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Cybersecurity today.

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Would like to thank Meter for their
support in bringing you This podcast

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Meter delivers a complete networking
stack, wired, wireless, and cellular

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in one integrated solution that's
built for performance and scale.

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You can find them at meter.com/cst.

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Welcome to Cybersecurity
Today on the weekend.

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We have a great guest for you today
and a rare treat in that my friend

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David Shipley is actually coming
in for this interview as well.

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Our guest, though, that you
don't know, is Neil Bisson Nil.

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Welcome.

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Thanks.

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Thanks for having me on, guys.

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Really excited to be here.

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Can you tell us a little
bit about yourself, Neil?

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just for the audience who doesn't know
you, just a little bit of background

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and then I'll reveal why that's
so important for this discussion.

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Great.

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yeah, so I am a retired intelligence
officer with the Canadian

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Security Intelligence Service.

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I retired in 2020 and, after I retired, I
realized that, there's still a lot of work

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to be done when it comes to understanding
National Security Intelligence collection

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here in Canada and the importance of that.

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So I took it upon myself to, start
the Global Intelligence Knowledge

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Network, which is basically a digitally
based company that, gives me an

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opportunity to speak to the media
about issues relating to everything

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from cybersecurity, cyber espionage,
to intelligence collection, terrorism,

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all that interesting stuff that, we
see on the news from time to time.

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So I'm, I've been doing that since then.

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And, 2023, I, decided to, I wanted to.

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See a little bit more about how the
cyber side of things is interacting

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with, national security intelligence.

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And I took a IBM course for, cybersecurity
analyst and that got me a little bit

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more into understanding what some of
the vulnerabilities that we're seeing

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on the digital plane as well as on,
just our own national security issues.

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For those who are wondering what this has
to do with cybersecurity, I think you've

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started to make that bridge and that
there's a lot of work that we talk about

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nation states And how they're involved.

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And that's one of the things I
want to talk to you about today,

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this discussion is to give us
some sort of perspective on this.

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We, and the problem is we get the news,
like it comes at us, piece by piece.

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And it's really difficult to get a
full picture of what's happening.

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I think people this news comes
at them like out of a fire hose.

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Need a little perspective.

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So just wanna back up and
talk a little bit about that.

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Can you talk about your perspective,
uh, as, um, as An intelligence

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officer and how you see the world.

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Can you share that picture with
us as to what, when you think

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about the world in terms of nation
states, what are you thinking about?

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Yeah, so I started my, career
with the federal government in

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the late eighties, early nineties.

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And at that time, it was.

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Telecommunications and, the internet.

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it was just burgeoning back then.

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now everyone's life is basically somehow
connected to either social media or, the

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way that we interact with one another.

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The way that we communicate with one
another, the way that we, basically

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talk about our own interests.

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It's all out there, it's
all on the internet now.

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And that has changed fundamentally
the way intelligence organizations

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look at collecting information and
targeting individuals that they want

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to collect further information from.

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So one of the big concerns that I think
everyone should be aware of is the

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fact that the more that you're putting
out there, if, foreign intelligence.

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State actor or even a non-state actor
who's being utilized by a foreign state

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is looking to garner that information.

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Whether you're working for a tech
company, whether you're working for the

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military, whether you're working for a
government department, all of that stuff

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helps them comprise, a plan for how
they would approach you, whether it's

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digitally or whether it's, face to face.

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back in the day when, we're talking
a little bit more old school

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espionage, we would try to find as
much information about an individual,

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compile that and then come up with a
plausible reason for us to make a meet

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or some sort of contact with them.

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Nowadays, it's so much easier to do that
because as I said, we all live digitally.

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It's a lot easier for us to reach
out to someone, whether it be with

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a business interest, whether it be
through, if they're on a dating app.

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It's just so much easier to do that
than it is logistically to try to

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figure out, okay, how am I gonna
make a connection with this person?

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And what's interesting is, this idea
of big data being available, both

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what, what we traditionally call open
source intelligence, but also if you

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look at what China's biggest raids on
North American information, whether

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it's the Anthem Healthcare breach,
you got health information on US

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government employees And other things,
the Marriot attacks, where they knew

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where people were staying, where they
were going, and all the other breaches.

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All this is being
funneled into a data set.

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One can imagine analysis because
in, in the exposure I've had to

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the world that you live in, Neil,
like you, you're looking for those

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motivational levers when you have
that first conversation with somebody,

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is this someone that's, ego-driven?

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Are they money motivated?

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is a little bit of cash gonna
help give them, decide to give up

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their administrative credentials
to a tech company so you can get

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that intellectual property out.

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are there other motivators which
are as old as time itself in terms

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of relationships and Russia's been
particularly good about using those,

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to great effect over multiple decades.

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So you take this information, you know
a lot about Jim, Neil and David, what

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buttons might work, why you would wanna
talk to them and pitches you can make.

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one could imagine now we've got a
spy DPT or two running around in

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various intelligent agencies, giving
suggestions of how can I flip Neil?

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if I, were you trying to flip Neil?

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I would talk about the Blue Jays
and maybe he's interested in some

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tickets for, I know we're after
the season, but we're all so cheap.

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we'd sell out our country
for Blue Jays tickets at one.

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Listen, you would be shocked
what people will sell out.

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people will give up their
passwords for a chocolate pie.

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that's true.

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It's true.

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Yeah.

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yeah.

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not asking Neil to, to spill any tea,
although we'd love to have any tea.

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but that's just kinda my take on it is
this big data problem, whether it's.

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It's openly and freely
available or just taken?

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yeah, like wholesale B and e Thieves,
They're using it to great effect.

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I need to take a step back.

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You guys are two steps ahead of me.

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I used to read Mad Magazine.

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I saw Spy versus Spy Comics.

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I know that Nations spy on each other,
but When did this become a business thing?

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Oh, it was always business.

