --> 00:26:52,508
And there's philosophical differences

923
00:26:52,548 --> 00:26:54,689
about getting my ass out of this room

924
00:26:54,709 --> 00:26:55,910
and being done, done for me.

925
00:26:56,630 --> 00:26:58,631
and making my systems and services work

926
00:26:59,031 --> 00:27:01,532
versus it living harmoniously in this

927
00:27:01,952 --> 00:27:04,255
luxurious cloud connected and enterprise

928
00:27:04,275 --> 00:27:07,156
environment where do i care i don't know

929
00:27:07,217 --> 00:27:09,198
and i think there's a lot of ground

930
00:27:09,238 --> 00:27:11,778
in between these two examples and we talk

931
00:27:11,798 --> 00:27:14,721
about it i don't know every day justin

932
00:27:15,241 --> 00:27:19,943
yeah pretty much my my biggest question is

933
00:27:21,525 --> 00:27:24,326
we we all understand you know how windows

934
00:27:24,406 --> 00:27:25,488
and apple and all these

935
00:27:25,830 --> 00:27:27,972
big companies deal with security and their

936
00:27:28,012 --> 00:27:28,894
challenges with it.

937
00:27:29,013 --> 00:27:30,654
And they have teams of what?

938
00:27:30,734 --> 00:27:31,076
I don't know.

939
00:27:31,115 --> 00:27:32,155
You guys know more than I do.

940
00:27:32,217 --> 00:27:34,097
Thousands of people dealing with security

941
00:27:34,157 --> 00:27:37,000
on their whatever more secure numbers.

942
00:27:37,020 --> 00:27:40,844
So how I want to like, logically speaking,

943
00:27:40,864 --> 00:27:42,005
it's like a guy in the basement.

944
00:27:42,045 --> 00:27:44,967
How do these small manufacturers that are

945
00:27:45,008 --> 00:27:46,388
all making these products that live on the

946
00:27:46,449 --> 00:27:49,490
network have a security team each in their

947
00:27:49,550 --> 00:27:49,971
house?

948
00:27:50,211 --> 00:27:52,114
Because we all understand that it

949
00:27:53,942 --> 00:27:55,544
changes daily, right?

950
00:27:55,784 --> 00:27:56,625
We all talked about that.

951
00:27:56,685 --> 00:27:59,970
So producing a product with Firmware X and

952
00:27:59,990 --> 00:28:01,571
then not releasing another firmware for

953
00:28:01,652 --> 00:28:02,313
six months.

954
00:28:02,753 --> 00:28:04,756
So are we expecting these people to

955
00:28:04,796 --> 00:28:06,499
release updates weekly, daily?

956
00:28:06,538 --> 00:28:06,699
Like,

957
00:28:06,719 --> 00:28:09,442
what is your thoughts on the long term

958
00:28:09,481 --> 00:28:11,285
here and how this is actually achievable?

959
00:28:13,057 --> 00:28:17,221
So there's a multifaceted approach to

960
00:28:17,240 --> 00:28:17,480
that,

961
00:28:17,500 --> 00:28:18,922
and I think it does vary a little

962
00:28:18,942 --> 00:28:20,382
bit based on what type of product it

963
00:28:20,482 --> 00:28:20,682
is.

964
00:28:20,962 --> 00:28:24,525
So you see a lot of Windows-based devices

965
00:28:24,625 --> 00:28:25,865
in audio visual today,

966
00:28:25,885 --> 00:28:27,686
and there's an existing security framework

967
00:28:27,707 --> 00:28:28,667
and a lot of rules that kind of

968
00:28:28,688 --> 00:28:30,848
wrap around Windows just by itself,

969
00:28:30,909 --> 00:28:33,029
not even including the other parts that

970
00:28:33,049 --> 00:28:34,830
would be Teams or Zoom or whatever

971
00:28:34,871 --> 00:28:35,711
specific, right?

972
00:28:37,868 --> 00:28:41,450
It's pretty hard to say that as a

973
00:28:41,509 --> 00:28:43,250
mandated standard,

974
00:28:43,270 --> 00:28:44,611
you should have X amount of security

975
00:28:44,651 --> 00:28:46,372
professionals regardless of your business

976
00:28:46,392 --> 00:28:47,413
size or anything like that.

977
00:28:47,972 --> 00:28:50,574
But I think part of what we're trying

978
00:28:50,614 --> 00:28:53,194
to kind of help with too is identify

979
00:28:53,275 --> 00:28:55,236
what should be expected as far as

980
00:28:55,415 --> 00:28:57,037
standards for the products that people

981
00:28:57,076 --> 00:28:57,676
kind of buy.

982
00:28:58,637 --> 00:29:00,740
um how somebody decides to make sure that

983
00:29:00,779 --> 00:29:02,001
those are in their products is up to

984
00:29:02,021 --> 00:29:03,544
them it can be a full-time person it

985
00:29:03,584 --> 00:29:05,465
can be a contracted team it can be

986
00:29:05,486 --> 00:29:06,847
you know a software development team it

987
00:29:06,867 --> 00:29:08,569
can be a cio right and i think

988
00:29:08,690 --> 00:29:10,152
how that works is going to be different

989
00:29:10,172 --> 00:29:11,733
based on the organization and the type of

990
00:29:11,773 --> 00:29:13,134
product that they sell and where they're

991
00:29:13,154 --> 00:29:13,816
trying to sell it

992
00:29:14,517 --> 00:29:16,518
But part of I think some of the

993
00:29:16,557 --> 00:29:18,719
variance amongst the vendors in the space

994
00:29:18,759 --> 00:29:21,059
has been a little bit just because there's

995
00:29:21,119 --> 00:29:22,141
not been a constant,

996
00:29:22,240 --> 00:29:24,442
a consistent type of communication about,

997
00:29:25,102 --> 00:29:25,221
hey,

998
00:29:25,261 --> 00:29:26,502
this is going to be the bare minimum

999
00:29:26,603 --> 00:29:28,763
stuff that we for sure expect out of

1000
00:29:28,864 --> 00:29:30,805
everything that we're going to see go into

1001
00:29:30,825 --> 00:29:32,125
a corporate or higher education or

1002
00:29:32,145 --> 00:29:33,906
whatever environment from a networking and

1003
00:29:34,106 --> 00:29:35,708
application security side of things.

1004
00:29:36,598 --> 00:29:39,259
And having those standards would make a

1005
00:29:39,279 --> 00:29:41,221
world of difference towards helping then

1006
00:29:41,260 --> 00:29:43,501
the companies making the products staff

1007
00:29:43,561 --> 00:29:45,202
and plan appropriately for product

1008
00:29:45,222 --> 00:29:45,702
development.

1009
00:29:45,722 --> 00:29:47,323
Some will know exactly what needs to go

1010
00:29:47,383 --> 00:29:48,644
in there when they do want to take

1011
00:29:48,663 --> 00:29:50,045
something to market, right?

1012
00:29:50,065 --> 00:29:51,125
Because right now it is all over the

1013
00:29:51,144 --> 00:29:51,365
place.

1014
00:29:51,765 --> 00:29:52,925
What would some of that be?

1015
00:29:53,046 --> 00:29:54,286
I mean, we have our ideas,

1016
00:29:54,346 --> 00:29:57,548
but from your guys' experiences,

1017
00:29:57,607 --> 00:29:59,127
what are some of those bare minimums?

1018
00:29:59,868 --> 00:30:02,230
If I'm evaluating in the future today,

1019
00:30:02,289 --> 00:30:02,730
yesterday,

1020
00:30:03,777 --> 00:30:05,657
What do you feel some of that bare

1021
00:30:05,698 --> 00:30:06,057
minimum?

1022
00:30:06,117 --> 00:30:06,298
What,

1023
00:30:06,397 --> 00:30:08,378
what kind of things should we be asking

1024
00:30:08,419 --> 00:30:08,578
from,

1025
00:30:08,838 --> 00:30:10,259
from the end user side to this

1026
00:30:10,298 --> 00:30:11,579
manufacturer says, look,

1027
00:30:12,579 --> 00:30:14,300
we all agree that these are the things

1028
00:30:14,621 --> 00:30:15,901
you don't have to be super specific

1029
00:30:15,921 --> 00:30:17,020
because none of us know,

1030
00:30:17,442 --> 00:30:19,061
but just the overarching thing.

1031
00:30:19,102 --> 00:30:20,021
What is, what is that?

1032
00:30:20,221 --> 00:30:21,502
What's it look like?

1033
00:30:21,603 --> 00:30:21,623
I.

1034
00:30:22,212 --> 00:30:24,034
I think that there's part of it,

1035
00:30:24,054 --> 00:30:25,315
and this is a discussion that we've all

1036
00:30:25,355 --> 00:30:25,674
had,

1037
00:30:25,714 --> 00:30:32,179
is that our method of updating devices has

1038
00:30:32,219 --> 00:30:33,579
been broken from the start.

1039
00:30:33,640 --> 00:30:35,941
And it's the idea that security updates

1040
00:30:36,020 --> 00:30:37,382
are tied to feature updates.

1041
00:30:37,942 --> 00:30:38,643
So there's companies,

1042
00:30:38,663 --> 00:30:40,743
they won't patch a security issue until

1043
00:30:40,763 --> 00:30:42,085
they have a new feature to roll out.

1044
00:30:42,904 --> 00:30:44,066
Because you remember the whole thing.

1045
00:30:44,086 --> 00:30:45,506
It's like there's certain brands where

1046
00:30:45,645 --> 00:30:47,047
once you get an unstable firmware,

1047
00:30:47,646 --> 00:30:48,547
don't touch it.

1048
00:30:48,586 --> 00:30:49,988
Don't touch it.

1049
00:30:50,008 --> 00:30:50,488
It's working.

1050
00:30:50,667 --> 00:30:51,188
Walk away.

1051
00:30:51,748 --> 00:30:52,828
Manufacturers are like, we're done.

1052
00:30:53,628 --> 00:30:54,189
This is it.

1053
00:30:54,209 --> 00:30:55,029
We're done.

1054
00:30:55,269 --> 00:30:55,970
I've even had somewhere,

1055
00:30:55,990 --> 00:30:57,369
it's like if you want this feature,

1056
00:30:57,611 --> 00:30:58,310
it's on this one.

1057
00:30:58,691 --> 00:30:59,750
If you want this feature on this one,

1058
00:30:59,770 --> 00:31:01,551
they do not exist across these two because

1059
00:31:01,612 --> 00:31:03,833
we couldn't figure out how to do it.

1060
00:31:03,873 --> 00:31:04,873
I think that there needs to be a

1061
00:31:04,893 --> 00:31:06,493
difference between security patching,

1062
00:31:06,513 --> 00:31:08,694
which should be mandatory over the year

1063
00:31:08,734 --> 00:31:09,335
patching,

1064
00:31:10,296 --> 00:31:12,238
and features which are optional.

1065
00:31:12,577 --> 00:31:15,121
I shouldn't have to accept a new version

1066
00:31:15,641 --> 00:31:17,824
just because I want to patch a security

1067
00:31:17,903 --> 00:31:18,964
issue.

1068
00:31:19,025 --> 00:31:21,166
I think that's a big thing that customers

1069
00:31:21,186 --> 00:31:22,628
can be asked for to be like, hey,

1070
00:31:23,068 --> 00:31:24,891
you need to separate these two things.

1071
00:31:25,711 --> 00:31:27,192
And I think that's part of the issue.

1072
00:31:27,314 --> 00:31:28,875
I think the other big issue that we

1073
00:31:28,914 --> 00:31:30,695
have as an industry and this is going

1074
00:31:30,715 --> 00:31:31,557
to, you know,

1075
00:31:31,576 --> 00:31:32,597
we're already starting to kind of like

1076
00:31:32,678 --> 00:31:36,060
poke on some some sore spots is we

1077
00:31:36,101 --> 00:31:39,544
have a serious issue with rebadged

1078
00:31:39,683 --> 00:31:40,285
devices.

1079
00:31:40,464 --> 00:31:42,226
So there's an original manufacturer

1080
00:31:43,207 --> 00:31:44,067
And then there's,

1081
00:31:44,508 --> 00:31:45,667
like we play that game where you go

1082
00:31:45,688 --> 00:31:47,107
to the little tiny tables around the edge

1083
00:31:47,147 --> 00:31:49,429
of InfoComm and you take notes.

1084
00:31:49,868 --> 00:31:50,189
Yeah,

1085
00:31:50,249 --> 00:31:51,730
and then you go and find it in

1086
00:31:52,130 --> 00:31:52,950
a thirty booths.

1087
00:31:53,029 --> 00:31:56,571
And so if the OEM finds a security

1088
00:31:57,372 --> 00:31:57,692
issue,

1089
00:31:58,613 --> 00:32:00,814
they can't patch that because everyone has

1090
00:32:00,834 --> 00:32:03,175
written custom firmware that at the very

1091
00:32:03,215 --> 00:32:05,578
least has a different name and logo in

1092
00:32:05,618 --> 00:32:08,560
it, or even better has, you know,

1093
00:32:08,601 --> 00:32:09,602
some other items,

1094
00:32:10,061 --> 00:32:11,564
but it means that there's this long,

1095
00:32:11,584 --> 00:32:13,305
complicated process of communicating

1096
00:32:13,365 --> 00:32:13,625
through.

1097
00:32:13,645 --> 00:32:14,385
And we've seen this in the past.

1098
00:32:14,425 --> 00:32:15,926
And we've called them out on that.

1099
00:32:15,948 --> 00:32:16,587
They're like, yeah,

1100
00:32:16,627 --> 00:32:18,549
that's the company we buy this shit from,

1101
00:32:18,569 --> 00:32:19,851
from Australia or whatever.

1102
00:32:19,871 --> 00:32:20,550
And you're like, well,

1103
00:32:21,092 --> 00:32:22,953
it's still a problem.

1104
00:32:23,173 --> 00:32:25,276
It's still your name on this invoice, sir.

1105
00:32:25,355 --> 00:32:25,536
Yeah.

1106
00:32:26,155 --> 00:32:26,457
Yeah,

1107
00:32:26,497 --> 00:32:27,897
you're still the support number I was told

1108
00:32:27,917 --> 00:32:28,679
to call.

1109
00:32:29,538 --> 00:32:32,020
And at a certain point, it's like, okay,

1110
00:32:32,481 --> 00:32:34,483
you're torpedoing your business model by

1111
00:32:34,963 --> 00:32:35,664
pointing backwards.

1112
00:32:35,684 --> 00:32:36,065
It's like, well,

1113
00:32:36,085 --> 00:32:37,286
then why wouldn't I just buy from the

1114
00:32:37,326 --> 00:32:39,228
person who's guaranteed to patch it?

1115
00:32:39,968 --> 00:32:42,550
And I think that's a big issue.

1116
00:32:42,590 --> 00:32:43,612
And these are things that I think are

1117
00:32:43,652 --> 00:32:44,873
important discussions to have.

1118
00:32:44,893 --> 00:32:47,515
And I'm hoping that this is part of

1119
00:32:47,535 --> 00:32:49,836
what we're talking about is to say, okay,

1120
00:32:49,876 --> 00:32:51,618
why don't we start pushing on these points

1121
00:32:51,778 --> 00:32:52,940
in a little more serious manner?

1122
00:32:54,693 --> 00:32:56,654
The other thing I just want to jump

1123
00:32:56,715 --> 00:32:57,615
in and say is like,

1124
00:32:57,997 --> 00:32:59,798
when we talk about security,

1125
00:33:00,038 --> 00:33:01,799
if you've noticed the last twenty minutes,

1126
00:33:02,240 --> 00:33:03,882
we're all trying to go towards that

1127
00:33:03,942 --> 00:33:05,323
technical conversation, right?

1128
00:33:05,363 --> 00:33:07,265
We're looking for how to secure things.

1129
00:33:07,746 --> 00:33:09,666
The fact of the matter is security never

1130
00:33:09,707 --> 00:33:11,449
starts from a technical conversation.

1131
00:33:11,788 --> 00:33:13,971
Security starts from a pure non-technical

1132
00:33:14,030 --> 00:33:15,071
documentation.

1133
00:33:15,492 --> 00:33:16,834
My favorite security term,

1134
00:33:16,913 --> 00:33:19,757
and I love using this, is risk profile.

1135
00:33:20,156 --> 00:33:21,198
What's a risk profile?

1136
00:33:21,759 --> 00:33:24,122
A risk profile is telling the stakeholder

1137
00:33:24,142 --> 00:33:24,521
that, hey,

1138
00:33:24,882 --> 00:33:27,585
I'm giving you this box and I have

1139
00:33:27,826 --> 00:33:29,027
no idea what it does.

1140
00:33:29,627 --> 00:33:29,847
Right.

1141
00:33:30,268 --> 00:33:33,132
And if Larry says, I'm cool with that,

1142
00:33:33,412 --> 00:33:34,292
I know what it does.

1143
00:33:34,432 --> 00:33:35,513
I'll take care of the risk.

1144
00:33:36,451 --> 00:33:37,311
I've done my job.

1145
00:33:38,272 --> 00:33:40,694
I've informed you that I'm clueless as far

1146
00:33:40,714 --> 00:33:41,955
as the security is concerned.

1147
00:33:42,696 --> 00:33:43,397
And Larry's like,

1148
00:33:43,577 --> 00:33:44,919
I know the function of the box.

1149
00:33:45,720 --> 00:33:48,001
I have a strategy in place for dealing

1150
00:33:48,021 --> 00:33:50,984
with boxes that have no security profile.

1151
00:33:51,565 --> 00:33:53,826
This is not uncommon in the world of

1152
00:33:53,926 --> 00:33:54,048
IT.

1153
00:33:55,308 --> 00:33:56,990
You'd think that IT is completely

1154
00:33:57,029 --> 00:33:58,891
standards-based and all uniform.

1155
00:33:59,191 --> 00:33:59,872
Heck no.

1156
00:34:00,451 --> 00:34:01,452
It's worse than this.

1157
00:34:02,653 --> 00:34:04,394
IT people and security people deal with

1158
00:34:04,434 --> 00:34:05,796
the same problems that we're talking

1159
00:34:05,836 --> 00:34:06,056
about.

1160
00:34:06,395 --> 00:34:08,257
Manufacturing inconsistencies,

1161
00:34:09,418 --> 00:34:11,260
firmware issues, patching problems,

1162
00:34:11,300 --> 00:34:12,860
security patching updates.

1163
00:34:13,101 --> 00:34:15,101
There are several products out there that

1164
00:34:15,322 --> 00:34:17,244
are very popular in the IT world today

1165
00:34:17,664 --> 00:34:19,585
that have not had a security update for

1166
00:34:19,885 --> 00:34:20,226
months.

1167
00:34:20,846 --> 00:34:21,806
And you know what?

1168
00:34:21,827 --> 00:34:23,027
That's common, they know it.

1169
00:34:23,487 --> 00:34:25,728
The thing is what we need to enable

1170
00:34:25,967 --> 00:34:28,489
the AV community as a whole is to

1171
00:34:28,628 --> 00:34:30,829
understand how do we deal with the risk

1172
00:34:30,869 --> 00:34:33,170
of it and what is the strategy associated

1173
00:34:33,190 --> 00:34:33,411
with it?

1174
00:34:33,550 --> 00:34:36,132
That is what we lack from the get-go,

1175
00:34:36,152 --> 00:34:36,273
right?

