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This season on Hitachi
Energy's Power Pulse podcast,

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we're turning our focus
to Grid Automation. Expect
bold ideas, real stories,

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and insights straight from the
experts shaping today's power grids.

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From smart digital solutions to the
challenges and opportunities of a more

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flexible, sustainable energy system,

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we'll be covering the
topics that matter most.

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As grids become more
digital and connected,

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cybersecurity is now essential
to reliability. In this
episode of Power Pulse,

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we explore what cybersecurity really
means for today's electric power systems

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and what often gets misunderstood.

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Drawing on his 42 years of experience
working with utilities, quality makers,

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and industry standards bodies,
cybersecurity expert Steve Kunsman,

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explains how threats are evolving,

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why compliance alone is only a starting
point and how real-world attacks have

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fundamentally reshaped how the
industry thinks about risk.

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The conversation explores
the convergence of IT and OT,

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the critical role of
international standards,

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and why defence in depth is essential
to protect substations, control systems,

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and mission critical infrastructure.
Hello, Steve.

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Hello.

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Welcome to the Power Pulse
podcast. How are you this morning?

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I'm doing fine. Yourself?

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Very well, thank you.

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So I hear you've been in the company
and in the protection control and

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automation business for 42 years.

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Yes, I have. It's been a long
journey, that's for sure.

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42 Years.That's a very long time.

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Yes. And I've been in development. I've
developed products for the business.

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I've been in global product management
and today I'm leading our technical team

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in North America on promoting
the solutions that we
have for grid automation.

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So as an industry veteran, Steve,

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I understand the policymakers and
industry consortia often rely on your

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insights. How did this begin?

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Yeah, that's a great question.

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Hitachi Energy has been extremely
fortunate to partner with US Department of

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Energy,

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their Caesar organisation on many
aspects of grid security and supply chain

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risk management and
cybersecurity. Initially,

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we were asked to participate on
Department of Energy's executive securing

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energy infrastructure task force as an
expert on OT control systems in this

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space.

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And Department of Energy was given the
task from Congress to give a report on

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the state of the union of the grid
security and what the grid is doing.

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Securing energy infrastructure,

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that task force has come out with
several deliverables from cyber informed

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engineering,

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which is a concept to
allow non-cybersecurity
engineers to understand the

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impact that they can have
on cybersecurity solutions.

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And then also some efforts have been
developed where I actually participated in

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developing a reference architecture or
cybersecurity system for the electric

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industry. And then that was
further turned over to ISA99,

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which is an industry consortium that
developed standards around 62443.

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So we are presently developing
electric energy OT security profiles

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for the different control systems in
the electric industry. In addition,

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we were asked to participate
and testify in a FERC,

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which is the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission from the US in their

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cybersecurity supply chain risk workshop.

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And we were able to provide some of the
goodness that Hitachi Energy is doing in

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this space and show that
cybersecurity is forefront.

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So let's look at the cybersecurity
landscape for the grid. And more recently,

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we're seeing a shift into digitalization
in an industry that's very much known

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to be analogue. Is there still a fear
of using digital as a way forward?

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Do you find a lot of resistance?

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There absolutely is.

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And the fear comes from basically
digitalization and the perception that

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having ethernet communications inside
the substation will open up the attack

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surface to adversaries from the outside.

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We can actually go back to the 80s where
we transitioned from electromechanical

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control systems to microprocessor and
that was a huge challenge as well as you

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introduce software into the control
system. Now moving to digitalization,

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we're replacing some of the key components
in the power system with digitalized

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units and the ability to then have this
data available for the protection and

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control opens up a whole new world
of opportunities for reliability and

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also data management.

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So what do utilities misunderstand about
what cybersecurity risk actually comes

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from within the digital substation?

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The risk is there.

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The question that needs to be asked is
how do we manage the risk that's in the

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system?

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There are performance-based standards
that are regulatory that give the utility

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the guidelines on what to do
for managing the cyber risk,

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but then there are also
technical standards for
cybersecurity that provide the

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blueprint on technical solutions and
defence in depth applications inside the

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substation.

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Can you tell me what a
common misconception about
cybersecurity in substations

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is?

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Yes. A few years ago,

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there was a misbelief that digital
substations and running ethernet

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communications outside of the control
house in the substation into the

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switchgear breakers transformers
violated the NERC SIP regulatory

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standards and that's not the case.

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Through standardisation and through
working with the various bodies,

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we were able to identify ways to
securely be able to deploy digital

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substations and also satisfy the
requirements of the regulatory side.

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The second misconception is when I
hear asset owners or industry peers

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say that all you need to
do is put software defined
networks in the solution and

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that's all the security that you need
that is so wrong because the defence in

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depth strategy is that you want to have
that solid core all the way through the

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cybersecurity solution. So again,

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the software defined networks will create
the hard shell and leave you a soft

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boiled egg on the centre.

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So what you're saying is
digitalization is unavoidable now.