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you go back to the great power
battles, and trying to achieve

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technological advantage.

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you can bet.

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that Moscow was doing their best to
steal every bit of Silicon Valley

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insight during the microchip races
and things that were happening on that

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technology side, whether it was defense
or civilian application, other things.

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And you look at China, when you have a
five year economic plan, you can literally

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create a shopping list of all the things
you need to have and what priority you

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need according to your central planning.

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it was always about money over ideology.

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'cause it takes money to run ideology.

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At least, that's my take.

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if you look at it traditionally,
technological advancements,

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Really were based on military
power at one time, right?

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everything used to trickle down from
the military into private industry.

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And then at one point in our
history that shifted, Whereas now

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private industry had gotten to the
point, and I think the internet

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was a big catalyst for that, right?

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even at that time it was, the idea was,
okay, we need a system that we could

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easily share ideas and information with.

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And even that was almost like from
a military perspective, but then it

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blossomed and you've got companies
like Microsoft and Apple and, Google

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and all of these other companies
that are amalgamating huge amounts

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of information and being used by
government departments, by military.

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And then that is just basically
expanding out and out and the

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ripple effect that you're seeing.

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So it gets to the point where state
and non-state actors realize that, Hey,

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listen, if we wanna make some sort of a
profit of information or profit of money,

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we need to start getting into this first,

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How are we, how do we have a military
advantage over the rest of the

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world, and how can we ensure that
our influence continues And all of

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those things can be based upon, is it.

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What's the next, technological
advancement gonna be?

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Are people gonna be buying more EVs?

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Okay, we'll make E EVs cheaper, but if
we steal the information from another

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company on how to build those EVs makes
it a lot easier for us to do that.

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And that's just a simple example, but all
of the companies out there right now that

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are privatized, even if you look at it
from the perspective of space exploration.

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You've got SpaceX, you've got, I can't
remember off the top of my head what

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Bezos is working on, it's project,
but it's got a different name now

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they're calling it Leo, I think.

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I'm not sure.

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Oh, okay.

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if you look at it from the perspective
of, at one time it was military and

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state secre, they wanted to get, now
our adversaries are realizing that

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really if you wanna have an, effect
on someone else's economy, if you want

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to influence what's happening, yeah.

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Politically we want to do certain
things and we want to be involved

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in the diaspora communities.

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But when it comes to the
technological advantage, that's

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what really helps us out.

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And China's a good example of that.

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they've always looked at
it from the perspective of.

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We can build it better.

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If we just steal the technology and,
reverse engineer it, then we have to worry

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about trying to, make a relationship with
another government or another company.

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and we've seen that and was there
a time in Canada, like you've got

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the classic Nortel example, right?

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Nortel was rated for its best,
most innovative technologies, and

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those miraculously showed up in,
a number of Chinese companies.

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Literally the documentation was copy
and pasted, and the impact on that.

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just recently hydro, just recently,
hydro Quebec, same situation, right?

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Yeah.

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You've got an individual working
for Hydro Quebec who is, on trial

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at this moment for secrets that he's
provided to the Chinese government.

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Because Canadians are used to
doing, okay, we're gonna fix this

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problem, we're gonna figure this out.

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And because we have such a huge
country and we have to make sure

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that IT infrastructure works.

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throughout such a large land mass, we
have made technological innovations and

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exactly what you're saying, like going
back to Nortel, we were making some

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incredible advancements at that time too.

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You go back to the Avro Arrow, we were
making advancements in, aerospace, but

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another country will come along and say,
instead of trying to talk to Canada or

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Canadian government or this company,
let's just take IP and use it ourselves.

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and it's not just rating the
private sector like Canada's

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National Research Council.

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I know this is it feels like
now I'm talking about decades

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ago, but it was, 10 years ago.

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the NRC, which is responsible for
funding billions of dollars worth

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of research across the country.

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Public and private sector research
partnerships, had the cookie jar

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completely cleaned out by the Chinese.

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Yeah.

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And afterwards they signed a,
we won't hack you agreement.

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of course, it's like when I was
a kid, I didn't go check the

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cookie jarre after I rated it.

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'cause mom hadn't made any more cookies.

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I promise Mom, I'm not gonna
write the cookie jar today.

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yeah.

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'cause there's no cookies.

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They're back.

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And what's been interesting is, there was
a report from, either CSE or C. So CSC

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being Canada's version of the NSA and Cs
a's being our combination of C-I-A-F-B-I,

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mandate just for American listeners,
that talked about that, the increase in

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nation chain activity targeting Canada's
private sector businesses via cloud

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attacks to go and get, 'cause the NRC
cookie JRR was getting filled back up.

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Maybe it had been locked down a
little bit tighter this time, and

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so they just moved to the next area.

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and this has just been about
secrets and intellectual property.

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That's not even half of what
we're seeing out there now.

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Neil, what, from your perspective, because
you were an intelligence agent at what

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point did you start to think, oh, wait a
minute, I'm thinking way more corporately

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now than I was maybe government?

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Or did that actually happen?

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for me the shift was like when
I was working as an intelligence

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officer, Canadian Security
Intelligence Service focuses on

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00:11:52,266 --> 00:11:53,976
national security threats to Canada.

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00:11:54,006 --> 00:11:56,226
So that breaks down into
basically four components.

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You're looking at terrorism, espionage,
foreign interference, and sabotage.

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00:12:02,466 --> 00:12:07,056
So we were looking at nation states
or actors, whether they be groups or

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individuals like, terrorist groups
and individuals that are affiliated

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to these terrorist organizations.

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What are their threats to Canada and
what are they doing to try to, cause

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problems for, Canada threatening our,
our livelihood, re-reading our lives?

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Now what we were looking at from
that perspective at that time was,

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okay, what about the corporations?

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How are they being infiltrated?