1176
00:34:36,952 --> 00:34:38,594
Once we've identified the strategy

1177
00:34:38,634 --> 00:34:40,293
associated with dealing with the risk,

1178
00:34:40,634 --> 00:34:42,135
then you'll have the right questions to

1179
00:34:42,195 --> 00:34:42,554
say, hey,

1180
00:34:42,835 --> 00:34:45,096
my network team will not accept something

1181
00:34:45,135 --> 00:34:46,396
that does not do this.

1182
00:34:46,996 --> 00:34:50,139
That is a more informed conversation to

1183
00:34:50,159 --> 00:34:51,898
your manufacturer than this saying, hey,

1184
00:34:51,918 --> 00:34:53,300
can you give me a document that says

1185
00:34:53,639 --> 00:34:54,681
all the different things you do?

1186
00:34:55,041 --> 00:34:56,442
They don't know what you're looking for.

1187
00:34:56,782 --> 00:34:58,782
And so maybe help the community as a

1188
00:34:58,862 --> 00:35:00,403
whole by building a collaborative

1189
00:35:00,443 --> 00:35:00,963
environment.

1190
00:35:01,364 --> 00:35:03,364
The problem is nobody knows what to ask

1191
00:35:03,385 --> 00:35:04,445
and nobody knows what to say.

1192
00:35:04,485 --> 00:35:06,166
So it's like it's a completely confusing

1193
00:35:06,246 --> 00:35:06,646
environment.

1194
00:35:06,666 --> 00:35:07,927
You have to build a common lexicon.

1195
00:35:08,126 --> 00:35:09,327
And I look at this and it feels

1196
00:35:09,347 --> 00:35:10,469
like this is a coming of age of

1197
00:35:10,528 --> 00:35:10,628
AV.

1198
00:35:11,429 --> 00:35:14,231
Are we finally being tall enough to ride

1199
00:35:14,650 --> 00:35:16,472
this IT rollercoaster in a way that we're

1200
00:35:16,492 --> 00:35:18,413
not just taking black boxes and just

1201
00:35:18,454 --> 00:35:20,094
pushing shit around structured cable?

1202
00:35:20,135 --> 00:35:21,434
Because that's really where this all came

1203
00:35:21,474 --> 00:35:21,695
from.

1204
00:35:22,036 --> 00:35:23,235
How can I save money and not have

1205
00:35:23,277 --> 00:35:24,617
to put this Klingon cable through this

1206
00:35:24,657 --> 00:35:26,378
wall where I can just use this CatFive

1207
00:35:26,398 --> 00:35:27,018
that's right here?

1208
00:35:27,458 --> 00:35:29,719
It all just kind of grew up a

1209
00:35:29,760 --> 00:35:30,101
little bit.

1210
00:35:30,641 --> 00:35:32,802
It was cheaper for a lot of people

1211
00:35:32,822 --> 00:35:33,262
to kind of...

1212
00:35:34,282 --> 00:35:35,922
basically put the blinders on and say,

1213
00:35:35,943 --> 00:35:36,324
hey, you know what?

1214
00:35:36,344 --> 00:35:37,503
I'm going to not care about that right

1215
00:35:37,523 --> 00:35:39,365
now because I can put this in a

1216
00:35:39,385 --> 00:35:41,586
closet and not look at it.

1217
00:35:41,666 --> 00:35:42,507
Network island.

1218
00:35:42,588 --> 00:35:45,849
And to Frank's point,

1219
00:35:45,909 --> 00:35:48,552
the whole premise about communication

1220
00:35:48,652 --> 00:35:48,711
is...

1221
00:35:49,431 --> 00:35:51,594
called security by obscurity and something

1222
00:35:51,693 --> 00:35:53,255
that's a big problem in av is like

1223
00:35:53,436 --> 00:35:55,297
this stuff is secured by basically not

1224
00:35:55,356 --> 00:35:57,639
having information available about it and

1225
00:35:57,679 --> 00:35:59,221
they say you know nobody knows how to

1226
00:35:59,240 --> 00:36:01,302
find anything so it's it's fine we're not

1227
00:36:01,463 --> 00:36:03,284
we're not gonna look it's all good yeah

1228
00:36:03,945 --> 00:36:06,706
uh and that's that's not a as functional

1229
00:36:06,827 --> 00:36:09,048
it never really was a strategy but it

1230
00:36:09,088 --> 00:36:10,550
kind of finds a lot of holes

1231
00:36:11,893 --> 00:36:13,934
as people are starting to require that

1232
00:36:13,974 --> 00:36:15,538
information in order to adopt the

1233
00:36:15,577 --> 00:36:17,199
technology properly because it needs to

1234
00:36:17,239 --> 00:36:18,501
integrate with the rest of your network

1235
00:36:18,541 --> 00:36:20,123
security profile, right?

1236
00:36:20,143 --> 00:36:20,945
That's how you communicate.

1237
00:36:21,105 --> 00:36:22,186
That's how communication works.

1238
00:36:22,427 --> 00:36:24,130
I like how Frank brought that up because

1239
00:36:24,409 --> 00:36:24,911
Mark and I,

1240
00:36:26,039 --> 00:36:26,239
you know,

1241
00:36:26,278 --> 00:36:27,780
when we're trying to put everything on,

1242
00:36:28,019 --> 00:36:30,061
on our enterprise, right, we had to have,

1243
00:36:30,481 --> 00:36:30,601
like,

1244
00:36:30,740 --> 00:36:32,121
one of the things I really struggled with

1245
00:36:32,161 --> 00:36:34,021
right away was I didn't understand network

1246
00:36:34,322 --> 00:36:35,463
names and terms.

1247
00:36:35,543 --> 00:36:39,003
And the the white sheet you get from

1248
00:36:39,083 --> 00:36:39,925
manufacturers, like, well,

1249
00:36:39,965 --> 00:36:42,085
QoS has to be well, that on enterprise,

1250
00:36:42,106 --> 00:36:44,166
that's not necessarily how work.

1251
00:36:44,347 --> 00:36:44,847
No, it's not.

1252
00:36:45,286 --> 00:36:45,567
Right.

1253
00:36:45,686 --> 00:36:47,208
And so I had just bark out orders

1254
00:36:47,228 --> 00:36:48,108
and say, do this.

1255
00:36:48,188 --> 00:36:49,349
It's not I had, yeah,

1256
00:36:49,389 --> 00:36:50,668
I had to learn all that I had

1257
00:36:50,688 --> 00:36:51,730
to learn the lexicon,

1258
00:36:51,789 --> 00:36:52,630
I had to learn

1259
00:36:53,289 --> 00:36:54,451
And I don't even know how to be

1260
00:36:54,471 --> 00:36:55,351
a systems admin,

1261
00:36:55,391 --> 00:36:56,831
but I had to know the language and

1262
00:36:56,871 --> 00:36:57,791
I had to be able to talk to

1263
00:36:57,831 --> 00:36:57,931
him.

1264
00:36:58,851 --> 00:37:00,032
And to Mark's point earlier,

1265
00:37:00,072 --> 00:37:01,552
I feel like this is the next step.

1266
00:37:02,032 --> 00:37:03,514
Like, I don't know what to ask.

1267
00:37:04,753 --> 00:37:05,893
I don't know what's going to get blocked

1268
00:37:05,914 --> 00:37:06,835
tomorrow until it is.

1269
00:37:06,894 --> 00:37:08,034
And then I say, well, why?

1270
00:37:09,175 --> 00:37:10,476
Well, because of these things.

1271
00:37:10,815 --> 00:37:12,976
Oh, well, I'll remember to ask next time.

1272
00:37:14,438 --> 00:37:16,961
Is this something for that lexicon thing?

1273
00:37:16,981 --> 00:37:18,583
Is that something that's kind of part of

1274
00:37:18,603 --> 00:37:19,184
the pathway too?

1275
00:37:19,204 --> 00:37:20,666
Kind of like, hey, dummy,

1276
00:37:20,686 --> 00:37:21,347
here's your primer.

1277
00:37:22,007 --> 00:37:24,210
These are the key words that you need

1278
00:37:24,230 --> 00:37:25,931
to ask even if you don't understand them.

1279
00:37:26,251 --> 00:37:27,594
So we can print them on AVSF cards

1280
00:37:27,614 --> 00:37:29,094
and have them at Infocomm.

1281
00:37:29,114 --> 00:37:30,896
These are the key security words you need

1282
00:37:30,936 --> 00:37:31,318
to know.

1283
00:37:31,358 --> 00:37:32,778
Know these words or know how to use

1284
00:37:32,798 --> 00:37:34,380
them in a sentence to sound like you

1285
00:37:34,400 --> 00:37:34,981
know these words.

1286
00:37:35,402 --> 00:37:37,583
Honestly, it's like even in the networks.

1287
00:37:38,123 --> 00:37:39,603
When I do teaching across managed

1288
00:37:39,623 --> 00:37:41,085
services, across IT stuff,

1289
00:37:41,684 --> 00:37:42,525
and now across security,

1290
00:37:42,585 --> 00:37:44,467
vocabulary is really big because

1291
00:37:45,123 --> 00:37:47,003
Everyone has acronyms that they know,

1292
00:37:48,085 --> 00:37:50,047
and they all speak this language,

1293
00:37:50,367 --> 00:37:53,509
and they have common meaning for words

1294
00:37:53,528 --> 00:37:55,250
that might just be normal words to the

1295
00:37:55,289 --> 00:37:56,010
rest of us.

1296
00:37:56,670 --> 00:37:57,992
And I think that is really important.

1297
00:37:58,132 --> 00:37:59,492
And I think the great thing about what

1298
00:37:59,512 --> 00:38:00,094
we're doing,

1299
00:38:00,614 --> 00:38:02,956
and this was a discussion early on about

1300
00:38:03,016 --> 00:38:03,936
how we were approaching this,

1301
00:38:04,436 --> 00:38:05,617
we don't want to create,

1302
00:38:06,237 --> 00:38:09,460
we don't want to baby the AV people

1303
00:38:09,559 --> 00:38:11,842
and say, oh, we're special.

1304
00:38:12,878 --> 00:38:14,599
We run IOT devices,

1305
00:38:14,639 --> 00:38:16,061
which are the most miserable,

1306
00:38:16,820 --> 00:38:18,722
hateful devices you could possibly put on

1307
00:38:18,782 --> 00:38:19,222
a network.

1308
00:38:19,563 --> 00:38:21,164
And once we accept that, we go, okay,

1309
00:38:21,184 --> 00:38:23,364
there's a framework for containing this

1310
00:38:23,405 --> 00:38:23,804
threat.

1311
00:38:24,286 --> 00:38:25,806
There's a vocabulary to go around it.

1312
00:38:25,826 --> 00:38:27,807
There are some specific things that are

1313
00:38:27,967 --> 00:38:30,349
unique to what we do because we have

1314
00:38:30,369 --> 00:38:32,530
things like Dante and we have NDI and

1315
00:38:32,550 --> 00:38:33,811
we have all sorts of fun stuff like

1316
00:38:33,831 --> 00:38:34,050
that.

1317
00:38:34,590 --> 00:38:36,231
But there does need to be a common

1318
00:38:36,271 --> 00:38:36,592
language.

1319
00:38:36,612 --> 00:38:37,472
And I think the nice thing is that

1320
00:38:37,592 --> 00:38:39,153
all that training is available and free

1321
00:38:39,313 --> 00:38:39,373
and

1322
00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:41,240
right now like i always tell people like

1323
00:38:41,260 --> 00:38:43,722
go get the cc it's an easy like

1324
00:38:43,742 --> 00:38:45,445
it's a it's a sort of one-on-one

1325
00:38:45,485 --> 00:38:48,567
vocabulary lesson okay cc expand that what

1326
00:38:48,586 --> 00:38:49,849
is like an acronym what does that mean

1327
00:38:50,309 --> 00:38:52,951
it's the sort of processor to the cissp

1328
00:38:53,472 --> 00:38:55,213
it's kind of like if you went to

1329
00:38:55,273 --> 00:38:56,434
infocomm and you got the

1330
00:38:57,375 --> 00:38:58,775
What's the one you do the little tests

1331
00:38:58,815 --> 00:38:59,416
for where it's like,

1332
00:38:59,436 --> 00:39:02,398
you're a certified AV technician?

1333
00:39:02,719 --> 00:39:03,480
What is that one?

1334
00:39:03,679 --> 00:39:06,402
There's a really easy test that you do

1335
00:39:06,481 --> 00:39:07,643
on InfoComm that gets you a really easy

1336
00:39:07,663 --> 00:39:07,742
test.

1337
00:39:07,762 --> 00:39:09,403
Oh, the recognized AV technologist one?

1338
00:39:09,423 --> 00:39:09,744
Yes, that one.

1339
00:39:11,025 --> 00:39:13,527
It's basically that for security.

1340
00:39:13,626 --> 00:39:14,967
It's a little more in-depth,

1341
00:39:15,447 --> 00:39:17,190
but it basically spends a lot of time

1342
00:39:17,230 --> 00:39:19,652
on the security triad and a lot of

1343
00:39:19,672 --> 00:39:20,211
the language,

1344
00:39:20,251 --> 00:39:22,353
because there is that sort of divergent

1345
00:39:22,393 --> 00:39:23,855
path within security.

1346
00:39:24,355 --> 00:39:26,876
there are the managers like cso's

1347
00:39:27,536 --> 00:39:30,076
generally aren't sitting and configuring

1348
00:39:31,257 --> 00:39:33,317
all of the security tools and at the

1349
00:39:33,336 --> 00:39:35,018
same time people who configure security

1350
00:39:35,038 --> 00:39:37,538
tools aren't generally writing policy

1351
00:39:37,697 --> 00:39:40,619
around risk and setting you know our risk

1352
00:39:40,679 --> 00:39:42,898
appetite around you know certain products

1353
00:39:42,978 --> 00:39:45,440
and that sort of piece so there's a

1354
00:39:45,579 --> 00:39:47,219
little bit of the language you have to

1355
00:39:47,239 --> 00:39:49,420
have just to get into the technical part

1356
00:39:49,460 --> 00:39:51,460
of it because they have to work together

1357
00:39:51,902 --> 00:39:52,902
and so yeah that is part of our

1358
00:39:52,942 --> 00:39:53,521
plan is to say

1359
00:39:53,981 --> 00:39:54,862
look, if we don't have the training,

1360
00:39:54,882 --> 00:39:56,302
I'll point you at it all day long.

1361
00:39:56,382 --> 00:39:57,784
And there's a lot of great resources

1362
00:39:57,824 --> 00:39:59,503
already available.

1363
00:40:00,085 --> 00:40:01,164
Exactly.

1364
00:40:01,184 --> 00:40:02,826
There's plenty of certifications in IT.

1365
00:40:03,286 --> 00:40:05,686
CC is one, Security Plus.

1366
00:40:06,547 --> 00:40:08,568
Heck, get a good network certification.

1367
00:40:09,989 --> 00:40:12,590
Even a vendor-based network certification

1368
00:40:12,610 --> 00:40:14,271
will give you some understanding of how

1369
00:40:14,291 --> 00:40:15,130
these things operate.

1370
00:40:15,351 --> 00:40:16,751
The problem is we come into it

1371
00:40:17,632 --> 00:40:19,713
saying that we're AV designers,

1372
00:40:19,773 --> 00:40:22,054
AV integrators, AV people,

1373
00:40:22,494 --> 00:40:24,735
and we have no idea what we're asking

1374
00:40:24,936 --> 00:40:26,217
of other people,

1375
00:40:26,396 --> 00:40:28,557
the other communities involved in our

1376
00:40:28,577 --> 00:40:29,018
deployment.

1377
00:40:29,259 --> 00:40:31,900
The crazy part is we do this really

1378
00:40:31,940 --> 00:40:33,760
well with everybody other than IT.

1379
00:40:34,742 --> 00:40:36,563
We have coordination documents

1380
00:40:37,003 --> 00:40:38,985
that are excellent, that go to architects,

1381
00:40:39,005 --> 00:40:40,905
that go to mechanical vendors,

1382
00:40:40,925 --> 00:40:42,266
that go to contractors, right?

1383
00:40:42,527 --> 00:40:43,947
But when it comes to IT,

1384
00:40:44,369 --> 00:40:45,929
you send them a signal flow drawing,

1385
00:40:45,969 --> 00:40:49,291
which is every network person that looks

1386
00:40:49,351 --> 00:40:50,233
at a signal flow is like,

1387
00:40:50,413 --> 00:40:51,114
what the hell is this?

1388
00:40:52,534 --> 00:40:53,394
Why are you giving me this?

1389
00:40:53,514 --> 00:40:54,496
What does this mean?

1390
00:40:55,277 --> 00:40:56,237
And that's the problem, right?

1391
00:40:56,797 --> 00:40:58,539
We've stopped somewhere along the way

1392
00:40:58,559 --> 00:40:59,599
saying this is not my job.

1393
00:40:59,719 --> 00:41:00,400
I don't know why.

1394
00:41:01,081 --> 00:41:01,922
But it is our job.

1395
00:41:01,942 --> 00:41:03,202
There's a lot of animosity still that's

1396
00:41:03,222 --> 00:41:04,702
built up over the years, right?

1397
00:41:04,742 --> 00:41:05,983
And so I think a lot of us,

1398
00:41:06,724 --> 00:41:07,625
we put things on,

1399
00:41:07,644 --> 00:41:09,927
I'm going to use their network, right?

1400
00:41:09,947 --> 00:41:10,807
So here that is.

1401
00:41:11,248 --> 00:41:13,588
And then we get the sense,

1402
00:41:13,628 --> 00:41:15,150
we're going to go talk to a network

1403
00:41:15,170 --> 00:41:15,871
security group today.

1404
00:41:16,150 --> 00:41:16,871
And everybody's like, okay,

1405
00:41:16,891 --> 00:41:17,552
you got your cheat sheet.

1406
00:41:17,572 --> 00:41:19,873
You got to just have the lingo right.

1407
00:41:19,893 --> 00:41:22,114
Because it's like unlocking an API.

1408
00:41:22,394 --> 00:41:24,275
If you don't have the correct code words,

1409
00:41:24,295 --> 00:41:24,556
it's done.

1410
00:41:24,577 --> 00:41:24,916
They're like,

1411
00:41:24,936 --> 00:41:26,157
you don't even know what the fuck you're

1412
00:41:26,177 --> 00:41:26,557
talking about.

1413
00:41:27,079 --> 00:41:27,641
Well,

1414
00:41:27,740 --> 00:41:29,385
and also to just as well as we

1415
00:41:29,405 --> 00:41:30,510
do, like they use their acronym.

1416
00:41:30,530 --> 00:41:31,092
We don't know what it is.

1417
00:41:31,152 --> 00:41:31,813
And that's it.

1418
00:41:31,893 --> 00:41:32,135
It's open.

1419
00:41:32,155 --> 00:41:34,000
And also you get one shot to authenticate.

1420
00:41:34,818 --> 00:41:35,518
In reality,

1421
00:41:35,619 --> 00:41:37,440
when you're communicating with a network

1422
00:41:37,460 --> 00:41:38,679
group or security group,

1423
00:41:39,661 --> 00:41:42,902
you as a AV professional, any of us,

1424
00:41:43,483 --> 00:41:44,764
don't make these things.