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Yes. I believe that we're going to see
with utility grid modernization plans,

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the need for power interconnecting
systems, data centres,
the demand for growth,

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the number of interconnections that
utility is facing today is far more than

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they did in the past.

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And to implement their
traditional substations,

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they cannot keep up with this demand.

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So digitalization provides a lot of
benefit to them on the cycle time

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of delivering these solutions and then
also the ability to get data out of the

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substations to be able to
drive reliability metrics
and have early indications

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of potential failures of different
components like transformers breakers.

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Steve, you're mentioning
digital substations.

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Can you tell our audience
what a digital substation is?

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Yeah.

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What I can do is tell
you what a conventional
substation is and then what is

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different on digital.

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So conventional substation had traditional
protection control connected to

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breakers and transformers,

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collecting analogue information
via current transformers,

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potential transformers,

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and then all this control wires
to be able to control the breaker.

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Digitalization moves the conversion
of the analogue signals at the breaker

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at the transformer and then passes the
digital communications back via ethernet

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into the substation control
system for protection.

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Thank you. So this grid modernization
that you've just mentioned is driving to

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digitalization. Does it ever break down?
And if so, where does it break down?

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Yeah. So the grid modernization,

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so the drivers behind that are the
influx of data centres going in that have

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a heavy demand for power system,

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the renewable conversion and integration
and these independent power producers

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trying to connect into the grid.

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And the sheer number of substation
interconnects that need to support this is

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putting utility in a position
where they can't keep up with these

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interconnection requests.

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So digital substations allow for the
utilities to do faster integration

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because the time that it takes to deploy
a digital substation is significantly

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less than a conventional substation.

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Then also the benefit that you get
from digitalization is the reduction of

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significant wires because
these traditional CTs,

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current transformers and potential
transformer connections are now reduced to

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ethernet communications.

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Okay.

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And would you say standards enable say
for digital transformation or do they

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slow them down?

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From standardisation,

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there are various standards out
there from IEEE IEC that support the

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digitalization and digital substations.

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And I think that's one of the key
elements that have also motivated a lot of

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manufacturers as well as utilities.

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Using open standards reduces the
dependency on a proprietary interface from

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different manufacturers.

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So this allows the utilities to also
use multiple suppliers in a single

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substation using that open standard.

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And the key one for digital
substation is IEC 61850,

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which is a communication architecture
standard that defines various aspects of

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the digital components and how they need
to interface together and how to test

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them together.

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Right. Okay.

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I'm going to ask you to tell me a little
bit more about the concept of defence

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in depth and what does it look
like inside a modern substation?

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Sure. Cybersecurity from a
best practises perspective,

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defence in depth is set up to be able
to have different layers of defence in

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your substation. If we look
at the security architecture,

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you have the ingress
point of the substation,

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which is typically
protected by a firewall.

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That firewall by itself is not enough
to protect all the components that are

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within that substation.

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So here what we establish is different
conduits and zones within the

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substation and each one of these zones
provides that different defence layer in

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the substation.

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And here's where we use the
standard IASA/IEC 62443 to

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provide the best practises around
doing the security components,

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the security features with inside our
products and technology and developing the

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security architectures around
this defence in depth strategy.

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Thank you, Steve. And when it comes
to reliability and performance,

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how do you balance these
with cybersecurity?

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Yeah, that's a great question.
And I can go back 2007.

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I was invited as a vendor on the
NERC SIP panel and they were asking

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questions.

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What is NERC SIP?

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So NERC CIP is a North American
Reliability Corporation
and they develop the

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regulatory standards for the US regulated
market and the CIP is the critical

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infrastructure protection.

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And in 2007 is when they
first went enforceable and
the standardisation committe

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brought a bunch of vendors
together and asked questions.

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And what was key about that is they were
all concerned about putting IEC 61850

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into the substations,

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putting ethernet into the substations
because they feared that this would cause

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the adversary's easy
access to the equipment.

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And what I quickly reminded them is don't
forget that the R in NERC stands for

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reliability, not resistance.
So from that perspective,

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what we did is we justified
the information that can
be attained from a digital

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substation is paramount
to the reliability.

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And what we need to do is find ways to
secure that substation to be able to

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allow for the real-time data outflow
so our analytics like asset performance

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management or other type of
machine learning analytics
can analyse the health of

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that transformer,

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health of the breaker and then provide
predictive maintenance algorithms to our

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customers.
And so from a reliability perspective,

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if you can get this digital information
from the substation that absolutely will

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drive the need and the importance
of the digital substation.

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Is everyone across the board convinced
that cybersecurity should be front of

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mind?

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I'm not so convinced that's the case.

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Okay. So who do you have to convince
that they should really pay attention?

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I think the key thing is, again,
going back to the NERC CIP standards.

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Those are reliability standards.

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They define the basement or
the bare minimum that the
utilities should be doing.