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00:12:28,886 --> 00:12:32,336
Because there's always that
understanding that, private industry

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has to, be responsible for themselves
and are they being targeted?

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00:12:36,036 --> 00:12:37,896
If you don't look at it, you don't see it.

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So when you're focused on, like I said,
those poor categories, you're not looking

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at it from a private industry perspective,
but take a look at the microbiology lab

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00:12:47,956 --> 00:12:52,466
in Winnipeg, and the information that was
stolen from there, like what we have to

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00:12:52,556 --> 00:12:55,866
get to the point that, Canadians in the
Canadian government understands, is that

246
00:12:56,826 --> 00:12:59,796
what's happening in the corporate and
private industry world, what's happening

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00:12:59,796 --> 00:13:06,096
with research and development is just as
important as a terrorist entity trying

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to, perpetrate an attack in Canada.

249
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Why is it just as important?

250
00:13:09,396 --> 00:13:13,446
Because if you're dealing with
a foreign state that is willing

251
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to use a biological weapon.

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Then if the information is being stolen
from Canada and used against another

253
00:13:19,806 --> 00:13:24,756
country or used to make the next
superbug, what are we gonna do about that?

254
00:13:25,366 --> 00:13:28,896
And the private industries
are really the linchpin.

255
00:13:28,946 --> 00:13:32,486
they're that, almost like that
more vulnerable, soft target now.

256
00:13:32,881 --> 00:13:36,486
and the reason the areas where,
you know, when I think about the

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future, right now, we are leaders
still in artificial intelligence.

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We've got some great AI companies, we've
got leaders in quantum, the development

259
00:13:44,086 --> 00:13:48,006
of quantum computing plus, leaders
in trying to develop host quantum,

260
00:13:48,076 --> 00:13:51,886
secure cryptographic communications
and, great examples of that happening

261
00:13:51,886 --> 00:13:54,641
with the Canadian telecommunications
companies like TELUS and others.

262
00:13:54,861 --> 00:13:57,591
so we've got lots of
cookies that are Oh yeah.

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Stealing.

264
00:13:58,891 --> 00:14:00,811
and our show covers
both the US and Canada.

265
00:14:00,871 --> 00:14:01,951
There's a huge amount that's there.

266
00:14:01,951 --> 00:14:05,461
But I wanna just back, I just wanna
extract it just a little more because

267
00:14:05,671 --> 00:14:08,961
when we started introducing you, you said,
oh, and I took a cybersecurity course.

268
00:14:09,011 --> 00:14:14,681
And I'm not being critical, but it,
made my heart go, 'cause I went, what?

269
00:14:14,681 --> 00:14:16,751
Wasn't that something
you always had to take?

270
00:14:17,181 --> 00:14:21,941
If our security operation is not
studying cybersecurity It's it's like

271
00:14:21,941 --> 00:14:24,861
sending the police out and saying
that thing on your, in your holster.

272
00:14:25,566 --> 00:14:28,356
You could take when you
retire, you can study that.

273
00:14:28,961 --> 00:14:32,646
for me, man, it's because I'm a
cyber, I'm a I'm an industrial guy.

274
00:14:32,856 --> 00:14:36,076
Yeah, I hear you From a, from,
from that perspective, I can

275
00:14:36,076 --> 00:14:37,006
see why you're saying that.

276
00:14:37,006 --> 00:14:41,176
But if you look at kind of the mandate
of each one of our organizations, David,

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00:14:41,176 --> 00:14:44,566
you had mentioned, the communication
security adoption of Canada CSE.

278
00:14:45,196 --> 00:14:50,436
They are more focused on what's happening
in relationships to, communications

279
00:14:50,496 --> 00:14:54,756
and intercepting those communications
and trying to understand what that

280
00:14:54,756 --> 00:14:56,376
means through those interceptions.

281
00:14:56,376 --> 00:14:59,556
Because it's not just the interception
of the communication, it's also

282
00:14:59,556 --> 00:15:03,886
the technology that's being used to
infiltrate, Canadian telecommunications.

283
00:15:03,936 --> 00:15:08,286
And where our adversaries and our enemies
are trying to get that information from.

284
00:15:08,676 --> 00:15:12,996
Now, as an intelligence officer, my
job was to be more of a face-to-face,

285
00:15:13,306 --> 00:15:16,576
having the conversation, making
the contact, and then getting the

286
00:15:16,576 --> 00:15:18,886
individual, let's say he works in cyber.

287
00:15:19,906 --> 00:15:22,996
Getting that individual comfortable
enough to say, Hey, listen, whatever

288
00:15:22,996 --> 00:15:26,206
group organization you're working for, you
realize that they're probably doing things

289
00:15:26,206 --> 00:15:28,396
that are not advantageous to Canada.

290
00:15:28,886 --> 00:15:30,716
we'd really like you
to help us out on this.

291
00:15:30,716 --> 00:15:32,726
How can we talk about making this work?

292
00:15:32,996 --> 00:15:38,396
So on one side we're CSC, you've got them
understanding the metadata and trying to

293
00:15:38,396 --> 00:15:40,616
get the information from that perspective.

294
00:15:40,916 --> 00:15:46,006
But my job, my role as an intelligence
officer was to, basically get the

295
00:15:46,006 --> 00:15:50,296
individual on board to become a human
source so that not only do we have the

296
00:15:50,296 --> 00:15:54,736
information, but now I may actually have
some opportunity to task and direct this

297
00:15:54,766 --> 00:15:57,016
individual to provide more or do more.

298
00:15:58,216 --> 00:15:59,866
So the crossover of those skills.

299
00:15:59,866 --> 00:16:00,826
And that's equally important.

300
00:16:00,826 --> 00:16:03,326
and by the way, if you're listening
to this, we're bringing you back

301
00:16:03,326 --> 00:16:07,706
for an entire show on how to
use those, the things that you

302
00:16:07,706 --> 00:16:09,486
learn, as an intelligence officer.