1425
00:41:44,824 --> 00:41:46,925
We're not making these boxes.

1426
00:41:47,405 --> 00:41:49,146
And so we're relying on the manufacturer's

1427
00:41:49,186 --> 00:41:49,927
documentation.

1428
00:41:50,427 --> 00:41:52,369
And so we conjure that up.

1429
00:41:52,389 --> 00:41:53,168
We call our reps.

1430
00:41:53,188 --> 00:41:54,409
We're like, do you have anything else?

1431
00:41:54,429 --> 00:41:55,510
Because this is shit.

1432
00:41:55,530 --> 00:41:56,590
I need some more information.

1433
00:41:56,630 --> 00:41:58,652
They send you some more stuff that's like

1434
00:41:58,711 --> 00:42:00,373
closed up in the back room that they're

1435
00:42:00,393 --> 00:42:01,034
not going to let out.

1436
00:42:01,054 --> 00:42:02,315
And you give that to the network group

1437
00:42:02,335 --> 00:42:02,715
and they're like,

1438
00:42:03,688 --> 00:42:04,889
none of this makes any sense.

1439
00:42:04,909 --> 00:42:05,369
You're an idiot.

1440
00:42:05,391 --> 00:42:07,751
We're like, ah,

1441
00:42:07,773 --> 00:42:09,614
so it starts with the manufacturers

1442
00:42:09,673 --> 00:42:10,034
really.

1443
00:42:10,255 --> 00:42:12,056
And it, and it flows from there.

1444
00:42:12,255 --> 00:42:13,197
That's the reality of it.

1445
00:42:13,217 --> 00:42:13,818
The biggest,

1446
00:42:13,858 --> 00:42:15,858
whatever thing in the world and give them

1447
00:42:15,898 --> 00:42:16,059
that.

1448
00:42:16,219 --> 00:42:18,802
I think this is an immature product.

1449
00:42:18,942 --> 00:42:21,264
Like we can't make up what the boxes.

1450
00:42:21,284 --> 00:42:21,523
Hold on here.

1451
00:42:24,126 --> 00:42:25,027
Here's the thing that I,

1452
00:42:25,266 --> 00:42:27,188
I struggle with is that,

1453
00:42:27,528 --> 00:42:27,889
Yes.

1454
00:42:27,989 --> 00:42:29,331
Security people are kind of throwing their

1455
00:42:29,351 --> 00:42:32,092
hands up and, you know, be like,

1456
00:42:32,432 --> 00:42:34,215
I think there's some there's some there's

1457
00:42:34,235 --> 00:42:36,157
something to be said for, hey,

1458
00:42:36,177 --> 00:42:37,498
we need to go patch things up with

1459
00:42:37,697 --> 00:42:38,418
security people.

1460
00:42:38,458 --> 00:42:39,539
We've been, you know,

1461
00:42:39,559 --> 00:42:40,760
letting our dog take a dump in their

1462
00:42:40,780 --> 00:42:42,322
yard every day and not cleaning it up

1463
00:42:42,362 --> 00:42:43,663
and then going, hey, neighbor.

1464
00:42:43,922 --> 00:42:44,724
And that's rude.

1465
00:42:44,764 --> 00:42:45,445
Moving on.

1466
00:42:45,485 --> 00:42:46,224
That's rude.

1467
00:42:46,985 --> 00:42:47,445
Wait.

1468
00:42:47,646 --> 00:42:47,927
It is.

1469
00:42:48,067 --> 00:42:49,148
One thing I would say is,

1470
00:42:49,547 --> 00:42:52,570
is I can't think of anyone who got

1471
00:42:52,610 --> 00:42:54,713
all the gear to the to their warehouse.

1472
00:42:55,333 --> 00:42:57,233
got it in a rack and then just

1473
00:42:57,275 --> 00:42:59,715
ran a basic vulnerability like a standard

1474
00:42:59,936 --> 00:43:03,099
vapt test on that gear and just check

1475
00:43:03,119 --> 00:43:04,360
to see if there's anything going on on

1476
00:43:04,400 --> 00:43:06,722
it yeah right and so hey okay cool

1477
00:43:06,742 --> 00:43:09,302
did you you know have you done your

1478
00:43:09,322 --> 00:43:10,543
basics like did you did you at least

1479
00:43:10,563 --> 00:43:11,425
check it out and make sure it's not

1480
00:43:11,505 --> 00:43:13,425
goofy or weird and you go i don't

1481
00:43:13,445 --> 00:43:14,646
know what you're talking about where i'm

1482
00:43:14,666 --> 00:43:16,128
just gonna throw it on your network so

1483
00:43:16,168 --> 00:43:18,010
now i have to do it while it's

1484
00:43:18,090 --> 00:43:19,251
on my production network

1485
00:43:20,619 --> 00:43:21,800
Well, we've been burned on this.

1486
00:43:21,840 --> 00:43:23,081
So we will, you know,

1487
00:43:23,141 --> 00:43:25,364
we'll lab it up or whatever one time.

1488
00:43:25,543 --> 00:43:26,244
Yeah, that's great.

1489
00:43:26,264 --> 00:43:27,505
Oh, this thing, this thing.

1490
00:43:28,186 --> 00:43:29,628
That's the other thing is the scale of

1491
00:43:29,668 --> 00:43:29,847
this.

1492
00:43:29,887 --> 00:43:31,148
So we lab it up.

1493
00:43:31,168 --> 00:43:33,811
Let's say it's a manufacturer X model Y.

1494
00:43:34,271 --> 00:43:35,753
We're like, OK, well, it passed.

1495
00:43:36,112 --> 00:43:37,875
There's no documentation that it says it's

1496
00:43:37,954 --> 00:43:39,755
using Telnet and you buy them.

1497
00:43:39,775 --> 00:43:40,556
And then, you know,

1498
00:43:40,637 --> 00:43:43,699
part of our practice is, you know,

1499
00:43:43,940 --> 00:43:45,721
we have to have the security group scan

1500
00:43:45,981 --> 00:43:47,402
our devices when they do end up on

1501
00:43:47,422 --> 00:43:48,784
our network because sometimes they do.

1502
00:43:50,027 --> 00:43:51,728
Um, I joke about network islands a lot,

1503
00:43:51,748 --> 00:43:52,847
but you know, it's whatever.

1504
00:43:53,628 --> 00:43:53,987
Yeah.

1505
00:43:54,047 --> 00:43:55,268
And then all of a sudden they,

1506
00:43:55,509 --> 00:43:57,608
they have this new firmware and then

1507
00:43:57,628 --> 00:43:59,010
there's this new thing exposed.

1508
00:43:59,090 --> 00:44:00,630
And now we look like idiots again,

1509
00:44:00,650 --> 00:44:01,889
because the security team caught it.

1510
00:44:01,929 --> 00:44:02,851
Like, why didn't you catch this?

1511
00:44:02,891 --> 00:44:03,650
Well, I'm not,

1512
00:44:03,670 --> 00:44:05,670
I'm not scanning every system that I have.

1513
00:44:05,710 --> 00:44:07,172
Cause we don't have the personnel to do

1514
00:44:07,211 --> 00:44:07,391
that.

1515
00:44:07,411 --> 00:44:08,411
And it goes,

1516
00:44:08,431 --> 00:44:09,592
it kind of goes back to the resources

1517
00:44:09,632 --> 00:44:09,853
too.

1518
00:44:10,213 --> 00:44:10,793
It's a, it's a.

1519
00:44:11,755 --> 00:44:14,056
it's a game cyclical thing that just never

1520
00:44:14,137 --> 00:44:14,317
ends.

1521
00:44:14,356 --> 00:44:14,838
Right.

1522
00:44:15,077 --> 00:44:15,157
But,

1523
00:44:15,297 --> 00:44:17,460
but I think that understanding who's

1524
00:44:17,500 --> 00:44:19,161
responsible, if you know that you're,

1525
00:44:20,061 --> 00:44:21,864
you're kind of responsible because you're

1526
00:44:21,903 --> 00:44:23,405
going to allow that firmware to go on,

1527
00:44:23,945 --> 00:44:25,206
but giving them a heads up being like,

1528
00:44:25,367 --> 00:44:25,527
Hey,

1529
00:44:25,547 --> 00:44:26,527
we're going to be pushing some new

1530
00:44:26,547 --> 00:44:26,989
firmware.

1531
00:44:27,509 --> 00:44:28,469
Just so you know.

1532
00:44:29,010 --> 00:44:29,931
Well, you don't even know.

1533
00:44:30,070 --> 00:44:31,871
You buy the product and it came with

1534
00:44:31,931 --> 00:44:31,992
it.

1535
00:44:32,012 --> 00:44:32,411
And you're like,

1536
00:44:32,873 --> 00:44:34,653
I didn't read every manual every time I

1537
00:44:34,693 --> 00:44:35,954
buy a product.

1538
00:44:36,014 --> 00:44:39,757
The one I tested came with version two

1539
00:44:39,797 --> 00:44:40,418
point oh.

1540
00:44:40,538 --> 00:44:41,958
And well, I mean,

1541
00:44:42,018 --> 00:44:43,079
I'll let you in on a secret.

1542
00:44:43,119 --> 00:44:44,880
I don't think all the manufacturers made

1543
00:44:44,920 --> 00:44:46,041
it either.

1544
00:44:46,181 --> 00:44:46,822
Exactly.

1545
00:44:47,101 --> 00:44:49,163
That's my point, Frank.

1546
00:44:49,222 --> 00:44:51,103
There's probably one person or two or a

1547
00:44:51,163 --> 00:44:53,103
small group of people who understand that

1548
00:44:53,164 --> 00:44:54,304
six-page white paper.

1549
00:44:54,724 --> 00:44:55,945
You're probably getting it from a rep.

1550
00:44:56,045 --> 00:44:58,925
They've seen two pages in it.

1551
00:44:58,985 --> 00:45:00,726
Heck, we have AI today, right?

1552
00:45:01,606 --> 00:45:02,686
I think AI is going to be a

1553
00:45:02,726 --> 00:45:04,547
bridge in a lot of these communications.

1554
00:45:04,646 --> 00:45:05,047
It has to.

1555
00:45:05,646 --> 00:45:06,168
It has to.

1556
00:45:07,927 --> 00:45:08,748
At some point,

1557
00:45:08,909 --> 00:45:11,269
we have to understand that our language

1558
00:45:11,329 --> 00:45:13,710
needs to align with whoever we're talking

1559
00:45:13,751 --> 00:45:15,572
to, otherwise our products.

1560
00:45:15,612 --> 00:45:17,932
And it doesn't help that there are still

1561
00:45:18,172 --> 00:45:19,492
strong proponents of,

1562
00:45:19,954 --> 00:45:21,713
let's build it out on our own island,

1563
00:45:21,753 --> 00:45:23,355
let's build it out on our own thing.

1564
00:45:23,474 --> 00:45:24,014
And you know what?

1565
00:45:24,615 --> 00:45:25,376
I'm okay with that.

1566
00:45:26,155 --> 00:45:28,697
If that's how your deployment strategy

1567
00:45:28,757 --> 00:45:29,157
works,

1568
00:45:29,697 --> 00:45:31,539
and if the client is okay with it,

1569
00:45:32,539 --> 00:45:34,521
Attach a risk profile to that and tell

1570
00:45:34,541 --> 00:45:35,260
them, hey,

1571
00:45:35,721 --> 00:45:37,382
we have no idea what's on your switch,

1572
00:45:37,541 --> 00:45:39,023
but we know your switches exist.

1573
00:45:39,182 --> 00:45:41,023
If that's okay with the client, sure.

1574
00:45:41,824 --> 00:45:42,364
But that's the thing.

1575
00:45:42,603 --> 00:45:44,204
We need to be able to give those

1576
00:45:44,405 --> 00:45:47,146
educated opinions, educated, qualified,

1577
00:45:47,507 --> 00:45:49,166
technical conversations about our

1578
00:45:49,206 --> 00:45:49,568
products.

1579
00:45:49,628 --> 00:45:50,867
If we're selling a product,

1580
00:45:51,407 --> 00:45:52,389
if we own a product,

1581
00:45:52,889 --> 00:45:53,628
we need to own it.

1582
00:45:54,130 --> 00:45:54,989
We need to understand it.

1583
00:45:55,010 --> 00:45:57,010
That's basic, basic, basic.

1584
00:45:57,411 --> 00:46:00,431
Any sales one-on-one.

1585
00:46:00,731 --> 00:46:01,833
I'm curious about how

1586
00:46:03,572 --> 00:46:06,293
we go beyond this black box strategy.

1587
00:46:06,313 --> 00:46:08,695
Because as we look forward,

1588
00:46:09,655 --> 00:46:11,275
I for one believe that it becomes less

1589
00:46:11,295 --> 00:46:12,097
about the black boxes.

1590
00:46:12,117 --> 00:46:14,538
When we start throwing in things like

1591
00:46:14,577 --> 00:46:14,978
cloud,

1592
00:46:15,862 --> 00:46:18,063
And service delivery from that.

1593
00:46:18,083 --> 00:46:20,385
That is a whole different layer of this

1594
00:46:20,445 --> 00:46:22,788
cake that I can tell right now from

1595
00:46:22,827 --> 00:46:24,730
my recent interactions with all these

1596
00:46:25,050 --> 00:46:27,592
monitoring companies and the manufacturers

1597
00:46:27,612 --> 00:46:28,293
they're tying up to.

1598
00:46:28,893 --> 00:46:31,135
I believe the industry is way out over

1599
00:46:31,175 --> 00:46:31,556
its skis.

1600
00:46:32,376 --> 00:46:34,057
Way out over its skis on a lot

1601
00:46:34,097 --> 00:46:34,818
of things right now.

1602
00:46:35,338 --> 00:46:36,099
And I don't know how...

1603
00:46:37,092 --> 00:46:38,574
they're going to pull things back because

1604
00:46:38,614 --> 00:46:39,976
right now they're trying to figure out how

1605
00:46:39,996 --> 00:46:41,559
to monetize things faster than they can

1606
00:46:41,619 --> 00:46:42,239
even support them.

1607
00:46:42,780 --> 00:46:45,585
And I think one of the things I

1608
00:46:45,605 --> 00:46:46,206
was going to ask on,

1609
00:46:46,246 --> 00:46:47,507
I think it dovetails here, Mark,

1610
00:46:47,547 --> 00:46:49,050
under your question is that I've heard

1611
00:46:49,090 --> 00:46:51,193
Colin say several times, IOT, IOT.

1612
00:46:51,594 --> 00:46:53,436
The only thing that my, like my people,

1613
00:46:54,056 --> 00:46:54,237
uh,

1614
00:46:54,277 --> 00:46:57,139
security people hate the term more than AV

1615
00:46:57,219 --> 00:46:57,820
is IOT.

1616
00:46:57,840 --> 00:46:59,001
Um,

1617
00:46:59,041 --> 00:47:01,322
but IOT because of the internet of things,

1618
00:47:01,541 --> 00:47:01,702
right?

1619
00:47:01,742 --> 00:47:03,222
That's the internet connected to the

1620
00:47:03,242 --> 00:47:03,523
cloud.

1621
00:47:03,784 --> 00:47:04,284
I agree.

1622
00:47:04,443 --> 00:47:06,646
I think we are moving to Mark's point.

1623
00:47:06,686 --> 00:47:08,266
We are moving to an IOT.

1624
00:47:08,306 --> 00:47:10,447
We are moving to a cloud persistence.

1625
00:47:10,487 --> 00:47:12,429
We are moving to a true internet of

1626
00:47:12,469 --> 00:47:15,152
things, whether or not they'd move audio,

1627
00:47:15,211 --> 00:47:16,612
video, something else.

1628
00:47:17,452 --> 00:47:18,393
So I was interested.

1629
00:47:18,554 --> 00:47:20,054
I was going to ask similar to call

1630
00:47:20,074 --> 00:47:21,596
it like you keep saying IOT,

1631
00:47:21,695 --> 00:47:22,356
which I agree with.

1632
00:47:22,737 --> 00:47:22,856
Um,

1633
00:47:23,952 --> 00:47:25,474
but that brings all these other challenges

1634
00:47:25,534 --> 00:47:26,215
to what Mark said.

1635
00:47:26,777 --> 00:47:27,797
How do we merge that?

1636
00:47:27,838 --> 00:47:30,541
How do we take it from the trons

1637
00:47:30,601 --> 00:47:31,782
to the cloud?

1638
00:47:32,023 --> 00:47:33,344
It's not just to have an account and

1639
00:47:33,364 --> 00:47:34,565
you owe your provision and you're paying

1640
00:47:34,585 --> 00:47:35,628
your thousands of dollars a month.

1641
00:47:35,668 --> 00:47:36,449
Well, everything's good.

1642
00:47:36,489 --> 00:47:37,269
It's like, no, no, no, no, no.

1643
00:47:37,289 --> 00:47:39,331
There's so much more to this story.

1644
00:47:40,009 --> 00:47:41,389
I think this is a little bit,

1645
00:47:41,949 --> 00:47:43,690
this is a challenge for even the IT

1646
00:47:43,710 --> 00:47:45,391
folks because, you know,

1647
00:47:45,431 --> 00:47:47,552
removing AV from the conversation,

1648
00:47:47,693 --> 00:47:50,295
the area of IoT security is honestly kind

1649
00:47:50,335 --> 00:47:51,815
of a new space for a lot of

1650
00:47:51,835 --> 00:47:53,096
people by itself, right?

1651
00:47:53,755 --> 00:47:54,597
So, you know,

1652
00:47:55,697 --> 00:47:57,557
it's helpful to be able to articulate,

1653
00:47:57,617 --> 00:47:57,938
I think,

1654
00:47:58,139 --> 00:48:00,920
that your devices are non-standard on the

1655
00:48:00,980 --> 00:48:01,360
network,

1656
00:48:01,400 --> 00:48:01,880
but also

1657
00:48:03,342 --> 00:48:05,184
the IT folks that a lot of people

1658
00:48:05,224 --> 00:48:07,065
are used to working with don't necessarily

1659
00:48:07,085 --> 00:48:08,786
have an immediate answer to the question,

1660
00:48:08,826 --> 00:48:08,927
hey,

1661
00:48:08,967 --> 00:48:11,268
how do you secure your IoT devices either?

1662
00:48:12,469 --> 00:48:14,451
Which is why it's all the more important

1663
00:48:14,490 --> 00:48:16,291
that we're able to articulate at least for

1664
00:48:16,331 --> 00:48:18,153
our own technology stack,

1665
00:48:18,173 --> 00:48:20,655
like what the needs and responsible usage

1666
00:48:20,695 --> 00:48:21,275
of that is.

1667
00:48:22,518 --> 00:48:23,878
I agree with the being out over our

1668
00:48:23,898 --> 00:48:24,599
skis thing.

1669
00:48:24,699 --> 00:48:26,782
History kind of usually shows that there's

1670
00:48:26,842 --> 00:48:28,242
a little bit of a rubber band effect

1671
00:48:28,302 --> 00:48:30,284
at some point when that starts to bite

1672
00:48:30,324 --> 00:48:31,025
us on the butt.

1673
00:48:33,088 --> 00:48:35,889
That was the journey and the experience

1674
00:48:35,911 --> 00:48:37,172
when we started to venture onto the

1675
00:48:37,211 --> 00:48:38,873
network in the first place with a couple

1676
00:48:38,893 --> 00:48:40,795
of things about application security and

1677
00:48:40,815 --> 00:48:41,576
functions online.