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When we take a look at industry
standards like IEC 62443,

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here it's built on foundations of years
used in the industrial control system

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market and we're now using this
in electric OT control systems,

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operational technology control systems
to be able to provide this foundation.

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And there,

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when we look at best in class or best
practise for cybersecurity standards,

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there's different levels of security that
we need to have in our products to be

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able to defend an adversary that's
at the doorstep of the product.

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On the security architecture is again,
building upon this defence in depth,

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ensuring that the most critical part of
the system is unattainable or difficult

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to attain. So again,
from a defence in depth,

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the security principles behind that are
to be able to deter the adversaries. If

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they do get into the system,

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delay them as much as possible and
then be able to mitigate any type of

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risk that's in there or mitigate any
type of threat that's in the system.

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This compliance you've just
mentioned, it's a baseline,

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so everybody has to adhere to it, but
it's not a full cybersecurity strategy.

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When you put your strategy
together for cybersecurity,

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does it fall within your wider business
strategy or does it stand on its own two

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feet?

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Yeah. So I think one thing to clarify
is the regulatory standards are

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performance-based standards.

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They tell the asset owners
or the utilities what to
do. The technical standards,

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IEC 62443, IEC 62351,

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they are the technical standards
that tell you how to do something.

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So cybersecurity should be an integral
part of any strategy for asset owners,

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for companies and so forth.

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The key thing is that cybersecurity
needs to be baked into an

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organisation. The difference between
regulatory and technical standards.

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So the regulatory standards,

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that part of the utility
that is under that programme,

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they're mandatory compliance
to those standards.

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The technical standards
are best practises.

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What I always state in many
of my presentations is if
we focus on compliance,

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we're missing an
opportunity for education,

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awareness of the organisation to bring
them together to understand the main goal

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behind cybersecurity and
the principles there.

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Technical standards will
provide the blueprints and
if you follow the blueprints

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of this, the incremental step to
regulatory compliance is much easier.

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Thank you. Throughout your 42-year career,

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what is the most avoidable
cybersecurity threat that you've seen?

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The biggest issue that I see is just
doing the perimeter protection on a system

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because when we take a look at
threats, it's not a question of if,

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it's a question of when
adversaries will be in the system.

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And we see now with the
activity of nation states,

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the increased penetration
on these systems,

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we take a look at what happened in the
Ukraine back in 2015, 2016 timeframe,

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which actually was a wake-up call to a
lot of the industry that says adversaries

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from the outside can penetrate through
the enterprise level and get into the OT

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control system and being able to get in
there and identify that the adversary is

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in there is the most important thing.

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So I believe monitoring
of these systems is key.

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Being able to have those defence
mechanisms, as we discussed earlier,

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the defence in depth is
a critical part of that,

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that if they do break through one layer,

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there's another defence mechanism in
there that tries to fort them or hold off

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that attack.
And again, monitoring systems there,

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I think are also extremely important
because if they do get into part of the

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systems,

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you need to be able to detect them and
then be able to minimise the impact of

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that adversarial threat.

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So Steve, one last question, if I may.

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Is there a parallel to be made between
personal cyber hygiene and what is

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happening on the grid when
it comes to cybersecurity?

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Yeah, I think absolutely.

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So I think if we see the event
of AI and the incidents that

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are occurring in our daily
lives, spoofing emails,

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phone calls from apparent people that
have their voice recorded and sounded like

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one of your relatives,

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I think it's very important that we
understand the risks that are out there

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today and what we do with
our personal cyber hygiene,

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I think is very relevant to where we
need to make sure that the grid is.

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And in the future, as we
continue this grid modernization,

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cybersecurity needs to be paramount and
forefront on any asset owner's mind,

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on any solution that we as grid automation
deliver into the system needs to be

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done with the rigour and the robustnes
that can withstand adversarial threat.

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From the modernization perspective,

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cybersecurity going out
into the next two, three,

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four years is going to be also extremely
important because of that aspect

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and these digital systems
if they're not protected,

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if we don't understand where the risk
is in the system. And this is also

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handled by our risk mitigation or risk
assessment strategy and risk assessments

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that we do for the systems to be able to
identify if we have the right security

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features in the system that will support
the risk tolerance of the asset owner.

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So again, I think this is
going to be an integral part.

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I think the organisations need to
embrace cybersecurity from awareness,

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understanding and execution perspective.

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Thank you very much,
Steve, for coming in today.

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It's been wonderful chatting with you.

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Thank you.

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And that's it for today. We'll be
back soon with some great content.

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But before you go, remember to give us
a follow so you don't miss an episode.

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Thanks for tuning in. See you soon.

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This episode was brought to
you by Hitachi Energy, created,

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introduced and hosted by
Bárbara Freitas-Daniels,

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content and script writing by Elizabeth
Kollross, Diane Galaz, Kristin McKinsey.

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Produced and edited by Creative
Chimps. Guest speaker, Steve Kunsman.