303
00:16:09,536 --> 00:16:12,186
And how you can use those
for, social engineering.

304
00:16:12,526 --> 00:16:13,516
But I wanna focus on this.

305
00:16:13,756 --> 00:16:17,356
So can we back up just another piece
and for the audience that's out there

306
00:16:17,406 --> 00:16:23,166
who are the players that are out there
and what are they doing right now?

307
00:16:23,166 --> 00:16:25,886
start with who the players are,
because I think they affect

308
00:16:26,036 --> 00:16:28,346
both the US and Canada directly.

309
00:16:28,646 --> 00:16:29,576
I hear about.

310
00:16:29,996 --> 00:16:30,746
North Korea.

311
00:16:30,746 --> 00:16:32,726
I hear about Russia, I hear about China.

312
00:16:33,116 --> 00:16:34,706
I'm not sure which one's more important.

313
00:16:34,706 --> 00:16:38,371
I'm not sure who's doing what, who
are the players in cybersecurity

314
00:16:38,641 --> 00:16:42,031
attacking, or at least that are
threatening cybersecurity right now?

315
00:16:42,271 --> 00:16:46,301
Yeah, so the big players, as they
would be in intelligence are China,

316
00:16:46,391 --> 00:16:49,031
Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

317
00:16:49,781 --> 00:16:56,441
And they've all shown a capacity to
infiltrate and to extract information

318
00:16:56,531 --> 00:16:59,006
or use information for their own means.

319
00:16:59,291 --> 00:17:02,381
So the interesting thing is if you
look at China, China is trying to

320
00:17:02,381 --> 00:17:06,491
grab as much information as they
can about every individual, in North

321
00:17:06,491 --> 00:17:08,771
America and in the western world.

322
00:17:08,831 --> 00:17:10,961
The Equifax attack by Stone Panda.

323
00:17:11,726 --> 00:17:17,486
That took 145 million individuals
information, and now basically the Chinese

324
00:17:17,486 --> 00:17:21,776
government has that and they're probably
churning it through, hundreds of different

325
00:17:21,776 --> 00:17:25,676
databases to try to get a profile of
every individual that they possibly can.

326
00:17:25,676 --> 00:17:27,776
they may be interested in what
they're doing in five or 10 or 15.

327
00:17:27,776 --> 00:17:32,006
Same as TikTok by grabbing as much
information on 10, 12, 13, 14 year

328
00:17:32,006 --> 00:17:36,326
olds in the next 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 years,
when they've actually got it into

329
00:17:36,326 --> 00:17:39,806
the working world, they can use that
information and hopefully they've

330
00:17:39,806 --> 00:17:42,896
been continuing to monitor what these
individuals went up to, and it makes

331
00:17:42,896 --> 00:17:47,306
it easier for them to reach out to them
either digitally or have some sort of

332
00:17:47,306 --> 00:17:49,466
contact with them and get information.

333
00:17:50,381 --> 00:17:53,321
Now when you look, so this are just
movies that people are actually

334
00:17:53,321 --> 00:17:56,771
studying people 10 years in advance
of when they make the approach.

335
00:17:57,191 --> 00:18:00,071
you can say a lot of horrible things
about authoritarian regime, but the

336
00:18:00,071 --> 00:18:03,311
one thing that you've gotta give
them credit for is that they can make

337
00:18:03,311 --> 00:18:07,571
decisions for what's going to happen
over the next 5, 10, 15, 20 years.

338
00:18:07,571 --> 00:18:10,901
They're not concerned about what the next
government coming in is gonna do because

339
00:18:10,901 --> 00:18:12,371
there is no other government coming in.

340
00:18:12,581 --> 00:18:16,691
They're not worried about, reaching
out to their constituency to find

341
00:18:16,691 --> 00:18:18,041
out what the issues are for them.

342
00:18:18,386 --> 00:18:21,206
It's their decisions that
are being made, right?

343
00:18:21,236 --> 00:18:24,476
The decisions of that authoritarian
regime is, listen, we're gonna make

344
00:18:24,476 --> 00:18:29,456
sure that we infiltrate influence
and do what we want to the rest of

345
00:18:29,456 --> 00:18:31,376
the world in the next 15 or 20 years.

346
00:18:31,376 --> 00:18:34,586
And if that means we have to overtake
their critical infrastructure, if

347
00:18:34,586 --> 00:18:37,466
that means that we have to steal
all their ip, if that means we have

348
00:18:37,466 --> 00:18:40,196
to get into their own political
systems, we're going to do that.

349
00:18:40,796 --> 00:18:42,266
And that's what their priority is.

350
00:18:42,686 --> 00:18:46,106
So you've got that from China, and then
you're looking at Russia who's looking

351
00:18:46,106 --> 00:18:47,966
at it from a military perspective, right?

352
00:18:48,026 --> 00:18:49,886
they're still involved in
the conflict in Ukraine.

353
00:18:50,576 --> 00:18:53,006
They're looking at, okay,
what's happening in Europe?

354
00:18:53,066 --> 00:18:54,536
What's happening in North America?

355
00:18:54,536 --> 00:18:57,566
How can we ensure that they
don't get the idea that they

356
00:18:57,566 --> 00:18:59,336
want to continue to help Ukraine?

357
00:18:59,336 --> 00:19:00,056
Or how can we.

358
00:19:00,686 --> 00:19:04,186
Cause some sort of, disruption
within their system.

359
00:19:04,186 --> 00:19:06,496
So they question their own
government and we've seen a lot

360
00:19:06,496 --> 00:19:07,816
of sabotage attacks happening.

361
00:19:07,816 --> 00:19:12,356
But those sabotage attacks are,
being coordinated with individuals

362
00:19:12,356 --> 00:19:15,566
that are working in the cyber
world to find out, okay, where

363
00:19:15,566 --> 00:19:18,216
are the, supply chain, weaknesses?