1678
00:48:41,976 --> 00:48:43,655
networking protocols and stuff like that.

1679
00:48:44,617 --> 00:48:46,016
I don't know what that catalyst is going

1680
00:48:46,036 --> 00:48:49,757
to be, but supply-demand situation,

1681
00:48:49,818 --> 00:48:51,458
if people are looking for more features

1682
00:48:51,498 --> 00:48:53,358
for maturation of their devices,

1683
00:48:53,378 --> 00:48:54,659
then usually there's a lot of stuff that

1684
00:48:54,699 --> 00:48:56,659
happens to catch up when it needs to

1685
00:48:56,699 --> 00:48:57,039
happen.

1686
00:48:57,900 --> 00:48:58,820
Usually there's a little bit of a

1687
00:48:58,880 --> 00:49:00,501
punishment first.

1688
00:49:00,581 --> 00:49:03,380
I think we all have CISOs or some

1689
00:49:03,420 --> 00:49:04,782
version of that on our campus.

1690
00:49:05,402 --> 00:49:07,001
I've had some recent conversations and a

1691
00:49:07,041 --> 00:49:08,782
lot of the belief is it's not the

1692
00:49:08,842 --> 00:49:10,262
traditional vector of attack.

1693
00:49:10,842 --> 00:49:12,184
It's not from an actor who's going to

1694
00:49:12,224 --> 00:49:13,025
come into our network.

1695
00:49:13,045 --> 00:49:14,847
The calls are going to come from inside

1696
00:49:14,887 --> 00:49:15,347
of the house.

1697
00:49:15,367 --> 00:49:17,030
That's going to be something that's here

1698
00:49:17,250 --> 00:49:19,313
that's going to call out and invite in

1699
00:49:19,592 --> 00:49:20,293
what's going on.

1700
00:49:20,353 --> 00:49:22,096
Probably those high school students we

1701
00:49:22,115 --> 00:49:23,536
just talked about earlier.

1702
00:49:23,556 --> 00:49:25,400
That's a different traditional posture

1703
00:49:25,440 --> 00:49:27,362
than your normal security.

1704
00:49:27,382 --> 00:49:29,664
And I think just the volume of stuff

1705
00:49:29,684 --> 00:49:30,565
that we have

1706
00:49:31,463 --> 00:49:33,103
makes them look at us a little bit

1707
00:49:33,123 --> 00:49:33,364
differently.

1708
00:49:33,385 --> 00:49:35,025
You have a lot of stuff that can

1709
00:49:35,065 --> 00:49:36,567
potentially communicate to the cloud

1710
00:49:36,586 --> 00:49:38,088
system, which we have no control over.

1711
00:49:38,288 --> 00:49:40,050
Well, not only that,

1712
00:49:40,230 --> 00:49:41,630
we have a lot of stuff,

1713
00:49:41,710 --> 00:49:44,333
and this is a very, very real concern,

1714
00:49:44,913 --> 00:49:46,213
is that anymore,

1715
00:49:47,514 --> 00:49:49,476
we're getting a little deeper into some of

1716
00:49:49,496 --> 00:49:51,338
the major issues and the things that give

1717
00:49:51,398 --> 00:49:52,099
me stress.

1718
00:49:52,878 --> 00:49:55,679
is that it is entirely possible,

1719
00:49:55,699 --> 00:49:57,780
because it has been caught numerous times

1720
00:49:57,840 --> 00:49:58,221
already,

1721
00:49:58,920 --> 00:50:01,581
for a device to record information

1722
00:50:02,402 --> 00:50:02,862
locally,

1723
00:50:04,262 --> 00:50:05,862
wait for an opportunity to open up a

1724
00:50:05,882 --> 00:50:06,563
window to open up,

1725
00:50:06,583 --> 00:50:08,023
and then exfiltrate that data out.

1726
00:50:08,304 --> 00:50:09,885
And when you have devices that are sitting

1727
00:50:09,905 --> 00:50:12,365
and listening to private conversations,

1728
00:50:12,945 --> 00:50:14,266
privileged conversations,

1729
00:50:15,487 --> 00:50:16,547
I can set advice to be like, hey,

1730
00:50:16,586 --> 00:50:17,987
look for the CEO of this company.

1731
00:50:18,108 --> 00:50:19,188
When you see that dude's face,

1732
00:50:19,228 --> 00:50:20,467
you start recording that audio.

1733
00:50:20,867 --> 00:50:21,969
Transcribe it to text.

1734
00:50:22,528 --> 00:50:24,271
Hide that text somewhere encrypted and

1735
00:50:24,291 --> 00:50:25,534
next time there's a little call out,

1736
00:50:25,574 --> 00:50:27,295
send that out and maybe we'll learn

1737
00:50:27,335 --> 00:50:28,318
something, you know,

1738
00:50:28,338 --> 00:50:30,099
and that's the kind of thing that we

1739
00:50:30,161 --> 00:50:30,420
are.

1740
00:50:31,001 --> 00:50:32,563
We are especially dangerous,

1741
00:50:32,643 --> 00:50:35,128
not just because we are an attack vector

1742
00:50:35,889 --> 00:50:37,972
that exists and is kind of forgotten

1743
00:50:37,992 --> 00:50:38,333
about.

1744
00:50:39,400 --> 00:50:41,121
But we are also capable of doing a

1745
00:50:41,181 --> 00:50:42,782
lot more damage because of what we can

1746
00:50:42,822 --> 00:50:43,182
bring in.

1747
00:50:43,643 --> 00:50:45,065
You've seen what's happened with the flock

1748
00:50:45,085 --> 00:50:45,505
cameras.

1749
00:50:45,846 --> 00:50:47,746
Their credibility is absolutely destroyed

1750
00:50:47,788 --> 00:50:48,188
right now.

1751
00:50:48,827 --> 00:50:49,648
And you watch the videos.

1752
00:50:49,688 --> 00:50:51,291
It's so easy to get into a flock

1753
00:50:51,311 --> 00:50:54,032
camera and just watch what's going on.

1754
00:50:54,052 --> 00:50:54,994
That's a lot of power.

1755
00:50:55,014 --> 00:50:56,835
Because if I can find a flock camera

1756
00:50:56,876 --> 00:51:00,478
somewhere that has privileged activities

1757
00:51:00,518 --> 00:51:01,239
going on in it,

1758
00:51:02,039 --> 00:51:04,561
I'm not now just getting into a camera.

1759
00:51:04,702 --> 00:51:06,503
I'm potentially getting information that I

1760
00:51:06,543 --> 00:51:08,465
should not have access to and probably

1761
00:51:08,485 --> 00:51:09,485
wouldn't have any other way.

1762
00:51:09,547 --> 00:51:12,329
And so we are in a very dangerous

1763
00:51:12,369 --> 00:51:14,110
position because we have put these things

1764
00:51:14,170 --> 00:51:16,251
inside of boardrooms.

1765
00:51:16,271 --> 00:51:18,414
We put this inside of government agencies.

1766
00:51:19,175 --> 00:51:23,038
And that's what stresses me out about it

1767
00:51:23,077 --> 00:51:28,262
is that we're such a widespread

1768
00:51:29,215 --> 00:51:30,556
technology based like everyone just

1769
00:51:30,615 --> 00:51:31,936
assumed you're going to have some sort of

1770
00:51:31,956 --> 00:51:32,976
video calling at this point.

1771
00:51:34,056 --> 00:51:36,318
But we're I don't think we're really up

1772
00:51:36,378 --> 00:51:36,677
to it.

1773
00:51:36,697 --> 00:51:40,820
I think it's the philosophical approach

1774
00:51:41,240 --> 00:51:42,420
from the years is like in q one,

1775
00:51:42,440 --> 00:51:43,681
we're going to sell this black box q

1776
00:51:43,702 --> 00:51:44,942
two, we're gonna sell this black box.

1777
00:51:45,081 --> 00:51:45,842
And yeah,

1778
00:51:45,862 --> 00:51:47,422
I think the industry is just overly

1779
00:51:47,463 --> 00:51:49,443
concerned about the better mousetrap

1780
00:51:49,483 --> 00:51:51,344
continuously that they're just not seeing

1781
00:51:51,364 --> 00:51:52,626
the entirety of this picture.

1782
00:51:53,246 --> 00:51:55,588
And they're not even staffed and their

1783
00:51:55,648 --> 00:51:58,068
organizational structure is not made up to

1784
00:51:58,269 --> 00:51:59,931
even dive into this.

1785
00:52:00,990 --> 00:52:02,632
We've engaged with the conversation and

1786
00:52:02,652 --> 00:52:04,554
they're just like,

1787
00:52:05,574 --> 00:52:07,496
they look at you in the biggest of

1788
00:52:07,536 --> 00:52:08,797
the big ones, all AV.

1789
00:52:08,876 --> 00:52:09,918
I want to throw them all in the

1790
00:52:09,958 --> 00:52:10,498
same bucket.

1791
00:52:11,559 --> 00:52:13,860
Nobody is tall enough to engage in this

1792
00:52:14,420 --> 00:52:15,981
for this ride and have the conversation

1793
00:52:16,021 --> 00:52:18,583
that they're too concerned about staying

1794
00:52:18,664 --> 00:52:20,304
solvent than they are solving the network

1795
00:52:20,324 --> 00:52:20,605
problem.

1796
00:52:21,481 --> 00:52:22,824
I mean, to be honest,

1797
00:52:22,943 --> 00:52:24,485
that's one of the reasons it was really

1798
00:52:24,505 --> 00:52:26,728
important to us to start AV Trust as

1799
00:52:26,748 --> 00:52:27,550
a nonprofit.

1800
00:52:28,231 --> 00:52:31,014
I think it's really tricky for a company

1801
00:52:31,034 --> 00:52:34,278
to prioritize security over revenue when

1802
00:52:34,298 --> 00:52:36,461
your whole business model revolves around

1803
00:52:36,501 --> 00:52:37,523
sales, right?

1804
00:52:39,105 --> 00:52:40,887
something that we kind of have to our

1805
00:52:41,086 --> 00:52:42,548
advantage or to our credit.

1806
00:52:42,608 --> 00:52:43,909
And I hope this is, you know,

1807
00:52:44,010 --> 00:52:46,552
ultimately what helps other people or help

1808
00:52:46,652 --> 00:52:48,494
other organizations is like we would be

1809
00:52:49,135 --> 00:52:50,317
one of the only, you know,

1810
00:52:50,677 --> 00:52:53,300
bodies of people that are actively working

1811
00:52:53,360 --> 00:52:54,561
on us because we care about it and

1812
00:52:54,621 --> 00:52:56,182
not because we're being forced to in order

1813
00:52:56,202 --> 00:52:56,722
to make money.

1814
00:52:57,364 --> 00:52:59,063
Right.

1815
00:52:59,204 --> 00:53:00,385
And that's really important in the

1816
00:53:00,425 --> 00:53:01,224
security space.

1817
00:53:01,304 --> 00:53:02,824
There are other industries where that's

1818
00:53:02,864 --> 00:53:04,585
been a precedent to where it's like, hey,

1819
00:53:04,606 --> 00:53:06,405
in order for there to be any kind

1820
00:53:06,465 --> 00:53:10,067
of consistent work put in to help kind

1821
00:53:10,106 --> 00:53:12,688
of keep this thing afloat, you know,

1822
00:53:12,807 --> 00:53:14,949
some some nonprofit participation is

1823
00:53:14,989 --> 00:53:15,449
required.

1824
00:53:15,509 --> 00:53:17,509
And that's that's kind of you know,

1825
00:53:17,628 --> 00:53:19,210
it was very important to us for that

1826
00:53:19,250 --> 00:53:19,570
reason,

1827
00:53:19,590 --> 00:53:21,990
that we would be a source of trust,

1828
00:53:22,210 --> 00:53:23,351
but also just

1829
00:53:24,371 --> 00:53:30,797
People know that we're not making money.

1830
00:53:30,856 --> 00:53:32,018
They're not doing it to make money.

1831
00:53:32,038 --> 00:53:33,418
They're doing it to make sure that it's

1832
00:53:33,438 --> 00:53:34,940
happening and happening for the right

1833
00:53:34,980 --> 00:53:37,041
reasons.

1834
00:53:37,722 --> 00:53:39,364
That's one of the most important parts of

1835
00:53:39,384 --> 00:53:39,603
that.

1836
00:53:40,003 --> 00:53:41,923
So for some of our, there's probably,

1837
00:53:42,164 --> 00:53:45,543
we may have a listener or two that

1838
00:53:45,603 --> 00:53:47,844
are very interested in this.

1839
00:53:49,085 --> 00:53:50,985
Well, not total listeners,

1840
00:53:51,025 --> 00:53:52,385
just that are interested in this.

1841
00:53:55,206 --> 00:53:56,567
Like if they're sitting there thinking,

1842
00:53:56,626 --> 00:53:57,748
how do I get involved with this?

1843
00:53:57,807 --> 00:53:59,347
This sounds awesome.

1844
00:53:59,387 --> 00:54:01,188
This is where I want to go.

1845
00:54:01,248 --> 00:54:03,048
This is my passion also.

1846
00:54:03,088 --> 00:54:05,429
And I've never heard somebody do an

1847
00:54:05,590 --> 00:54:06,489
organization like this.

1848
00:54:07,349 --> 00:54:09,012
How can they get involved with you?

1849
00:54:09,132 --> 00:54:11,253
And what kind of things are you like?

1850
00:54:11,574 --> 00:54:13,496
What kind of helpers are you looking for?

1851
00:54:14,115 --> 00:54:15,416
I'm going to guess you don't just need

1852
00:54:15,476 --> 00:54:16,277
some nerd.

1853
00:54:16,878 --> 00:54:17,259
You know,

1854
00:54:17,278 --> 00:54:19,201
like you have specific initiatives you

1855
00:54:19,221 --> 00:54:20,961
want to go to.

1856
00:54:21,021 --> 00:54:22,202
No more nerds,

1857
00:54:22,402 --> 00:54:24,344
only non-nerds who can communicate.

1858
00:54:24,786 --> 00:54:25,806
No super nerds.

1859
00:54:25,826 --> 00:54:28,608
Got my candy, right?

1860
00:54:28,789 --> 00:54:30,911
But like what skill set,

1861
00:54:30,990 --> 00:54:32,492
not skill set in particular,

1862
00:54:32,552 --> 00:54:34,775
but like your initiatives are X, Y,

1863
00:54:34,795 --> 00:54:36,356
Z right now, your short term goals.

1864
00:54:36,835 --> 00:54:37,956
What kind of people are you looking for

1865
00:54:37,996 --> 00:54:39,018
to help you get there?

1866
00:54:39,077 --> 00:54:40,139
Because as a nonprofit,

1867
00:54:40,159 --> 00:54:41,059
it's not like you're just out there

1868
00:54:41,079 --> 00:54:42,942
throwing money at all these people.

1869
00:54:43,481 --> 00:54:45,164
So if somebody is passionate,

1870
00:54:45,384 --> 00:54:46,846
what kind of passionate person do you

1871
00:54:46,885 --> 00:54:47,166
want?

1872
00:54:48,106 --> 00:54:48,887
Yeah, so I mean,

1873
00:54:48,967 --> 00:54:50,206
it was important to us to be able

1874
00:54:50,226 --> 00:54:51,807
to have a lot of different types of

1875
00:54:51,847 --> 00:54:53,208
people contribute.

1876
00:54:53,248 --> 00:54:54,630
There are going to be people that care

1877
00:54:54,650 --> 00:54:56,371
that don't have a whole bunch of

1878
00:54:56,431 --> 00:54:57,851
cybersecurity training formally,

1879
00:54:57,891 --> 00:54:59,253
but they would potentially want to learn.

1880
00:55:00,474 --> 00:55:02,074
There's also some people that have come to

1881
00:55:02,135 --> 00:55:04,275
us from actual full-time cybersecurity

1882
00:55:04,315 --> 00:55:06,398
jobs that haven't done very much AV that

1883
00:55:06,418 --> 00:55:06,717
were like,

1884
00:55:06,737 --> 00:55:07,998
this is really interesting to us because

1885
00:55:08,018 --> 00:55:09,900
of the IoT conversation, right?

1886
00:55:10,300 --> 00:55:11,000
which is really great.

1887
00:55:11,019 --> 00:55:12,001
And that was honestly the goal.

1888
00:55:12,021 --> 00:55:12,521
We were really,

1889
00:55:12,581 --> 00:55:14,442
really hoping we would get people from

1890
00:55:14,481 --> 00:55:16,003
both sides because that's that's what's

1891
00:55:16,023 --> 00:55:16,822
going to make us better,

1892
00:55:16,842 --> 00:55:20,204
because I think the the being able to

1893
00:55:20,244 --> 00:55:22,664
translate from cybersecurity as a whole to

1894
00:55:22,764 --> 00:55:24,885
audio visual and make sure the lexicon

1895
00:55:24,925 --> 00:55:25,726
works and stuff like that,

1896
00:55:25,766 --> 00:55:27,648
it's going to require a good understanding

1897
00:55:27,728 --> 00:55:29,768
of our environment, our ecosystem,

1898
00:55:29,788 --> 00:55:30,829
our technology stack,

1899
00:55:31,248 --> 00:55:32,409
but also a good understanding of how the

1900
00:55:32,429 --> 00:55:33,530
industry as a whole does things we can

1901
00:55:33,570 --> 00:55:34,230
learn from each other.

1902
00:55:34,389 --> 00:55:35,570
Right.

1903
00:55:36,010 --> 00:55:38,112
So we're kind of putting together a couple

1904
00:55:38,132 --> 00:55:41,034
of different councils about one is

1905
00:55:41,494 --> 00:55:43,257
generally for standards development,

1906
00:55:43,556 --> 00:55:45,878
you know, just understanding, hey,

1907
00:55:45,898 --> 00:55:47,320
this is going to be, you know,

1908
00:55:47,340 --> 00:55:48,661
we talked about what the bare minimum is

1909
00:55:48,702 --> 00:55:50,704
going to be for technology that goes on

1910
00:55:50,724 --> 00:55:52,786
the network that we see from vendors like

1911
00:55:53,246 --> 00:55:54,527
putting together councils to start to

1912
00:55:54,547 --> 00:55:55,887
build those standards a little bit so that

1913
00:55:55,907 --> 00:55:56,588
we can say, hey,

1914
00:55:57,048 --> 00:55:58,469
if you guys want to, you know,

1915
00:55:59,010 --> 00:55:59,570
X vendor,

1916
00:55:59,630 --> 00:56:00,972
if you guys want to have a technology

1917
00:56:01,012 --> 00:56:02,612
product that gets reviewed by us or,

1918
00:56:02,793 --> 00:56:03,673
you know, by a client,

1919
00:56:03,693 --> 00:56:05,135
they ask us for help or whatever.

1920
00:56:05,155 --> 00:56:06,315
These are the standards we're going to use

1921
00:56:06,356 --> 00:56:08,538
to kind of benchmark that, so to speak,

1922
00:56:09,177 --> 00:56:12,121
and kind of start to put that together

1923
00:56:12,181 --> 00:56:13,581
so that people can understand what that is

1924
00:56:13,601 --> 00:56:15,143
and have a common understanding of like

1925
00:56:15,163 --> 00:56:16,224
what the expectation is.