364
00:19:18,426 --> 00:19:20,496
How can we overcome these weaknesses?

365
00:19:20,896 --> 00:19:22,276
you've got China, you've got Russia.

366
00:19:22,276 --> 00:19:25,456
Iran is always concerned about their
dissidents and they're concerned

367
00:19:25,456 --> 00:19:26,986
about their own nuclear program.

368
00:19:27,436 --> 00:19:30,886
So they're gonna try to infiltrate
anything that deals with defense.

369
00:19:31,096 --> 00:19:33,916
They're gonna try to get ahold
of information from IP from.

370
00:19:34,681 --> 00:19:38,651
We talked about, rocket companies like,
space exploration, and now you, you

371
00:19:38,651 --> 00:19:42,441
mentioned it yourself, David, Canada
is really getting big into AI and

372
00:19:42,441 --> 00:19:44,181
we're trying to push that envelope.

373
00:19:44,871 --> 00:19:48,951
Iran would be looking at Canadian
companies that are startups and

374
00:19:48,951 --> 00:19:51,471
the aerospace industry and being
like, okay, we want to get in there.

375
00:19:51,471 --> 00:19:52,461
We want to find out what they're doing.

376
00:19:53,076 --> 00:19:55,816
So and it's interesting because
the service speaking of startups,

377
00:19:56,056 --> 00:19:59,896
so CSIS had a great alert out to
Canadian startups, and this would

378
00:19:59,896 --> 00:20:01,216
apply to American startups as well.

379
00:20:01,216 --> 00:20:03,936
It's hey, these contests where
they invite you to China?

380
00:20:04,086 --> 00:20:05,076
Maybe not such a good idea.

381
00:20:05,766 --> 00:20:05,976
Yeah.

382
00:20:06,031 --> 00:20:08,851
for these potential investments,
which you're gonna disclose all

383
00:20:08,851 --> 00:20:11,491
of your deepest secrets and where
you're at, and potentially Get

384
00:20:11,491 --> 00:20:12,661
money and investment this way.

385
00:20:12,661 --> 00:20:12,721
Yeah.

386
00:20:13,051 --> 00:20:16,906
Which is, interesting that they decided
to go loud as part of that it, it is

387
00:20:16,906 --> 00:20:21,796
worth noting, Jim, the George, was it
the, the guy behind Game US owns, George.

388
00:20:23,671 --> 00:20:24,631
You're on your own buddy.

389
00:20:24,871 --> 00:20:25,231
Yeah.

390
00:20:25,231 --> 00:20:25,681
Sorry.

391
00:20:25,801 --> 00:20:26,071
Yeah.

392
00:20:26,371 --> 00:20:29,271
George R. Martin, has this
famous quote that no one's the

393
00:20:29,271 --> 00:20:30,441
villain in their own story.

394
00:20:30,491 --> 00:20:35,021
and for us, the absence of cyber
digital evil is, Russia, China,

395
00:20:35,071 --> 00:20:37,531
North Korea, sometimes Iran.

396
00:20:37,921 --> 00:20:39,811
but we do it, we pioneered it.

397
00:20:39,841 --> 00:20:45,331
The United States started this
by tapping Cisco routers back in

398
00:20:45,331 --> 00:20:47,401
the day, being shipped to Moscow.

399
00:20:47,456 --> 00:20:50,311
the whole reason we're so wired
about Huawei networking gears.

400
00:20:50,316 --> 00:20:51,856
'cause we did it first.

401
00:20:51,916 --> 00:20:55,291
Now they may be doing it more
and better than us, but But, we.

402
00:20:56,356 --> 00:20:59,521
I had a chance to meet members of the
intelligence committee from the United

403
00:20:59,521 --> 00:21:03,796
States, and remember that awkward moment
when Snowden leaks were happening and

404
00:21:03,796 --> 00:21:05,676
there was the, one guy was sent out.

405
00:21:05,676 --> 00:21:06,306
I just met him.

406
00:21:06,306 --> 00:21:10,676
He was the official apology tour
for the CIA, going to, Angela

407
00:21:10,676 --> 00:21:14,346
Merkel and others saying, we're
really sorry we spied on your phone.

408
00:21:14,506 --> 00:21:16,036
because allies do it to each other.

409
00:21:16,036 --> 00:21:19,386
Israel spies on everybody, for
their own national interests.

410
00:21:19,676 --> 00:21:24,026
what's interesting sometimes for me
is the countries we never hear about.

411
00:21:24,056 --> 00:21:26,056
I had some really interesting
conversations back when,

412
00:21:26,056 --> 00:21:29,446
particularly Canada was having
a very tense time with India.

413
00:21:29,446 --> 00:21:32,266
we made a series of geopolitical
choices to get in a fight.

414
00:21:33,166 --> 00:21:35,986
Hilariously have our Prime Ministers
plane break down after we start the

415
00:21:35,986 --> 00:21:38,056
fight in India, which was super awkward.

416
00:21:38,486 --> 00:21:40,076
there's no red carpet.

417
00:21:40,116 --> 00:21:42,996
can we get some spare parts, for
but where I'm going with this is

418
00:21:43,026 --> 00:21:44,376
we don't talk enough about India.

419
00:21:44,806 --> 00:21:48,616
everyone I read on the intelligence
assessments on India's cyber capabilities,

420
00:21:48,616 --> 00:21:49,996
they're very condescending and I'm like,

421
00:21:49,996 --> 00:21:50,476
Wait a second.

422
00:21:50,566 --> 00:21:54,586
This country has more engineers than
some countries have populations.

423
00:21:55,106 --> 00:21:57,596
and they're incredibly
hardworking and incredibly smart.

424
00:21:57,596 --> 00:22:04,106
And I think you're being incredibly dumb
to ignore, India's potential into 21st

425
00:22:04,106 --> 00:22:05,426
century in building up these capacities.

426
00:22:05,426 --> 00:22:09,656
So yes, a lot of their attention is spent
on Pakistan as two nuclear armed countries

427
00:22:10,226 --> 00:22:14,096
that like to spark off, would spend their
time, but that don't mean they can't.

428
00:22:14,326 --> 00:22:15,701
and when we were getting tents in Canada.

429
00:22:16,891 --> 00:22:19,561
We have a lot of offshore
software development in India.

430
00:22:20,101 --> 00:22:22,831
And so one of the goals for Indian
intelligence, like Neil was saying,

431
00:22:22,831 --> 00:22:27,671
would be develop assets inside their own,
companies that may potentially want to put

432
00:22:27,671 --> 00:22:31,861
code back doors, other things, these are
This is a form of power projection now.

433
00:22:31,961 --> 00:22:34,147
we talk about the players, it's everybody.

434
00:22:34,147 --> 00:22:37,987
And, Canada, we got caught in
Snowden hacking Brazil's phone.

435
00:22:37,987 --> 00:22:39,637
So during trade negotiations.

436
00:22:39,637 --> 00:22:40,027
Awkward.

437
00:22:40,127 --> 00:22:43,877
and I was very proud of our spies 'cause
we're really good at, we had a really good

438
00:22:43,877 --> 00:22:45,527
track record of hacking mobile devices.

439
00:22:45,917 --> 00:22:46,277
Cool stuff.

440
00:22:46,277 --> 00:22:47,792
but we had our hand on the cookie jar too.

441
00:22:47,792 --> 00:22:52,082
As much as I will China for stealing
our stuff, we do it to others.

442
00:22:52,592 --> 00:22:52,862
Yeah.

443
00:22:53,742 --> 00:22:55,362
so we've got these companies.

444
00:22:55,692 --> 00:23:01,902
And now, my sense is it's gone beyond
information and I first encountered

445
00:23:01,902 --> 00:23:06,102
this as a telco consultant way back,
and I was an African, I was meeting

446
00:23:06,102 --> 00:23:10,102
guys from Huawei and realizing, who
Huawei is, building the telephone

447
00:23:10,102 --> 00:23:13,012
infrastructure for the world right now.

448
00:23:13,132 --> 00:23:14,722
And David, you talk about Nortel.

449
00:23:14,902 --> 00:23:19,672
So we know, and I think most of us
are aware that Huawei devices are

450
00:23:20,122 --> 00:23:24,202
intricately meshed into most of
the telecommunications networks.

451
00:23:24,412 --> 00:23:27,412
I think a lot of people think they've
been pulled outta the Western networks.

452
00:23:27,712 --> 00:23:29,242
Germany would disagree.

453
00:23:29,462 --> 00:23:32,192
and many other countries as
well still have these devices.

454
00:23:32,492 --> 00:23:36,392
But those are, that's one place
of where they, we've infiltrated.

455
00:23:36,392 --> 00:23:40,622
But I've heard stories of, and
I don't know how true they are,

456
00:23:40,682 --> 00:23:42,272
but you get the news on them.

457
00:23:42,572 --> 00:23:45,362
Oh, I think I have an idea of
how true they're, but that.

458
00:23:46,022 --> 00:23:49,432
Most of the infrastructure, the
critical infrastructure that

459
00:23:49,432 --> 00:23:51,142
we have has been infiltrated.

460
00:23:51,382 --> 00:23:56,182
how deep are these intelligence
agencies in our corporate and our

461
00:23:56,182 --> 00:23:56,902
physical structures right now?

462
00:23:58,757 --> 00:24:03,177
it's the, the worst kept secret
out there, that cozy bear and stone

463
00:24:03,177 --> 00:24:07,887
panda and salt typhoon, and all
of these other APT's are actually

464
00:24:07,887 --> 00:24:11,877
working on behalf of the government,
but they're working as contractors.

465
00:24:12,147 --> 00:24:15,237
So a lot of these governments, the
Russian government doesn't care if

466
00:24:15,237 --> 00:24:19,497
they're stealing Bitcoin or if they're
involved in ransomware or some of these

467
00:24:19,497 --> 00:24:22,347
other things, as long as they're getting
them the information that they want.

468
00:24:22,347 --> 00:24:25,587
And really it's, a symbiotic
relationship because.

469
00:24:26,427 --> 00:24:32,157
These foreign governments are not going
to start looking into the actions of these

470
00:24:32,487 --> 00:24:36,297
hacking group because they're essentially
working on their behalf as well.

471
00:24:36,297 --> 00:24:41,057
So you've got that happening now, you
take that in consideration with how

472
00:24:41,057 --> 00:24:45,587
far they're going to go into critical
infrastructure and then provide the

473
00:24:45,587 --> 00:24:49,297
information back to their foreign state
countries that they're working for.

474
00:24:50,177 --> 00:24:55,997
we all know that sometimes it can
be years before a company or a

475
00:24:56,027 --> 00:24:59,207
department or an organization even
knows they've been infiltrated.

476
00:25:00,137 --> 00:25:03,287
And the unfortunate thing is at
that point in time, it's too late.

477
00:25:03,477 --> 00:25:06,267
if something decides to happen,
if they wanna probe and find out,

478
00:25:06,267 --> 00:25:09,987
okay, we're gonna shut down part of
Southwestern Ontario's electrical

479
00:25:09,987 --> 00:25:13,017
grid for the next four, eight
hours, just to see if it works.

480
00:25:13,537 --> 00:25:16,667
look at Russia and what they were
doing to Estonia with their financial.

481
00:25:16,717 --> 00:25:18,737
you could, if you went to
Estonia and you tried to get

482
00:25:18,737 --> 00:25:20,027
money out of a bank, forget it.