1926
00:56:16,764 --> 00:56:18,405
We're also kind of looking for people to

1927
00:56:18,425 --> 00:56:21,085
help with some events and some training

1928
00:56:21,146 --> 00:56:22,407
materials, education,

1929
00:56:22,447 --> 00:56:23,628
writing documentation,

1930
00:56:23,648 --> 00:56:24,849
because there is a ton of that that's

1931
00:56:24,909 --> 00:56:27,650
so very needed that they'd be able to

1932
00:56:27,730 --> 00:56:30,472
interface with some of our nerds and help

1933
00:56:30,492 --> 00:56:32,333
with some of that in writing and help

1934
00:56:32,393 --> 00:56:33,492
with the education part of it,

1935
00:56:33,512 --> 00:56:34,353
because that's going to be really

1936
00:56:34,393 --> 00:56:35,393
important for us as well.

1937
00:56:36,355 --> 00:56:37,976
I think contact information wise and we

1938
00:56:37,996 --> 00:56:40,077
can share this in any format necessary,

1939
00:56:40,137 --> 00:56:41,518
but we have a Discord right now that

1940
00:56:41,677 --> 00:56:43,798
that's been kind of doing well,

1941
00:56:43,858 --> 00:56:44,418
popping off.

1942
00:56:45,659 --> 00:56:48,643
We have a website, which is aviatrust.org,

1943
00:56:48,702 --> 00:56:50,025
which Colin put a lot of time and

1944
00:56:50,065 --> 00:56:50,844
effort into.

1945
00:56:50,864 --> 00:56:51,806
So that's awesome.

1946
00:56:51,846 --> 00:56:53,568
And our email address and contact info is

1947
00:56:53,608 --> 00:56:55,409
on there as well.

1948
00:56:56,130 --> 00:56:57,251
I put a lot of time and effort

1949
00:56:57,291 --> 00:56:58,873
into it because I'm not good at making

1950
00:56:58,914 --> 00:56:59,454
websites.

1951
00:56:59,534 --> 00:57:01,715
So what you see on there is the

1952
00:57:01,817 --> 00:57:03,637
absolute best I can do.

1953
00:57:04,960 --> 00:57:05,360
Yeah,

1954
00:57:05,420 --> 00:57:06,862
a lot of time and a lot of

1955
00:57:06,902 --> 00:57:07,001
like...

1956
00:57:07,739 --> 00:57:11,862
why why doesn't this work no but yeah

1957
00:57:11,902 --> 00:57:13,023
i think i think the and the other

1958
00:57:13,043 --> 00:57:14,344
thing too is like we do have the

1959
00:57:14,385 --> 00:57:17,407
secretariat council that is meant to uh

1960
00:57:17,507 --> 00:57:21,110
ingest the any sort of security sides to

1961
00:57:21,130 --> 00:57:23,012
it um i i think

1962
00:57:23,873 --> 00:57:25,793
to it's like, yes, we're a nonprofit.

1963
00:57:26,675 --> 00:57:27,514
Yes, we do need money.

1964
00:57:27,614 --> 00:57:29,675
I think one of the things that some

1965
00:57:29,735 --> 00:57:31,257
of the people that we need to interface

1966
00:57:31,277 --> 00:57:32,697
with will not work for free and I

1967
00:57:32,717 --> 00:57:33,597
wouldn't expect them to.

1968
00:57:34,038 --> 00:57:35,818
If I want to hire a security researcher

1969
00:57:36,500 --> 00:57:39,661
to study a family of products,

1970
00:57:40,181 --> 00:57:41,121
I need to be able to buy those

1971
00:57:41,161 --> 00:57:41,541
products,

1972
00:57:41,641 --> 00:57:42,802
pay for that person's time and then

1973
00:57:42,822 --> 00:57:43,882
present that information.

1974
00:57:44,322 --> 00:57:45,844
I'd love to do that in partnership with

1975
00:57:45,884 --> 00:57:47,485
someone so I can put their name on

1976
00:57:47,525 --> 00:57:48,846
it, we use it for marketing, whatever.

1977
00:57:49,445 --> 00:57:50,706
But then it will be freely available to

1978
00:57:50,726 --> 00:57:51,126
everyone.

1979
00:57:51,907 --> 00:57:53,307
That is a really important piece about

1980
00:57:53,327 --> 00:57:55,168
what we talked about is that there's not

1981
00:57:55,208 --> 00:57:56,750
really membership.

1982
00:57:56,769 --> 00:57:57,851
People will be on councils,

1983
00:57:57,891 --> 00:57:58,831
people will be sponsors,

1984
00:57:59,251 --> 00:58:00,351
but everything we do,

1985
00:58:00,371 --> 00:58:01,293
we want to be available.

1986
00:58:01,313 --> 00:58:02,213
If we put on an event,

1987
00:58:02,253 --> 00:58:03,074
we're going to record it,

1988
00:58:03,393 --> 00:58:04,675
we're going to put it on for free

1989
00:58:04,715 --> 00:58:06,675
because it is better for all of us

1990
00:58:06,695 --> 00:58:08,356
that that information is available.

1991
00:58:09,335 --> 00:58:11,175
than to try and turn it into some

1992
00:58:11,235 --> 00:58:13,295
sort of incentive to give us money.

1993
00:58:13,956 --> 00:58:15,197
I just want to get things out there.

1994
00:58:15,237 --> 00:58:18,438
But there is some money necessary to get

1995
00:58:18,458 --> 00:58:18,737
into that,

1996
00:58:18,757 --> 00:58:20,498
because I would like to pay researchers to

1997
00:58:20,878 --> 00:58:21,759
just dive on stuff.

1998
00:58:21,778 --> 00:58:23,420
Send them a box full of stuff and

1999
00:58:23,440 --> 00:58:24,880
say, hey, take this apart.

2000
00:58:24,940 --> 00:58:25,639
Look at the boards.

2001
00:58:25,679 --> 00:58:26,920
Tell me what components are on it.

2002
00:58:27,541 --> 00:58:28,320
tell me what's going on.

2003
00:58:28,440 --> 00:58:29,521
I'd love to, you know, to that point,

2004
00:58:29,541 --> 00:58:30,422
it's like when we talk about like,

2005
00:58:30,481 --> 00:58:31,702
how do we get better with this?

2006
00:58:32,282 --> 00:58:34,003
I don't think anyone,

2007
00:58:34,722 --> 00:58:36,463
there is not currently a YouTube channel

2008
00:58:36,483 --> 00:58:38,465
where someone gets AV gear and opens it

2009
00:58:38,545 --> 00:58:40,644
up and looks at what's actually on there.

2010
00:58:40,684 --> 00:58:44,306
And there's a famous picture that, um,

2011
00:58:44,327 --> 00:58:46,367
this has gone around us every time the

2012
00:58:46,407 --> 00:58:47,807
sticker, the warranty sticker.

2013
00:58:48,188 --> 00:58:48,947
Oh yeah.

2014
00:58:48,967 --> 00:58:50,809
There's that last screw and you can't,

2015
00:58:50,929 --> 00:58:52,148
you cannot get through it.

2016
00:58:52,168 --> 00:58:53,590
It stops me every time.

2017
00:58:53,690 --> 00:58:54,449
I'll just tell you.

2018
00:58:55,210 --> 00:58:57,333
It's your deep conscious.

2019
00:58:57,873 --> 00:58:57,974
No,

2020
00:58:57,994 --> 00:58:59,695
but there's a famous picture of this

2021
00:58:59,835 --> 00:59:04,239
converter box that is filled with USB to

2022
00:59:04,519 --> 00:59:06,762
BNC converters.

2023
00:59:06,943 --> 00:59:09,786
And then there's an Arduino and a

2024
00:59:09,826 --> 00:59:10,646
Raspberry Pi.

2025
00:59:10,706 --> 00:59:11,628
And it's in a chassis.

2026
00:59:11,688 --> 00:59:12,268
It looks like a product,

2027
00:59:12,289 --> 00:59:13,210
but you open it up and they just...

2028
00:59:13,590 --> 00:59:15,210
have stuffed a bunch of stuff in there,

2029
00:59:15,550 --> 00:59:16,431
coded it together,

2030
00:59:16,512 --> 00:59:17,711
put some nice interfaces on it,

2031
00:59:17,731 --> 00:59:19,032
and shipped it out.

2032
00:59:21,434 --> 00:59:22,474
It's insane.

2033
00:59:22,554 --> 00:59:25,436
Chris is already on it.

2034
00:59:25,456 --> 00:59:26,717
He's like, I got this.

2035
00:59:28,938 --> 00:59:30,398
I think this is actually a really good...

2036
00:59:32,367 --> 00:59:34,206
chance for higher ed to just like you

2037
00:59:34,226 --> 00:59:36,347
mentioned before to really dive in because

2038
00:59:36,807 --> 00:59:38,248
I think there is a level of importance

2039
00:59:38,288 --> 00:59:40,829
of like third party in this right where

2040
00:59:40,889 --> 00:59:44,028
it's sometimes we're not going to take the

2041
00:59:44,048 --> 00:59:45,150
manufacturers and say, Okay,

2042
00:59:45,170 --> 00:59:46,690
they've they've done these things where

2043
00:59:47,190 --> 00:59:49,630
we're talking about large scale enterprise

2044
00:59:49,650 --> 00:59:52,610
deployments that have mature security

2045
00:59:52,650 --> 00:59:54,172
parts within their organization,

2046
00:59:54,231 --> 00:59:55,411
they can actually do

2047
00:59:56,211 --> 00:59:58,373
this testing and do the reporting at

2048
00:59:58,434 --> 00:59:58,733
scale,

2049
00:59:58,833 --> 01:00:01,615
I think higher ed is perfectly positioned

2050
01:00:01,695 --> 01:00:02,436
to do that.

2051
01:00:02,456 --> 01:00:04,579
And I think that this is a great

2052
01:00:04,619 --> 01:00:06,019
vertical to kind of start getting that

2053
01:00:06,099 --> 01:00:06,619
word out.

2054
01:00:06,659 --> 01:00:07,900
And if nothing else,

2055
01:00:07,920 --> 01:00:09,722
like if you're listening to this now and

2056
01:00:10,202 --> 01:00:11,164
you think you can contribute,

2057
01:00:11,945 --> 01:00:13,166
you have to reach out to these guys.

2058
01:00:13,186 --> 01:00:14,126
Sounds like a thesis material to me.

2059
01:00:14,186 --> 01:00:16,128
That's what it sounds like.

2060
01:00:16,648 --> 01:00:18,090
And especially since so many of our

2061
01:00:18,130 --> 01:00:20,391
colleges are in the process of opening up

2062
01:00:20,472 --> 01:00:22,994
cybersecurity centers and test hubs,

2063
01:00:23,494 --> 01:00:24,735
like this sounds like a perfect

2064
01:00:24,875 --> 01:00:25,695
partnership.

2065
01:00:27,164 --> 01:00:30,108
I agree.

2066
01:00:30,168 --> 01:00:31,588
And I think that would be a huge

2067
01:00:31,628 --> 01:00:33,891
tool to even the manufacturers because you

2068
01:00:33,911 --> 01:00:35,251
got to look at it from their perspective

2069
01:00:35,291 --> 01:00:35,672
too, right?

2070
01:00:36,072 --> 01:00:37,134
What are they trying to solve?

2071
01:00:37,934 --> 01:00:40,677
Because you have the entire spectrum in

2072
01:00:40,717 --> 01:00:40,998
AV.

2073
01:00:41,057 --> 01:00:43,059
We have people who just want the box

2074
01:00:43,119 --> 01:00:45,021
and they don't care about any security all

2075
01:00:45,041 --> 01:00:47,704
the way up to government deployments that

2076
01:00:47,844 --> 01:00:49,065
are ultimately there.

2077
01:00:49,264 --> 01:00:49,425
Yeah.

2078
01:00:51,186 --> 01:00:52,887
So it's that entire spectrum.

2079
01:00:52,947 --> 01:00:53,088
So

2080
01:00:53,889 --> 01:00:56,110
Our hope with AV Trust is that it

2081
01:00:56,150 --> 01:00:58,653
becomes that information is crowdsourced

2082
01:00:59,034 --> 01:01:01,056
and crowd driven and the community is able

2083
01:01:01,096 --> 01:01:04,059
to push the industry forward together in

2084
01:01:04,119 --> 01:01:05,579
saying, hey, this is what we need.

2085
01:01:05,701 --> 01:01:07,282
And then once that baseline is set,

2086
01:01:07,661 --> 01:01:09,123
I think it makes it easy on everyone.

2087
01:01:09,284 --> 01:01:11,704
You know, there's no animosity here.

2088
01:01:12,005 --> 01:01:14,005
The goal is to make sure that everybody

2089
01:01:14,065 --> 01:01:15,764
plays to the same, you know,

2090
01:01:15,804 --> 01:01:17,545
tunes and everybody's talking well and

2091
01:01:17,846 --> 01:01:18,445
communicating.

2092
01:01:18,485 --> 01:01:21,126
And eventually we have a more secure AV

2093
01:01:21,186 --> 01:01:21,686
industry,

2094
01:01:21,786 --> 01:01:24,206
which is what we need before we have,

2095
01:01:24,226 --> 01:01:25,726
we end up in the news as some

2096
01:01:25,746 --> 01:01:28,108
box that caused the entire thing to crash.

2097
01:01:28,148 --> 01:01:29,288
That's not an if, that's a when, right?

2098
01:01:29,307 --> 01:01:32,228
I'll tell you, I was a little terrified.

2099
01:01:32,268 --> 01:01:34,449
Like this excites me because I was a

2100
01:01:34,469 --> 01:01:35,889
little terrified earlier when you were

2101
01:01:35,909 --> 01:01:36,048
like,

2102
01:01:36,108 --> 01:01:37,710
nobody puts their stuff in a stack and

2103
01:01:37,730 --> 01:01:38,949
just runs a security system.

2104
01:01:39,230 --> 01:01:41,291
audit on it i'm like oh god don't

2105
01:01:41,411 --> 01:01:44,291
don't just know that i don't want to

2106
01:01:44,331 --> 01:01:47,092
know it's that ignorance is bliss right

2107
01:01:47,512 --> 01:01:49,554
yep but i do need to know and

2108
01:01:49,713 --> 01:01:50,853
and some of the reason is that i

2109
01:01:50,893 --> 01:01:52,655
can see why integrators and some

2110
01:01:52,695 --> 01:01:54,594
manufacturers are like well that just

2111
01:01:54,775 --> 01:01:56,635
that's that's a bottom dollar thing at

2112
01:01:56,675 --> 01:01:59,697
that point where to everybody's point like

2113
01:01:59,717 --> 01:02:00,978
in higher ed we're like well we can

2114
01:02:01,038 --> 01:02:02,498
run these tests all day long and we

2115
01:02:02,557 --> 01:02:05,298
all have these enterprise systems and and

2116
01:02:05,458 --> 01:02:07,099
we're not making money on these most of

2117
01:02:07,119 --> 01:02:07,400
the time

2118
01:02:08,976 --> 01:02:11,556
So I've always said that higher ed will

2119
01:02:11,657 --> 01:02:14,358
definitely lead the AV industry in setting

2120
01:02:14,398 --> 01:02:15,358
the security standards.

2121
01:02:15,978 --> 01:02:17,960
It's been my belief because they're

2122
01:02:18,480 --> 01:02:20,240
uniquely positioned, they're enterprise,

2123
01:02:20,681 --> 01:02:23,362
yet they also have resources and the need,

2124
01:02:23,402 --> 01:02:25,023
frankly, to secure some of these things.

2125
01:02:25,682 --> 01:02:27,585
I'm going to say something controversial.

2126
01:02:29,547 --> 01:02:29,706
Do it.

2127
01:02:29,746 --> 01:02:29,887
Do it.

2128
01:02:29,927 --> 01:02:30,246
Do it.

2129
01:02:30,266 --> 01:02:32,068
This is not the show for this, Colin.

2130
01:02:32,088 --> 01:02:37,313
I think also higher ed leads the industry

2131
01:02:37,353 --> 01:02:40,175
in putting AV devices on public IP

2132
01:02:40,195 --> 01:02:40,797
addresses.

2133
01:02:42,197 --> 01:02:44,358
Yeah, let's do it.

2134
01:02:44,579 --> 01:02:50,623
There is some absolutely incredible stuff

2135
01:02:50,663 --> 01:02:51,523
that happens.

2136
01:02:51,623 --> 01:02:51,804
Yeah,

2137
01:02:51,824 --> 01:02:52,945
like throwing everything in the DMZ

2138
01:02:52,965 --> 01:02:54,925
because, well, it's just easier.

2139
01:02:55,706 --> 01:02:57,588
I'm not like, again,

2140
01:02:58,068 --> 01:02:59,148
this is not what we're trying to do

2141
01:02:59,168 --> 01:02:59,469
with AV Trust.

2142
01:02:59,489 --> 01:03:00,469
It's like, call people out.

2143
01:03:00,489 --> 01:03:01,349
That's too easy.

2144
01:03:01,809 --> 01:03:02,690
The better thing is to be like,

2145
01:03:02,990 --> 01:03:04,672
I'm going to do education that may happen

2146
01:03:04,692 --> 01:03:06,934
to mention your specific situation.

2147
01:03:07,653 --> 01:03:08,934
And then when I check back with you

2148
01:03:08,974 --> 01:03:09,554
in a year,

2149
01:03:09,833 --> 01:03:11,255
you better not see this thing still

2150
01:03:11,315 --> 01:03:11,835
happening.

2151
01:03:12,255 --> 01:03:14,355
And that's the kind of stuff I'd like

2152
01:03:14,394 --> 01:03:15,335
to see.

2153
01:03:16,016 --> 01:03:17,016
I'm curious, like as a goal,

2154
01:03:17,076 --> 01:03:18,576
do you see yourself as like a scoring

2155
01:03:18,596 --> 01:03:19,795
and grading service?

2156
01:03:21,135 --> 01:03:21,416
You know,

2157
01:03:22,336 --> 01:03:23,817
that's something that we've had some

2158
01:03:23,836 --> 01:03:26,936
discussion about.

2159
01:03:26,998 --> 01:03:29,918
Like one of the things I've been trying

2160
01:03:29,938 --> 01:03:32,458
to work with is trying to find good

2161
01:03:32,518 --> 01:03:34,518
vendors that we can vet

2162
01:03:35,539 --> 01:03:38,202
and actually offer services to to be like,

2163
01:03:38,282 --> 01:03:38,581
Hey,

2164
01:03:38,702 --> 01:03:40,583
here's like if you want to do security

2165
01:03:40,623 --> 01:03:44,487
training for your, you know,

2166
01:03:44,507 --> 01:03:45,367
for your staff,

2167
01:03:45,507 --> 01:03:46,969
here's a product we recommend.

2168
01:03:47,409 --> 01:03:48,110
Go use, you know,

2169
01:03:48,150 --> 01:03:50,592
you use discount code AV Trust and we

2170
01:03:50,612 --> 01:03:51,753
get a little, you know,

2171
01:03:51,773 --> 01:03:53,034
a little money for us and you get

2172
01:03:53,074 --> 01:03:54,956
a product that we've added because I think

2173
01:03:54,976 --> 01:03:55,916
what's what's happening,

2174
01:03:56,036 --> 01:03:57,398
what will happen with this because this is

2175
01:03:57,619 --> 01:03:58,900
this has been a discussion with like

2176
01:03:59,039 --> 01:03:59,760
managed services

2177
01:04:00,400 --> 01:04:01,583
where you get to the stage like, okay,

2178
01:04:01,623 --> 01:04:03,507
pick a ticketing platform and they go,

2179
01:04:03,806 --> 01:04:04,929
and you start looking and you look at

2180
01:04:04,949 --> 01:04:06,411
the quadrant and you see six thousand

2181
01:04:06,452 --> 01:04:07,333
logos and then you go,

2182
01:04:08,293 --> 01:04:09,255
I'll do this some other time.

2183
01:04:09,275 --> 01:04:10,615
And then you just leave and you never

2184
01:04:10,675 --> 01:04:11,036
come back.

2185
01:04:11,396 --> 01:04:12,237
And I want people to be able to

2186
01:04:12,277 --> 01:04:12,757
say, okay,

2187
01:04:13,097 --> 01:04:15,018
if this is a concern of yours, here's,

2188
01:04:15,159 --> 01:04:16,219
here's something to buy.

2189
01:04:16,478 --> 01:04:17,800
And because to a certain extent,

2190
01:04:17,820 --> 01:04:18,081
it's like,

2191
01:04:18,601 --> 01:04:19,822
if you're not an expert in it,

2192
01:04:20,481 --> 01:04:22,523
someone's got to just say, do this,

2193
01:04:22,563 --> 01:04:24,264
just do this, be good.

2194
01:04:24,344 --> 01:04:25,105
And I, and I do agree.

2195
01:04:25,125 --> 01:04:25,244
Like,

2196
01:04:25,304 --> 01:04:26,865
I think that scoring is a potential piece

2197
01:04:26,905 --> 01:04:27,146
of it.

2198
01:04:27,527 --> 01:04:29,427
I think that one of the things I'm

2199
01:04:29,467 --> 01:04:31,650
trying to find right now is a trusted

2200
01:04:31,690 --> 01:04:33,811
partner to do vulnerability testing and,

2201
01:04:34,210 --> 01:04:36,512
on hardware so that if you, a customer,

2202
01:04:37,293 --> 01:04:39,434
want to test gear, we can say, okay,

2203
01:04:39,534 --> 01:04:41,356
this is someone we trust that has good

2204
01:04:41,416 --> 01:04:41,795
output.

2205
01:04:42,597 --> 01:04:44,757
They have expertise in this area.

2206
01:04:44,777 --> 01:04:45,378
They're good to go.

2207
01:04:45,657 --> 01:04:47,199
Or if you're a manufacturer that says,

2208
01:04:47,619 --> 01:04:49,101
hey, I want to take this more seriously.

2209
01:04:49,701 --> 01:04:52,322
Who can I ship some boxes to to

2210
01:04:52,402 --> 01:04:55,784
actually hammer on this stuff and scan it

2211
01:04:55,905 --> 01:04:58,385
and try to break it and then come

2212
01:04:58,405 --> 01:04:58,726
back to me?

2213
01:04:58,746 --> 01:05:00,188
And that is something that we would like

2214
01:05:00,228 --> 01:05:01,467
to do just as a...

2215
01:05:02,648 --> 01:05:04,731
as a point of service for the industry,

2216
01:05:04,771 --> 01:05:06,672
because it'll be easier if we do all

2217
01:05:06,692 --> 01:05:08,094
the legwork and just go, hey,

2218
01:05:08,114 --> 01:05:09,153
this person is trusted.

2219
01:05:09,494 --> 01:05:09,954
Go for it.

2220
01:05:10,014 --> 01:05:10,255
You know,

2221
01:05:10,275 --> 01:05:11,476
and that's that's what we're trying to get

2222
01:05:11,516 --> 01:05:12,836
to.

2223
01:05:12,938 --> 01:05:14,559
You're going to come in, right?

2224
01:05:14,719 --> 01:05:15,920
You're going to build these types of

2225
01:05:16,179 --> 01:05:18,501
things pretty quick to actually leverage

2226
01:05:18,521 --> 01:05:19,782
that and start that kind of service.

2227
01:05:20,023 --> 01:05:21,764
Have you thought about partnering with a

2228
01:05:21,804 --> 01:05:23,746
higher ed institution about doing security

2229
01:05:23,907 --> 01:05:25,487
audits through the whole campus?

2230
01:05:27,351 --> 01:05:27,911
That would be...

2231
01:05:28,032 --> 01:05:29,492
Or just sitting in the parking lot of

2232
01:05:29,572 --> 01:05:31,333
one of them and doing... Yeah,

2233
01:05:31,353 --> 01:05:32,434
you don't have to...

2234
01:05:32,693 --> 01:05:34,375
Scattering USB drives and seeing that.

2235
01:05:34,434 --> 01:05:35,494
I mean, you all know this,

2236
01:05:35,534 --> 01:05:36,295
but a lot of IT companies...

2237
01:05:36,315 --> 01:05:37,835
You could probably just show up and be

2238
01:05:37,876 --> 01:05:38,356
like, oh,

2239
01:05:38,615 --> 01:05:40,336
I just did this ten minutes ago.

2240
01:05:40,396 --> 01:05:41,858
You might think about it.

2241
01:05:41,918 --> 01:05:42,898
But, I mean, that's the thing,

2242
01:05:42,918 --> 01:05:44,739
because I think IT companies hire,

2243
01:05:44,958 --> 01:05:46,438
you know, third party to, you know,

2244
01:05:46,478 --> 01:05:48,119
do a self-test on themselves.

2245
01:05:48,320 --> 01:05:50,221
Like, why wouldn't AV do the same thing?

2246
01:05:50,240 --> 01:05:51,501
And that could be you all, too,

2247
01:05:51,561 --> 01:05:52,181
just to get some extra money.

2248
01:05:52,202 --> 01:05:53,222
Just a ransom attack without the actual...

2249
01:05:53,302 --> 01:05:53,902
Potentially.

2250
01:05:53,922 --> 01:05:55,605
I mean, I think, I think the other,

2251
01:05:56,125 --> 01:05:57,186
I think the other piece is like,

2252
01:05:57,507 --> 01:05:57,686
you know,

2253
01:05:57,706 --> 01:06:00,130
if we're talking about AV as a business,

2254
01:06:00,170 --> 01:06:02,672
this is a huge opportunity.

2255
01:06:02,693 --> 01:06:03,853
Yeah, exactly.

2256
01:06:03,873 --> 01:06:05,215
As a, as a practice,

2257
01:06:05,235 --> 01:06:05,976
like there's no real,

2258
01:06:05,996 --> 01:06:09,059
like these are services that are valuable

2259
01:06:09,199 --> 01:06:12,103
and have like have real value.

2260
01:06:12,123 --> 01:06:13,025
They can't be afterthoughts.

2261
01:06:13,664 --> 01:06:13,824
Yeah,

2262
01:06:13,905 --> 01:06:15,547
and so I think that I think that

2263
01:06:15,626 --> 01:06:16,387
this is an opportunity.

2264
01:06:16,407 --> 01:06:16,987
It's like sure.

2265
01:06:17,007 --> 01:06:17,228
Well,

2266
01:06:17,327 --> 01:06:19,168
we'll probably look at some stuff But

2267
01:06:19,228 --> 01:06:19,708
honestly,

2268
01:06:19,829 --> 01:06:21,309
I think that some people out there as

2269
01:06:21,329 --> 01:06:23,931
they get going or kind of you know,

2270
01:06:24,271 --> 01:06:25,512
figure this out They're gonna go.

2271
01:06:25,693 --> 01:06:25,873
Okay.

2272
01:06:25,893 --> 01:06:27,635
This is this is a way to this

2273
01:06:27,655 --> 01:06:29,655
is a way to make money and that's

2274
01:06:29,936 --> 01:06:31,597
exactly if you're if you're good at it

2275
01:06:31,836 --> 01:06:32,518
and you hit it and

2276
01:06:32,958 --> 01:06:34,219
man, go develop it.

2277
01:06:34,818 --> 01:06:35,880
And that's a big,

2278
01:06:37,061 --> 01:06:39,222
I think that is a big potential to

2279
01:06:39,262 --> 01:06:39,882
say, okay,

2280
01:06:40,003 --> 01:06:41,724
when does the first firm pop up that

2281
01:06:41,744 --> 01:06:43,925
has a suite of security services

2282
01:06:44,405 --> 01:06:46,206
specifically tailored to AV?

2283
01:06:46,306 --> 01:06:47,568
Dedicated to AV, that's right.

2284
01:06:47,588 --> 01:06:48,668
Because you have to, yeah.

2285
01:06:50,489 --> 01:06:51,269
And you don't think we're,

2286
01:06:51,291 --> 01:06:52,210
we're there to partner after there's a

2287
01:06:52,271 --> 01:06:53,152
major vulnerability,

2288
01:06:53,192 --> 01:06:54,353
which takes out a huge university.

2289
01:06:56,675 --> 01:06:56,875
Well,

2290
01:06:56,974 --> 01:06:59,577
and so we're all starting to play around

2291
01:06:59,597 --> 01:07:00,858
with AI and Mark,

2292
01:07:00,998 --> 01:07:02,278
Mark and I have been doing some open

2293
01:07:02,298 --> 01:07:02,798
call stuff.

2294
01:07:02,838 --> 01:07:05,661
So daily I have a network security scan

2295
01:07:05,722 --> 01:07:07,483
and a vulnerability test on my home

2296
01:07:07,543 --> 01:07:08,023
network.

2297
01:07:08,583 --> 01:07:09,244
And guess what?

2298
01:07:09,563 --> 01:07:11,005
And I'll say the manufacturer's name

2299
01:07:11,025 --> 01:07:12,706
because it's not AV related really,

2300
01:07:13,166 --> 01:07:16,909
but I've got six or seven whaps here

2301
01:07:16,949 --> 01:07:17,550
at the house and,

2302
01:07:18,414 --> 01:07:20,496
And a specific manufacturer called

2303
01:07:20,596 --> 01:07:22,577
Ubiquity, for some reason,

2304
01:07:23,099 --> 01:07:25,541
has three of the WAPs open on Telnet,

2305
01:07:25,561 --> 01:07:26,581
and I can't figure out how to turn

2306
01:07:26,601 --> 01:07:27,081
it off yet.

2307
01:07:27,362 --> 01:07:29,764
And so I didn't know that because I

2308
01:07:29,804 --> 01:07:32,106
did my own security scan on my AV

2309
01:07:32,146 --> 01:07:33,748
devices, but here we are with...

2310
01:07:34,605 --> 01:07:36,445
Some of the access points in my house,

2311
01:07:36,465 --> 01:07:37,686
they're all the same model number.

2312
01:07:38,226 --> 01:07:40,648
Three of them run Intel net wide open.

2313
01:07:40,969 --> 01:07:42,590
I think that speaks to like,

2314
01:07:42,610 --> 01:07:45,731
we have to lower the threshold of like

2315
01:07:46,132 --> 01:07:48,414
interest in this and curiosity, right?

2316
01:07:48,434 --> 01:07:49,855
There has to be a level of folks

2317
01:07:49,894 --> 01:07:51,596
because we talk about InfoComm or any

2318
01:07:51,615 --> 01:07:52,336
other trade show you go to,

2319
01:07:52,356 --> 01:07:53,077
people are going to be like,

2320
01:07:53,217 --> 01:07:55,438
How many IO spigots does it have?

2321
01:07:56,059 --> 01:07:57,460
What's the latest chip that does on it?

2322
01:07:57,659 --> 01:07:58,561
Nobody's ever said, oh,

2323
01:07:58,581 --> 01:07:59,342
how's the security work?

2324
01:07:59,362 --> 01:07:59,981
Right.

2325
01:08:00,021 --> 01:08:01,702
And so I think.

2326
01:08:02,184 --> 01:08:03,585
Would that even be interesting on a

2327
01:08:03,605 --> 01:08:05,585
marketing document, though?

2328
01:08:05,606 --> 01:08:06,666
Try that next time you're at a trade

2329
01:08:06,686 --> 01:08:06,786
show.

2330
01:08:06,806 --> 01:08:07,927
Right.

2331
01:08:08,148 --> 01:08:10,050
But we as consumers,

2332
01:08:10,070 --> 01:08:10,769
because let's face it,

2333
01:08:10,809 --> 01:08:12,110
we are consuming these products.

2334
01:08:12,911 --> 01:08:15,034
We're not voting with our dollars

2335
01:08:15,074 --> 01:08:15,574
correctly.

2336
01:08:15,753 --> 01:08:17,354
We are not asking the questions.

2337
01:08:17,416 --> 01:08:19,296
Sometimes we don't have an option, Mark.

2338
01:08:19,497 --> 01:08:20,698
But yes, I agree with you.

2339
01:08:20,717 --> 01:08:21,679
But sometimes it's like,

2340
01:08:21,719 --> 01:08:22,380
don't look around.

2341
01:08:22,619 --> 01:08:23,180
We don't look.

2342
01:08:23,360 --> 01:08:24,761
It's just not in the lexicon.

2343
01:08:24,782 --> 01:08:26,604
And the sales reps are doing everything

2344
01:08:26,623 --> 01:08:28,164
they can to not talk about that.

2345
01:08:28,564 --> 01:08:30,247
Look at how many ports are on this

2346
01:08:30,306 --> 01:08:30,868
black box.

2347
01:08:31,528 --> 01:08:32,929
so frank a minute ago you mentioned would

2348
01:08:32,948 --> 01:08:34,670
that be interesting absolutely yes so i've

2349
01:08:34,689 --> 01:08:36,872
run into and mark i do vote with

2350
01:08:36,891 --> 01:08:37,932
my dollars in this case but it's a

2351
01:08:37,972 --> 01:08:39,694
very small amount of dollars so who cares

2352
01:08:40,434 --> 01:08:42,536
i've run into some some displays these are

2353
01:08:42,636 --> 01:08:44,617
large lcd panel big displays that we're

2354
01:08:44,636 --> 01:08:46,538
all putting all over the place that did

2355
01:08:46,599 --> 01:08:49,400
not support um uh modern namespace network

2356
01:08:49,560 --> 01:08:51,042
identification it was basically like you

2357
01:08:51,061 --> 01:08:51,762
could put in a

2358
01:08:52,483 --> 01:08:55,487
a pseudo hard-coded static IP address.

2359
01:08:55,907 --> 01:08:57,810
If you could wedge in a name,

2360
01:08:57,829 --> 01:08:59,051
it had to be within like eight characters.

2361
01:08:59,070 --> 01:09:01,373
It's like all these like semi-arbitrary

2362
01:09:01,875 --> 01:09:04,457
limitations on just how it even reports to

2363
01:09:04,497 --> 01:09:05,059
the network,

2364
01:09:05,078 --> 01:09:07,742
which didn't meet any current modern

2365
01:09:07,782 --> 01:09:09,784
standards of like ten, fifteen years ago.

2366
01:09:10,324 --> 01:09:11,425
And to the point where when I went

2367
01:09:11,444 --> 01:09:13,166
to buy another set of displays for another

2368
01:09:13,185 --> 01:09:13,466
building,

2369
01:09:13,586 --> 01:09:16,067
I did not buy from that brand because

2370
01:09:16,146 --> 01:09:17,707
I didn't want to deal with their nonsense.

2371
01:09:17,728 --> 01:09:18,847
And I'm currently dealing with that with

2372
01:09:18,908 --> 01:09:22,128
another huge, huge brand of displays.

2373
01:09:22,149 --> 01:09:23,310
It does projectors and displays and all

2374
01:09:23,329 --> 01:09:25,170
sorts of stuff that has trouble with how

2375
01:09:25,210 --> 01:09:27,011
their NICs report on the network.

2376
01:09:27,131 --> 01:09:28,251
And I don't want to deal with that.

2377
01:09:28,270 --> 01:09:29,072
So the next round,

2378
01:09:29,332 --> 01:09:31,612
I'm not buying that brand of displays.

2379
01:09:31,671 --> 01:09:31,851
Now,

2380
01:09:32,172 --> 01:09:33,512
I didn't actually light them up and tell

2381
01:09:33,533 --> 01:09:34,212
them that's why,

2382
01:09:34,252 --> 01:09:37,354
but I think that's a valid feature set

2383
01:09:37,373 --> 01:09:38,595
and a valid kind of, you know,

2384
01:09:39,215 --> 01:09:40,475
you know, customer feedback to say,

2385
01:09:41,154 --> 01:09:43,256
I can't use your stuff on my network

2386
01:09:43,275 --> 01:09:44,315
because of X, Y, and Z.

2387
01:09:44,355 --> 01:09:46,076
You don't meet the basic threshold.

2388
01:09:46,095 --> 01:09:47,856
You don't meet the modern requirements.

2389
01:09:47,877 --> 01:09:49,237
You don't meet whatever these,

2390
01:09:49,417 --> 01:09:50,377
and they're, they're so,

2391
01:09:50,537 --> 01:09:51,516
there's such a low bar.

2392
01:09:51,537 --> 01:09:53,016
It's so easy to kind of get across

2393
01:09:53,037 --> 01:09:54,198
these things, but you know,

2394
01:09:54,238 --> 01:09:55,858
it's that same challenge of like,

2395
01:09:56,158 --> 01:09:56,837
how do we,

2396
01:09:57,358 --> 01:09:58,698
how do we get that across to

2397
01:09:58,717 --> 01:09:59,319
manufacturers?

2398
01:09:59,338 --> 01:10:00,179
And so I love that you guys are

2399
01:10:00,198 --> 01:10:01,479
putting this together as a potential

2400
01:10:01,498 --> 01:10:02,418
content to do that.

2401
01:10:02,899 --> 01:10:04,439
And also to Mark's point,

2402
01:10:04,479 --> 01:10:06,239
maybe this helps us start to square that

2403
01:10:06,300 --> 01:10:06,840
circle of,

2404
01:10:07,720 --> 01:10:09,501
Most AV devices, now,

2405
01:10:09,621 --> 01:10:10,962
even if everything moves to the cloud,

2406
01:10:10,981 --> 01:10:12,162
we're still going to have endpoints that

2407
01:10:12,182 --> 01:10:14,465
are a display or speakers or whatever that

2408
01:10:14,524 --> 01:10:14,585
is,

2409
01:10:14,604 --> 01:10:15,925
something that has to be in the physical

2410
01:10:15,965 --> 01:10:16,246
space.

2411
01:10:16,805 --> 01:10:17,926
I'm going to purchase that once.

2412
01:10:18,266 --> 01:10:19,608
That is going to be good for ten,

2413
01:10:20,047 --> 01:10:21,248
twelve, fifteen years.

2414
01:10:21,368 --> 01:10:23,029
I'm not going to think about it again,

2415
01:10:24,230 --> 01:10:26,091
which means that thing never gets updated.

2416
01:10:26,112 --> 01:10:27,693
It never gets refreshed.

2417
01:10:27,712 --> 01:10:29,274
There's no firmware revs to it because

2418
01:10:29,293 --> 01:10:32,136
it's, let's be honest, it's a dumb device.