483
00:25:20,032 --> 00:25:20,807
It wasn't gonna happen.

484
00:25:21,017 --> 00:25:24,827
And they were just doing that essentially
just to mess with them to say, Hey,

485
00:25:24,827 --> 00:25:28,007
listen, when we want to, we'll shut
your lights off when we want to.

486
00:25:28,007 --> 00:25:29,777
We'll shut your water off when we want to.

487
00:25:29,777 --> 00:25:32,027
We'll shut your money off and
what are you gonna do about that?

488
00:25:32,397 --> 00:25:35,127
we haven't gotten to that point yet
because we're still dealing with

489
00:25:35,127 --> 00:25:38,307
the issue of, okay, at what point
does it become a military attack?

490
00:25:38,817 --> 00:25:42,177
At what point do you involve
yourselves in shutting off?

491
00:25:42,177 --> 00:25:43,407
And how do we attribute it to you?

492
00:25:43,407 --> 00:25:47,727
Because if you've got Salt, typhoon
or some other organization that's a

493
00:25:47,727 --> 00:25:51,197
hacking group and the government, of
China says, they don't work for us.

494
00:25:51,197 --> 00:25:52,337
We don't know what you're talking about.

495
00:25:52,387 --> 00:25:56,707
at what point do we, we have to
connect the dots and basically make

496
00:25:56,707 --> 00:25:58,457
the argument to say, guess what?

497
00:25:58,457 --> 00:26:01,397
You are funding Stone Panda.

498
00:26:01,397 --> 00:26:04,487
You are funding salt Typhoon, and
we're gonna do something about this.

499
00:26:05,072 --> 00:26:05,282
Yeah.

500
00:26:05,282 --> 00:26:09,332
And what's interesting here, so I spent
the weekend, I watched, the new Netflix,

501
00:26:09,412 --> 00:26:13,812
Kate Bigelow movie, house of Dynamite,
which is talking about the modern kind

502
00:26:13,812 --> 00:26:18,012
of nuclear era we're in and runs you
through a very uncomfortable situation

503
00:26:18,012 --> 00:26:21,452
of a, a nuclear strike on the United
States and all the things that people

504
00:26:21,452 --> 00:26:22,712
are trying to struggle and deal with.

505
00:26:23,172 --> 00:26:27,406
And one of the interesting points about
that movie is they missed who fired it.

506
00:26:27,586 --> 00:26:30,916
The satellite didn't show where the
myth, they only caught it once the

507
00:26:30,916 --> 00:26:33,406
missile was on the upwards trajectory.

508
00:26:33,456 --> 00:26:35,166
And so they had no attribution.

509
00:26:35,816 --> 00:26:41,216
and that causes significant issues
as you try and with us, that's cyber.

510
00:26:42,146 --> 00:26:48,926
You have no idea who launched the, massive
crippling attack on the West coast.

511
00:26:48,956 --> 00:26:50,066
you have suspicions.

512
00:26:50,516 --> 00:26:53,916
And, and you gotta remember too,
is that depending on the country,

513
00:26:54,246 --> 00:26:58,056
their policy response is not
necessarily to respond proportionally.

514
00:26:58,366 --> 00:27:01,396
you look at the US playbook, is
that a significant enough cyber

515
00:27:01,396 --> 00:27:05,386
event could response result in
a kinetic response or higher?

516
00:27:05,386 --> 00:27:09,806
and Israel, set the tone for this
with, one of its raids on, Hamas.

517
00:27:09,866 --> 00:27:14,026
before the most recent war, they, they
took out a floor, one of the buildings.

518
00:27:14,821 --> 00:27:19,461
Where Hamas software devs had
built a really clever spying, app.

519
00:27:19,761 --> 00:27:23,391
It was made as a soccer app and
it was targeting IDF soldiers.

520
00:27:23,391 --> 00:27:26,271
And what happens when they installed
this soccer app, it was ping in all

521
00:27:26,271 --> 00:27:27,651
their troop deployments and locations.

522
00:27:27,731 --> 00:27:28,511
brilliant.

523
00:27:28,901 --> 00:27:29,171
Great.

524
00:27:29,291 --> 00:27:32,111
Like you gotta give them points
for operational audacity.

525
00:27:32,161 --> 00:27:36,451
But the response to that particular
intrusion was, we're gonna wipe

526
00:27:36,451 --> 00:27:39,321
out this whole team that's that
this is where it gets messy.

527
00:27:39,661 --> 00:27:43,221
but you, to your question, like how
deep is China in anything that's

528
00:27:43,221 --> 00:27:46,731
critical infrastructure and has a
Cisco router has had a bad time?

529
00:27:47,391 --> 00:27:50,981
In the last couple of years, because our
infrastructure is fundamentally insecure.

530
00:27:51,311 --> 00:27:54,101
The motivations aren't there
to properly lock it down.

531
00:27:54,491 --> 00:27:59,021
And, our intelligence agencies up until
the last few years in Canada were a

532
00:27:59,021 --> 00:28:03,071
little bit tied in terms of how much
cooperation they could actually do.

533
00:28:03,381 --> 00:28:07,251
CSE could engage through the cyber
center if there was voluntary interest.

534
00:28:07,251 --> 00:28:09,921
They wanted to engage proactively,
let us know what was happening.

535
00:28:09,921 --> 00:28:10,581
They would get involved.

536
00:28:10,941 --> 00:28:15,161
CSIS really had its hands tied until the
changes, as result of all the foreign

537
00:28:15,161 --> 00:28:16,931
interference and spying stuff in Canada.

538
00:28:16,931 --> 00:28:20,461
We had some major legislative
changes, and I was witness to, CSIS

539
00:28:20,491 --> 00:28:23,431
stepping up and doing some really
great work with the private sector.

540
00:28:23,431 --> 00:28:26,491
So we're starting to see
those linkages happen.