2419
01:10:32,235 --> 01:10:34,177
device a dumb endpoint that doesn't need

2420
01:10:34,318 --> 01:10:36,078
you know we talked about earlier those

2421
01:10:36,099 --> 01:10:38,079
security features transducer with no no

2422
01:10:38,100 --> 01:10:40,042
logic well the security may come with

2423
01:10:40,082 --> 01:10:42,323
feature updates but that you know a giant

2424
01:10:42,884 --> 01:10:44,045
lcd panel is not going to get a

2425
01:10:44,085 --> 01:10:46,346
feature update hopefully or older

2426
01:10:46,407 --> 01:10:48,307
equipment that like we're still rocking

2427
01:10:48,427 --> 01:10:50,369
mps-one-hundreds on our campus on right

2428
01:10:50,510 --> 01:10:52,211
that's my point because that's lower

2429
01:10:52,451 --> 01:10:54,412
restaurant patched by mps-one-hundred

2430
01:10:54,792 --> 01:10:56,375
So what's our conduit to the industry to

2431
01:10:56,414 --> 01:10:56,654
say,

2432
01:10:56,876 --> 01:10:58,436
you need to be more up to speed

2433
01:10:58,457 --> 01:10:58,757
with this.

2434
01:10:59,639 --> 01:11:01,161
We are interested in this,

2435
01:11:01,780 --> 01:11:02,962
but you also have to go back to

2436
01:11:02,983 --> 01:11:05,045
your monstrous back catalog of those four

2437
01:11:05,085 --> 01:11:06,447
other companies you purchased over the

2438
01:11:06,466 --> 01:11:08,309
last ten years and either fix that stuff

2439
01:11:08,349 --> 01:11:09,750
or give us some way to go in

2440
01:11:09,770 --> 01:11:10,511
and disable things,

2441
01:11:10,952 --> 01:11:12,353
or I'm taking it off the network and

2442
01:11:12,393 --> 01:11:13,895
I'm building an island because that's the

2443
01:11:13,914 --> 01:11:14,435
only way it'll work.

2444
01:11:14,948 --> 01:11:15,729
Yeah,

2445
01:11:15,750 --> 01:11:17,831
and I think that's why the information is

2446
01:11:17,890 --> 01:11:19,233
one of the most important parts of this,

2447
01:11:19,292 --> 01:11:21,314
because it's not going to be affordable

2448
01:11:21,354 --> 01:11:23,155
for everybody to just go throw away

2449
01:11:23,636 --> 01:11:25,197
everything they bought and buy something

2450
01:11:25,297 --> 01:11:25,578
else.

2451
01:11:26,057 --> 01:11:27,960
So at minimum,

2452
01:11:28,279 --> 01:11:29,661
we need to be able to say like,

2453
01:11:29,761 --> 01:11:30,221
all right, well,

2454
01:11:30,261 --> 01:11:32,623
we know that this one is not great,

2455
01:11:32,644 --> 01:11:34,284
but we know what it is doing and

2456
01:11:34,305 --> 01:11:35,086
what it's not doing,

2457
01:11:35,105 --> 01:11:36,506
and we can kind of respond appropriately.

2458
01:11:36,527 --> 01:11:37,467
If it needs to be on its own

2459
01:11:37,528 --> 01:11:38,108
segment, cool,

2460
01:11:38,127 --> 01:11:39,288
we can make the changes we need to

2461
01:11:39,309 --> 01:11:39,869
make, right?

2462
01:11:40,250 --> 01:11:41,890
But that's not information that we've

2463
01:11:41,930 --> 01:11:43,672
historically had publicly available.

2464
01:11:44,172 --> 01:11:46,014
And that's why I think the information and

2465
01:11:46,033 --> 01:11:47,875
the communication part is is also the most

2466
01:11:47,914 --> 01:11:49,815
important part of this for the short term,

2467
01:11:49,855 --> 01:11:51,796
especially because then that's going to be

2468
01:11:51,815 --> 01:11:53,997
what allows people to actually plan their

2469
01:11:54,037 --> 01:11:55,717
hardware strategy around that for long

2470
01:11:55,738 --> 01:11:56,278
term stuff.

2471
01:11:56,318 --> 01:11:58,939
And I, for one, you know,

2472
01:11:59,460 --> 01:12:01,780
I really like that the information part in

2473
01:12:01,841 --> 01:12:03,601
the in the bringing it all together is

2474
01:12:03,641 --> 01:12:06,023
there because it is an intimidating thing

2475
01:12:06,063 --> 01:12:07,503
to people who aren't used to it.

2476
01:12:07,764 --> 01:12:09,243
So I personally,

2477
01:12:09,944 --> 01:12:12,826
it's like it seems big and scary.

2478
01:12:13,583 --> 01:12:15,265
And I keep putting off learning more about

2479
01:12:15,326 --> 01:12:15,426
it.

2480
01:12:15,525 --> 01:12:17,146
But if you can give me a baby's

2481
01:12:17,186 --> 01:12:17,787
first step,

2482
01:12:18,307 --> 01:12:19,689
or these are what to look for,

2483
01:12:20,229 --> 01:12:21,011
then all of a sudden,

2484
01:12:21,070 --> 01:12:22,551
it's not a scary conversation.

2485
01:12:22,653 --> 01:12:23,493
It is not a,

2486
01:12:23,512 --> 01:12:25,314
how did I learn that this was insecure?

2487
01:12:25,354 --> 01:12:25,534
Well,

2488
01:12:25,555 --> 01:12:27,176
somebody else told me I couldn't have it

2489
01:12:27,216 --> 01:12:27,617
anymore.

2490
01:12:28,097 --> 01:12:31,000
You know, usually my CISO.

2491
01:12:32,081 --> 01:12:32,301
But...

2492
01:12:33,712 --> 01:12:34,373
I like this.

2493
01:12:34,713 --> 01:12:36,194
I like that you guys are trying to

2494
01:12:37,095 --> 01:12:39,617
go to baby's first step and take it

2495
01:12:39,636 --> 01:12:41,859
to a higher level and be that

2496
01:12:41,918 --> 01:12:43,399
intermediary.

2497
01:12:43,500 --> 01:12:44,479
I'm kind of excited for this.

2498
01:12:44,539 --> 01:12:46,362
I hope you guys,

2499
01:12:46,662 --> 01:12:47,722
they're all listening to the show,

2500
01:12:47,783 --> 01:12:48,962
our twenty thousand listeners.

2501
01:12:50,224 --> 01:12:51,324
Twenty two thousand six hundred and

2502
01:12:51,345 --> 01:12:51,984
fourteen.

2503
01:12:52,405 --> 01:12:53,726
And they all call you.

2504
01:12:53,747 --> 01:12:55,547
We get some real good experts and they're

2505
01:12:55,587 --> 01:12:56,347
throwing cash at you.

2506
01:12:56,448 --> 01:12:58,829
I really hope that this goes because I'm

2507
01:12:58,850 --> 01:13:00,911
looking forward to somebody being kind of

2508
01:13:01,091 --> 01:13:02,993
that centralized force.

2509
01:13:03,733 --> 01:13:05,694
to bring us all together and start having

2510
01:13:05,734 --> 01:13:11,537
that conversation without boxing gloves.

2511
01:13:11,557 --> 01:13:13,519
You're not going to have to commit to

2512
01:13:13,538 --> 01:13:13,698
this,

2513
01:13:13,719 --> 01:13:14,760
but I would really love a cheat sheet

2514
01:13:14,800 --> 01:13:15,260
preamble.com.

2515
01:13:15,918 --> 01:13:18,600
Oh, asking for a friend, just stay.

2516
01:13:18,680 --> 01:13:20,362
I will give you all of Chris's time

2517
01:13:20,481 --> 01:13:21,103
to put that together.

2518
01:13:21,122 --> 01:13:21,783
Go ahead.

2519
01:13:21,842 --> 01:13:23,104
If you guys can focus on two things,

2520
01:13:23,283 --> 01:13:23,864
yeah, the cheat sheet,

2521
01:13:23,904 --> 01:13:24,886
the common dictionary,

2522
01:13:25,246 --> 01:13:26,947
know these terms and what they mean so

2523
01:13:26,966 --> 01:13:28,127
you can start speaking the language and

2524
01:13:28,167 --> 01:13:28,707
build from there.

2525
01:13:28,747 --> 01:13:29,828
Colin, like you said, there's some early,

2526
01:13:29,929 --> 01:13:31,010
there's a lot of certs out there and

2527
01:13:31,029 --> 01:13:32,030
things you can kind of build towards,

2528
01:13:32,070 --> 01:13:33,412
but that first step.

2529
01:13:33,712 --> 01:13:34,271
The other thing is,

2530
01:13:34,351 --> 01:13:35,993
I think if you guys build this common

2531
01:13:36,073 --> 01:13:39,655
framework for like communicating security

2532
01:13:39,695 --> 01:13:41,377
issues, both directions,

2533
01:13:41,396 --> 01:13:43,038
like from manufacturers down to end users,

2534
01:13:43,059 --> 01:13:44,460
because God knows some of them are,

2535
01:13:45,020 --> 01:13:46,240
terrible at it and others just don't do

2536
01:13:46,301 --> 01:13:48,323
it um and then also the same direction

2537
01:13:48,403 --> 01:13:50,125
hey we're seeing this weird kind of thing

2538
01:13:50,145 --> 01:13:51,845
on our network how do we get in

2539
01:13:51,905 --> 01:13:53,266
touch with the right people at some of

2540
01:13:53,287 --> 01:13:54,849
these manufacturers and other

2541
01:13:55,009 --> 01:13:56,750
organizations and whatnot to to kind of

2542
01:13:56,770 --> 01:13:57,751
start community so like some sort of

2543
01:13:57,791 --> 01:13:59,393
framework to go both directions on like

2544
01:13:59,653 --> 01:14:00,873
centralizing and communicating some of

2545
01:14:00,894 --> 01:14:02,555
this stuff uh in that kind of like

2546
01:14:02,574 --> 01:14:03,877
you said kind of like we're gonna legally

2547
01:14:04,697 --> 01:14:07,059
like protect you pull you back one step

2548
01:14:07,078 --> 01:14:08,199
so you're removed slightly from that

2549
01:14:08,220 --> 01:14:09,220
you're not going to get hammered about it

2550
01:14:09,240 --> 01:14:10,782
but at the same time this is important

2551
01:14:10,801 --> 01:14:11,703
stuff to be able to communicate if you

2552
01:14:11,722 --> 01:14:13,604
can do those two things i think you

2553
01:14:13,625 --> 01:14:15,086
guys are going to be in a great

2554
01:14:15,246 --> 01:14:17,287
great great place because it puts us in

2555
01:14:17,347 --> 01:14:18,988
a good spot for conversation and that's

2556
01:14:19,009 --> 01:14:20,170
where we want to be yeah and if

2557
01:14:20,189 --> 01:14:22,011
you haven't looked at look at the educause

2558
01:14:22,091 --> 01:14:24,113
heck that as a potential model because it

2559
01:14:24,153 --> 01:14:25,333
is a very wide range if you haven't

2560
01:14:25,354 --> 01:14:26,956
looked at that it's free if not i'll

2561
01:14:27,015 --> 01:14:28,556
dig all universities should at least have

2562
01:14:28,596 --> 01:14:29,698
awareness of the heck that

2563
01:14:30,257 --> 01:14:30,658
Well,

2564
01:14:30,958 --> 01:14:32,979
somebody on each university campus has

2565
01:14:33,000 --> 01:14:33,560
awareness of it,

2566
01:14:33,640 --> 01:14:35,060
probably not the right person,

2567
01:14:35,081 --> 01:14:36,801
but it's a comprehensive kind of like

2568
01:14:37,662 --> 01:14:40,744
vendor evaluation thing for how you do

2569
01:14:41,085 --> 01:14:41,984
updates, how you do security,

2570
01:14:42,005 --> 01:14:44,567
how you maintain your security posture on

2571
01:14:44,587 --> 01:14:45,688
things, how you maintain your software,

2572
01:14:45,747 --> 01:14:46,568
all sorts of stuff.

2573
01:14:46,608 --> 01:14:47,548
It's very wide ranging,

2574
01:14:47,569 --> 01:14:49,449
but it's a framework you could use as

2575
01:14:49,470 --> 01:14:50,751
a model to kind of like, I mean,

2576
01:14:50,951 --> 01:14:51,850
it's very comprehensive,

2577
01:14:51,871 --> 01:14:52,612
but you could use it as like,

2578
01:14:52,652 --> 01:14:53,832
how do we even just communicate some of

2579
01:14:53,853 --> 01:14:54,292
this stuff?

2580
01:14:54,332 --> 01:14:54,512
Yeah.

2581
01:14:54,752 --> 01:14:55,953
a good starting point yeah i think it's

2582
01:14:56,194 --> 01:14:57,533
a fantastic starting point look at that

2583
01:14:57,774 --> 01:14:58,975
steal from the best keep doing all those

2584
01:14:58,994 --> 01:14:59,975
things they spend all the time on it

2585
01:14:59,996 --> 01:15:01,997
why not just take that so um no

2586
01:15:02,136 --> 01:15:03,518
and i agree and i think that's that's

2587
01:15:03,557 --> 01:15:06,139
an important thing to realize that this is

2588
01:15:06,179 --> 01:15:08,460
already a mature practice for a lot of

2589
01:15:08,500 --> 01:15:09,820
people and i don't want us to come

2590
01:15:09,900 --> 01:15:10,180
in like

2591
01:15:10,740 --> 01:15:11,921
I feel like the old way of doing

2592
01:15:11,942 --> 01:15:12,863
things would have been like, okay,

2593
01:15:12,882 --> 01:15:13,743
in order to be more secure,

2594
01:15:13,764 --> 01:15:15,784
we're going to create a new proprietary

2595
01:15:15,824 --> 01:15:16,445
network port.

2596
01:15:16,466 --> 01:15:17,506
We need a new standard.

2597
01:15:17,787 --> 01:15:20,649
We have a new connector.

2598
01:15:20,708 --> 01:15:23,952
You'll know that if you plug into it

2599
01:15:24,051 --> 01:15:26,134
and you have to get a special switch,

2600
01:15:26,793 --> 01:15:28,136
which some manufacturers would love.

2601
01:15:28,155 --> 01:15:28,256
Yeah.

2602
01:15:28,336 --> 01:15:31,278
It's like, we can't,

2603
01:15:31,457 --> 01:15:32,378
we can't keep doing this.

2604
01:15:32,399 --> 01:15:33,920
Like we have this stuff in place and

2605
01:15:33,960 --> 01:15:36,521
it also, like, I think it'll,

2606
01:15:36,682 --> 01:15:38,224
I think it'll sort of clear a lot

2607
01:15:38,283 --> 01:15:39,265
of the, um,

2608
01:15:41,293 --> 01:15:41,796
How do I say this?

2609
01:15:41,856 --> 01:15:44,369
It'll clear up a lot of the...

2610
01:15:46,561 --> 01:15:50,063
opacity we have right now with hardware

2611
01:15:50,443 --> 01:15:51,103
specifically,

2612
01:15:51,143 --> 01:15:54,064
because I struggle to have those

2613
01:15:54,104 --> 01:15:55,743
conversations because there are companies

2614
01:15:55,783 --> 01:15:58,444
that are manufacturers that do not have a

2615
01:15:58,484 --> 01:15:58,904
factory.

2616
01:15:58,963 --> 01:16:01,564
They're a marketing company that will mail

2617
01:16:01,585 --> 01:16:02,265
you a box.

2618
01:16:02,965 --> 01:16:06,685
And that is something that I don't

2619
01:16:07,645 --> 01:16:08,746
particularly care for.

2620
01:16:08,985 --> 01:16:10,686
And I think that a lot of customers

2621
01:16:11,627 --> 01:16:13,849
don't know any better because the

2622
01:16:13,889 --> 01:16:15,430
branding's really nice and it comes in a

2623
01:16:15,470 --> 01:16:17,412
good box and everything's logoed and it's

2624
01:16:17,452 --> 01:16:18,051
good to go.

2625
01:16:18,112 --> 01:16:19,372
But I think that there's an obscurity

2626
01:16:19,412 --> 01:16:19,632
there.

2627
01:16:20,094 --> 01:16:21,375
And the people that are doing their own

2628
01:16:21,414 --> 01:16:21,875
work,

2629
01:16:22,956 --> 01:16:24,317
like I don't think it's necessarily bad to

2630
01:16:24,457 --> 01:16:25,297
OEM something,

2631
01:16:25,497 --> 01:16:26,519
but you have to do it in a

2632
01:16:26,559 --> 01:16:30,542
way that inspires some trust,

2633
01:16:31,362 --> 01:16:32,643
not that feels like you're trying to

2634
01:16:32,682 --> 01:16:34,604
obscure where it's going.

2635
01:16:34,645 --> 01:16:35,506
Like that's always the game.

2636
01:16:35,525 --> 01:16:36,787
Like every time a new product comes out,

2637
01:16:37,367 --> 01:16:39,368
you run over to alibaba and you see

2638
01:16:39,667 --> 01:16:41,809
uh which picture matches it and what their

2639
01:16:41,908 --> 01:16:43,970
unit cost is there you go oh cool

2640
01:16:43,990 --> 01:16:46,452
neat yeah that new phone found it i

2641
01:16:46,471 --> 01:16:50,073
could make one too i guess um why

2642
01:16:50,113 --> 01:16:51,533
not and that's not it's not all gear

2643
01:16:51,554 --> 01:16:53,295
but there's a lot of it every every

2644
01:16:53,354 --> 01:16:53,855
rack has

2645
01:16:54,695 --> 01:16:55,997
those little doodads and widgets and

2646
01:16:56,016 --> 01:16:56,476
things in there.

2647
01:16:56,497 --> 01:16:57,078
And like some of them,

2648
01:16:57,097 --> 01:16:57,819
I guess it doesn't matter.

2649
01:16:57,859 --> 01:16:58,259
Like some of them,

2650
01:16:58,279 --> 01:17:00,560
it does not matter because if it's just,

2651
01:17:00,860 --> 01:17:01,161
you know,

2652
01:17:02,061 --> 01:17:04,604
point A to point B transmitting HDMI,

2653
01:17:05,064 --> 01:17:05,604
I don't care.

2654
01:17:06,324 --> 01:17:07,466
And I think that there has to be

2655
01:17:07,506 --> 01:17:08,006
something to say.

2656
01:17:08,027 --> 01:17:08,266
It's like,

2657
01:17:08,806 --> 01:17:10,269
I agree that it's nice to know what's

2658
01:17:10,309 --> 01:17:11,328
going on with stuff,

2659
01:17:12,170 --> 01:17:13,610
but some stuff just doesn't need to be

2660
01:17:13,650 --> 01:17:14,152
on the network.

2661
01:17:15,051 --> 01:17:17,354
Like a TV, I don't know.

2662
01:17:17,453 --> 01:17:18,795
If I can tell whether it's drawing enough

2663
01:17:18,814 --> 01:17:20,497
power to keep that little LED light on

2664
01:17:20,537 --> 01:17:21,837
that says, you know, red or green,

2665
01:17:22,457 --> 01:17:23,559
I can probably tell if it's alive.

2666
01:17:24,640 --> 01:17:25,480
And that's all I need.

2667
01:17:25,680 --> 01:17:27,082
Because anything else that's wrong with it

2668
01:17:27,122 --> 01:17:28,382
is going to be something I cannot detect

2669
01:17:28,403 --> 01:17:28,823
remotely.

2670
01:17:29,283 --> 01:17:30,545
If someone punched a hole in it,

2671
01:17:31,005 --> 01:17:32,287
or there's a big red line running up

2672
01:17:32,306 --> 01:17:32,747
and down it,

2673
01:17:33,489 --> 01:17:35,110
No amount of remote monitoring tells me

2674
01:17:35,131 --> 01:17:35,350
that.

2675
01:17:35,390 --> 01:17:37,850
And so is it really worth it to

2676
01:17:37,912 --> 01:17:40,612
have that device on the network for

2677
01:17:41,033 --> 01:17:41,733
minimal benefits?

2678
01:17:42,453 --> 01:17:44,054
I have a massive amount of risk for

2679
01:17:44,913 --> 01:17:46,734
almost no return because I'm not updating

2680
01:17:46,753 --> 01:17:47,414
the firmware on it.

2681
01:17:47,494 --> 01:17:48,154
I'm not patching it.

2682
01:17:48,175 --> 01:17:49,114
I'm not pulling logs.

2683
01:17:50,615 --> 01:17:51,695
And all I'm doing is putting a device

2684
01:17:51,735 --> 01:17:53,016
on there that could end up part of

2685
01:17:53,077 --> 01:17:54,877
a bot network or something like that.

2686
01:17:55,077 --> 01:17:56,957
Everything should be serial controlled.

2687
01:17:57,578 --> 01:17:58,057
Yes.

2688
01:17:58,599 --> 01:18:02,359
Honestly, that's the network-based,

2689
01:18:02,539 --> 01:18:05,981
the IP-based RS-DU-DU controllers.

2690
01:18:06,362 --> 01:18:08,703
There is something to say for, okay,

2691
01:18:08,743 --> 01:18:10,743
if I have a bunch of unsecured devices,

2692
01:18:11,224 --> 01:18:12,744
the easiest way to secure them is to

2693
01:18:12,805 --> 01:18:16,627
have a device I know I can secure.

2694
01:18:16,667 --> 01:18:17,927
I can have a jump box with two

2695
01:18:17,988 --> 01:18:18,768
NIC cards on it.

2696
01:18:19,247 --> 01:18:19,448
Okay,

2697
01:18:19,587 --> 01:18:20,988
I only have to worry about that one

2698
01:18:21,009 --> 01:18:22,951
thing, and if something goes sideways,

2699
01:18:23,011 --> 01:18:24,091
I can pull the plug on it,

2700
01:18:24,492 --> 01:18:25,592
and it doesn't really matter what's

2701
01:18:25,632 --> 01:18:26,913
downstream of it because they're going to

2702
01:18:26,934 --> 01:18:28,014
be having their own issues,

2703
01:18:29,175 --> 01:18:30,015
and we can segregate it.

2704
01:18:30,176 --> 01:18:31,256
Is that the best idea?

2705
01:18:31,337 --> 01:18:33,978
Probably not, but that's how IoT is.

2706
01:18:34,439 --> 01:18:35,840
I mean, that's how IoT is dealt with.

2707
01:18:35,880 --> 01:18:37,421
There's devices that are specifically for

2708
01:18:37,461 --> 01:18:38,962
that that have a bunch of, like,

2709
01:18:38,981 --> 01:18:41,182
a billion USB ports because they're there

2710
01:18:41,564 --> 01:18:42,864
to keep track of a bunch of IoT

2711
01:18:42,885 --> 01:18:44,305
devices, and they don't want...

2712
01:18:44,905 --> 01:18:47,228
They don't want those devices actually on

2713
01:18:47,268 --> 01:18:48,108
a production network.

2714
01:18:48,127 --> 01:18:49,349
They don't want it on Wi-Fi.

2715
01:18:49,729 --> 01:18:51,149
That's why a lot of IoT devices,

2716
01:18:51,170 --> 01:18:53,072
like you throw a SIM card in and

2717
01:18:53,091 --> 01:18:55,052
it's like, great, it can get to something,

2718
01:18:55,092 --> 01:18:56,434
but it's not getting to my network.

2719
01:18:57,255 --> 01:18:58,756
So who cares?

2720
01:18:58,796 --> 01:19:00,796
Who cares about T-Mobile?

2721
01:19:00,817 --> 01:19:01,277
You know what?

2722
01:19:01,317 --> 01:19:02,217
That's their problem.

2723
01:19:02,257 --> 01:19:05,159
If they get taken down by my errant

2724
01:19:05,279 --> 01:19:08,202
air sensor, that's their problem.

2725
01:19:09,743 --> 01:19:11,564
Humidity is just right,

2726
01:19:11,625 --> 01:19:12,805
but T-Mobile went down.

2727
01:19:13,305 --> 01:19:15,726
Yeah.

2728
01:19:15,766 --> 01:19:15,867
Well,

2729
01:19:15,886 --> 01:19:17,108
I think this has been a fantastic

2730
01:19:17,127 --> 01:19:17,627
conversation.

2731
01:19:17,667 --> 01:19:18,548
We'll have to have you guys back because,

2732
01:19:18,569 --> 01:19:19,868
you know, let's check in six months.

2733
01:19:19,889 --> 01:19:21,649
And I think Mark gave us a good,

2734
01:19:21,729 --> 01:19:22,570
and I hope you have plans for it,

2735
01:19:22,610 --> 01:19:23,591
a good kind of benchmark.

2736
01:19:23,610 --> 01:19:25,051
It's like, what do you got at Infocom?

2737
01:19:25,072 --> 01:19:26,193
Because there's got to be something big.

2738
01:19:26,233 --> 01:19:27,774
You got, what, ninety days or so.

2739
01:19:27,833 --> 01:19:29,073
I'm sure you have some plans and things.

2740
01:19:30,154 --> 01:19:31,555
We'll have a new website, Colin.

2741
01:19:31,676 --> 01:19:32,376
A new one.

2742
01:19:32,416 --> 01:19:32,735
Come on.

2743
01:19:32,756 --> 01:19:34,497
You come up with little stickers you go

2744
01:19:34,516 --> 01:19:35,457
around and put on products.

2745
01:19:35,478 --> 01:19:37,118
Say, this thing sucks on your network.

2746
01:19:37,158 --> 01:19:37,538
Please don't.

2747
01:19:38,158 --> 01:19:39,380
We'll do it for you.

2748
01:19:39,399 --> 01:19:40,479
We love doing that kind of stuff.

2749
01:19:40,500 --> 01:19:40,539
A.V.

2750
01:19:40,560 --> 01:19:41,320
Trust acknowledged.

2751
01:19:43,402 --> 01:19:44,261
This is going to be a problem.

2752
01:19:44,301 --> 01:19:44,381
A.V.

2753
01:19:44,502 --> 01:19:45,662
Trust, just to get on there.

2754
01:19:47,844 --> 01:19:48,904
We have to get the word out somewhere.

2755
01:19:48,925 --> 01:19:50,605
And there's a lot of stuff that just

2756
01:19:50,626 --> 01:19:51,225
gets unpacked.

2757
01:19:51,466 --> 01:19:52,426
Firmware never gets touched.

2758
01:19:52,447 --> 01:19:53,226
It never gets configured.

2759
01:19:53,247 --> 01:19:54,067
It just gets plugged into the network.

2760
01:19:54,087 --> 01:19:54,667
People walk away.

2761
01:19:54,688 --> 01:19:55,387
So there's all sorts of problems.

2762
01:19:55,408 --> 01:19:57,488
So to that end,

2763
01:19:57,529 --> 01:19:58,289
people want to get involved.

2764
01:19:58,310 --> 01:19:59,489
People want to find out what's going on.

2765
01:20:00,011 --> 01:20:00,451
Where are we going?

2766
01:20:00,470 --> 01:20:01,110
Where are we sending them?

2767
01:20:01,371 --> 01:20:01,791
What are we doing?

2768
01:20:01,810 --> 01:20:02,832
Where are we looking for all that stuff?

2769
01:20:04,329 --> 01:20:05,511
AVTrust.org.

2770
01:20:05,570 --> 01:20:07,514
There is the link to the Discord on

2771
01:20:07,533 --> 01:20:07,875
there.

2772
01:20:08,555 --> 01:20:09,936
Link to our LinkedIn if you're a big

2773
01:20:10,158 --> 01:20:10,998
LinkedIn user.

2774
01:20:11,739 --> 01:20:14,122
Or, I mean, you have our names.

2775
01:20:14,162 --> 01:20:15,083
We're all online.

2776
01:20:15,385 --> 01:20:16,185
Come and find us.

2777
01:20:16,326 --> 01:20:17,087
Yeah, reach out.

2778
01:20:17,547 --> 01:20:19,050
Yeah, you can get up through LinkedIn,

2779
01:20:19,090 --> 01:20:20,131
through the website, through Discord.

2780
01:20:20,150 --> 01:20:20,811
We're all on there.

2781
01:20:22,353 --> 01:20:23,274
Yeah, definitely.

2782
01:20:23,514 --> 01:20:24,835
We're starting to form councils,

2783
01:20:24,854 --> 01:20:27,395
so if you have interest in creating

2784
01:20:27,435 --> 01:20:28,957
education, reviewing standards,

2785
01:20:29,016 --> 01:20:33,000
putting out information, great.

2786
01:20:33,020 --> 01:20:33,520
We joke,

2787
01:20:33,560 --> 01:20:35,240
but I would love someone who knows more

2788
01:20:35,261 --> 01:20:36,381
about making a website,

2789
01:20:36,402 --> 01:20:37,703
because if we're gonna have a lot more

2790
01:20:37,762 --> 01:20:39,524
content going out,

2791
01:20:40,024 --> 01:20:41,685
I can't spend twenty hours putting one

2792
01:20:41,725 --> 01:20:43,365
page up on a WordPress site.

2793
01:20:43,386 --> 01:20:44,386
You're gonna get spammed by every

2794
01:20:44,447 --> 01:20:45,686
contractor out there that has a Wix

2795
01:20:45,707 --> 01:20:46,127
account.

2796
01:20:46,188 --> 01:20:48,109
Everybody who's got their Clawbot running

2797
01:20:48,128 --> 01:20:48,509
is gonna be like, oh,

2798
01:20:48,529 --> 01:20:49,829
I can do that for you.

2799
01:20:51,168 --> 01:20:52,550
Doug and Frank, last words.

2800
01:20:52,590 --> 01:20:54,430
Any last things we didn't cover or didn't

2801
01:20:54,451 --> 01:20:56,612
mention you want to throw out there?

2802
01:20:56,652 --> 01:20:57,792
No, I mean, thanks for having us.

2803
01:20:57,851 --> 01:20:59,073
This was great.

2804
01:20:59,172 --> 01:21:00,193
I'm really excited about this.

2805
01:21:00,212 --> 01:21:02,394
It's nice to hear other people feel the

2806
01:21:02,413 --> 01:21:02,753
same.

2807
01:21:04,295 --> 01:21:06,655
You know, next up for us is definitely,

2808
01:21:06,676 --> 01:21:06,916
you know,

2809
01:21:06,956 --> 01:21:08,957
the documentation stuff you guys asked for

2810
01:21:08,997 --> 01:21:11,738
is already absolutely on our list anyway.

2811
01:21:12,099 --> 01:21:13,538
Specific feedback about stuff that you

2812
01:21:13,559 --> 01:21:15,140
guys would like to see in the lexicon

2813
01:21:15,159 --> 01:21:15,640
or other stuff,

2814
01:21:15,680 --> 01:21:17,740
we will take that feedback in any way

2815
01:21:17,761 --> 01:21:18,721
that you are willing to give it.

2816
01:21:19,021 --> 01:21:20,842
Because, you know,

2817
01:21:20,863 --> 01:21:22,323
we want it to be a community-guided thing.

2818
01:21:22,342 --> 01:21:23,882
We want the stuff to actually feel useful

2819
01:21:23,903 --> 01:21:24,344
to people,

2820
01:21:24,363 --> 01:21:26,423
and that helps get that real-time

2821
01:21:26,444 --> 01:21:26,904
feedback.

2822
01:21:27,003 --> 01:21:27,503
And, you know,

2823
01:21:27,543 --> 01:21:29,045
we're working with vendors and stuff like

2824
01:21:29,064 --> 01:21:30,125
that right now, actually,

2825
01:21:31,386 --> 01:21:32,985
having some early conversations about,

2826
01:21:33,025 --> 01:21:33,225
you know,

2827
01:21:33,246 --> 01:21:34,626
what would shared training materials look

2828
01:21:34,725 --> 01:21:36,226
like, what would, you know,

2829
01:21:36,266 --> 01:21:37,606
making sure that we have some kind of

2830
01:21:37,627 --> 01:21:39,627
consistent modus operandi sound like for

2831
01:21:39,648 --> 01:21:40,488
reporting things.

2832
01:21:41,047 --> 01:21:42,548
So more announcements to come from our

2833
01:21:42,609 --> 01:21:43,488
side on that as well.

2834
01:21:45,301 --> 01:21:46,962
Again, thank you for having us.

2835
01:21:47,363 --> 01:21:47,904
This has been great.

2836
01:21:47,925 --> 01:21:49,206
It's a fantastic conversation.

2837
01:21:49,667 --> 01:21:52,529
I think the conclusion is we understand

2838
01:21:52,569 --> 01:21:55,212
that AV is not so unique in that

2839
01:21:55,372 --> 01:21:57,255
we're just part of the network,

2840
01:21:57,354 --> 01:21:58,936
but we're also unique enough where there's

2841
01:21:59,037 --> 01:22:00,819
some nuances to the way we operate things.

2842
01:22:01,159 --> 01:22:01,619
Hopefully,

2843
01:22:01,720 --> 01:22:03,301
AV Trust can come in and bridge some

2844
01:22:03,341 --> 01:22:05,184
of that through education and training.

2845
01:22:05,845 --> 01:22:07,546
community participation we just want to

2846
01:22:07,567 --> 01:22:10,309
make security friendly uh security doesn't

2847
01:22:10,349 --> 01:22:12,612
have to be that taboo topic that we

2848
01:22:12,652 --> 01:22:14,672
avoid because you can't avoid it anymore

2849
01:22:15,014 --> 01:22:16,454
and hopefully more people talk about it

2850
01:22:16,494 --> 01:22:18,497
and you know there's a lot of like

2851
01:22:18,516 --> 01:22:19,979
we that we started this off on a

2852
01:22:20,019 --> 01:22:22,680
very nice note but with the with the

2853
01:22:22,761 --> 01:22:24,483
education platforms and how people are

2854
01:22:24,523 --> 01:22:26,184
talking about cyber security education

2855
01:22:26,645 --> 01:22:28,225
there's an opportunity in av there's like

2856
01:22:28,365 --> 01:22:30,148
thousands of boxes there's thousands of

2857
01:22:30,207 --> 01:22:30,588
networks

2858
01:22:31,149 --> 01:22:32,610
We could spur new businesses.

2859
01:22:32,671 --> 01:22:34,814
We could spur new job opportunities,

2860
01:22:34,974 --> 01:22:36,676
things that are absolutely necessary.

2861
01:22:37,096 --> 01:22:37,296
You know,

2862
01:22:37,337 --> 01:22:38,899
hopefully we can be the center point of

2863
01:22:39,159 --> 01:22:41,341
education or just the gateway to make

2864
01:22:41,381 --> 01:22:43,645
security friendly for AV people and AV

2865
01:22:43,685 --> 01:22:44,947
friendly for security people.

2866
01:22:45,488 --> 01:22:46,588
And hopefully this all becomes,

2867
01:22:46,930 --> 01:22:48,471
we'll all have our kumbaya moment,

2868
01:22:48,511 --> 01:22:48,692
you know?

2869
01:22:50,237 --> 01:22:51,018
Tons of opportunity.

2870
01:22:51,217 --> 01:22:51,698
Love it.

2871
01:22:51,818 --> 01:22:51,978
Indeed.

2872
01:22:52,359 --> 01:22:52,679
Yep.

2873
01:22:52,719 --> 01:22:54,600
So looking for that first huge

2874
01:22:54,619 --> 01:22:55,300
vulnerability.

2875
01:22:56,900 --> 01:22:57,381
It's out there.

2876
01:22:57,921 --> 01:22:59,061
Probably people will know about it, too.

2877
01:22:59,162 --> 01:22:59,761
All right.

2878
01:23:00,182 --> 01:23:01,023
Well, we're going to wrap this up,

2879
01:23:01,063 --> 01:23:04,604
and we'll see what the future brings and

2880
01:23:04,625 --> 01:23:06,086
what you guys have for us at Infocomm.

2881
01:23:06,145 --> 01:23:06,626
And hopefully,

2882
01:23:06,685 --> 01:23:07,966
I like those little stickers that says

2883
01:23:08,006 --> 01:23:10,688
this thing's terrible on your network.

2884
01:23:10,927 --> 01:23:11,729
Those just floating around.

2885
01:23:12,029 --> 01:23:12,988
If we don't make them, I will,

2886
01:23:13,009 --> 01:23:13,909
and we'll go put them out there.

2887
01:23:14,869 --> 01:23:15,770
We won't do the security scans.

2888
01:23:16,551 --> 01:23:18,212
Anyway, so thanks again to everybody.

2889
01:23:18,332 --> 01:23:19,351
Head over to abtrust.org,

2890
01:23:19,372 --> 01:23:19,853
see what's going on,

2891
01:23:19,893 --> 01:23:22,113
and we'll catch you guys next week with

2892
01:23:22,134 --> 01:23:23,194
another episode of Nonsense.

2893
01:23:23,774 --> 01:23:25,395
Same bat channel, same bat time.

2894
01:23:26,456 --> 01:23:31,877
Thank you.

2895
01:23:31,917 --> 01:23:32,177
Well,

2896
01:23:32,257 --> 01:23:34,198
we've managed to ruin yet another episode

2897
01:23:34,238 --> 01:23:35,880
of AV Super Friends Off the Rails.

2898
01:23:36,340 --> 01:23:37,860
You can contact us with questions,

2899
01:23:37,940 --> 01:23:38,600
topic ideas,

2900
01:23:38,661 --> 01:23:40,502
or general complaints at mailbag at

2901
01:23:40,662 --> 01:23:41,921
avsuperfriends.com.

2902
01:23:42,443 --> 01:23:43,443
If you complain loud enough,

2903
01:23:43,502 --> 01:23:44,984
we might just invite you on the show.

2904
01:23:50,108 --> 01:23:50,668
Nice work, everyone.

2905
01:23:50,708 --> 01:23:54,511
Short broadcast.

2906
01:23:54,551 --> 01:23:54,792
Really good.

2907
01:23:54,832 --> 01:23:55,453
Everyone on the floor as well.

2908
01:23:55,472 --> 01:23:55,932
Best sounding podcast.

2909
01:23:56,052 --> 01:23:57,573
The opinions expressed by the AV Super

2910
01:23:57,594 --> 01:23:58,734
Friends are solely those of the

2911
01:23:58,755 --> 01:24:00,355
individuals and do not represent their

2912
01:24:00,376 --> 01:24:02,257
respective institutions, organizations,

2913
01:24:02,318 --> 01:24:08,243
companies, or clients.

2914
01:24:08,403 --> 01:24:08,643
Hello.

2915
01:24:08,662 --> 01:24:08,762
Hello.