541
00:28:26,671 --> 00:28:29,511
and I don't believe it's
just a cynical check the box.

542
00:28:29,511 --> 00:28:31,671
We could say we've consulted
with the private sector.

543
00:28:31,771 --> 00:28:36,091
there's been some decent non-classified
conversations, but it's bad out there.

544
00:28:36,161 --> 00:28:37,121
and the challenge is that.

545
00:28:37,876 --> 00:28:42,476
Canada, we lack the legislative tools
to force critical infrastructure

546
00:28:42,746 --> 00:28:45,386
and particularly things like energy
transmission where we almost had a

547
00:28:45,386 --> 00:28:50,186
pipeline go kaboom on orders from
the GRU because a bunch of script

548
00:28:50,186 --> 00:28:53,011
kitties got in and said, hey, do
you want us to try and make this go?

549
00:28:53,281 --> 00:28:56,551
And then just a couple weeks ago
in Canada, we had an alert from our

550
00:28:56,551 --> 00:29:00,001
intelligence agencies that four different
critical infrastructure, everything

551
00:29:00,001 --> 00:29:04,241
from water treatment to a grain silo
plant, which I did not realize how

552
00:29:04,241 --> 00:29:06,011
dangerous grain silo plants can be.

553
00:29:06,011 --> 00:29:07,691
But those things can go boom too.

554
00:29:08,061 --> 00:29:10,371
that people were in there
messing with the controls.

555
00:29:10,471 --> 00:29:15,511
and they were described as, but
back to Neil's point sweetest

556
00:29:15,511 --> 00:29:20,251
words in any kind of nation states
toolkits, plausible deniability.

557
00:29:20,551 --> 00:29:23,131
And that gets us back to our
house of dynamite problem.

558
00:29:23,896 --> 00:29:28,596
We had, someone from, one of the
US groups that works with smaller

559
00:29:28,596 --> 00:29:34,026
organizations all around in terms of
their water plants and things like that.

560
00:29:34,296 --> 00:29:40,536
And these, according to them, the
attacks were just constant and that most

561
00:29:40,536 --> 00:29:42,576
of these plants could be controlled.

562
00:29:42,576 --> 00:29:44,686
And when you think about it,
we don't think about these

563
00:29:44,686 --> 00:29:45,946
dangers, grain elevators.

564
00:29:45,946 --> 00:29:47,206
I grew up near a grain elevator.

565
00:29:47,686 --> 00:29:49,696
a huge explosion waiting to happen.

566
00:29:50,236 --> 00:29:51,586
If the ventilation goes down.

567
00:29:51,586 --> 00:29:51,646
Yeah.

568
00:29:52,026 --> 00:29:55,656
if you look at water treatment
plants, these are all automated.

569
00:29:55,956 --> 00:30:00,306
They release chemicals into the
water that we get 15 minutes later.

570
00:30:00,696 --> 00:30:02,076
Most of our major cities.

571
00:30:02,406 --> 00:30:07,176
And if those were ever played with
in a way you could do serious damage.

572
00:30:07,226 --> 00:30:11,576
and we saw that in one small town
in Ontario, the water treatment

573
00:30:11,576 --> 00:30:17,176
plant stops working and a lot of the
population gets sick very quickly.

574
00:30:17,696 --> 00:30:19,580
Nevermind the chemicals
that they could dump in.

575
00:30:20,090 --> 00:30:25,400
so we're fundamentally weak in
our infrastructure, if I'm hearing

576
00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:28,730
you correctly, we're fundamentally
weak in our corporations.

577
00:30:29,150 --> 00:30:30,530
Every government is playing.

578
00:30:30,530 --> 00:30:31,850
David added another one.

579
00:30:31,850 --> 00:30:34,820
The Israelis, we like to ignore
them because they're providing

580
00:30:34,820 --> 00:30:37,130
the spying equipment that our
own governments are using on us.

581
00:30:37,180 --> 00:30:39,190
I'll use that, that tired phrase.

582
00:30:39,190 --> 00:30:40,750
Do your own research.

583
00:30:41,300 --> 00:30:45,460
the apple phone spying that
governments can use and all of that.

584
00:30:45,700 --> 00:30:47,260
It's all Israeli technology.

585
00:30:47,890 --> 00:30:51,250
And I don't know how much Canada's
bought, I know how much the US has

586
00:30:51,250 --> 00:30:55,900
bought because they are, they're now
using that effectively for facial

587
00:30:55,900 --> 00:30:59,590
recognition and for spying on people
on their phones, whomever they want.

588
00:30:59,990 --> 00:31:02,630
and actually, citizen Lab at the
University of Toronto has done some

589
00:31:02,630 --> 00:31:06,710
phenomenal work into the NSO group, the
Pegasus Malware and all that fun stuff.

590
00:31:06,710 --> 00:31:08,330
to Jim's point, it's all there.

591
00:31:08,385 --> 00:31:12,385
and you know what I, in terms
of the norms, I'm okay with

592
00:31:12,385 --> 00:31:13,855
countries spying on each other.

593
00:31:14,415 --> 00:31:17,865
because in, in some ways,
that is a steam release valve.

594
00:31:18,740 --> 00:31:19,730
What are they thinking?

595
00:31:19,820 --> 00:31:20,870
What are they doing?

596
00:31:20,900 --> 00:31:21,650
All right, great.

597
00:31:21,655 --> 00:31:23,635
you're not, you don't feel we're
gonna give you the straight answer

598
00:31:23,635 --> 00:31:26,035
and you need to go look behind the
sheets and see what's going on.

599
00:31:26,035 --> 00:31:26,425
Fine.

600
00:31:26,755 --> 00:31:28,485
And, protect your intellectual property.

601
00:31:28,485 --> 00:31:30,285
It's your job to put your
goalie in front and wave.

602
00:31:30,335 --> 00:31:34,479
What I don't like is this,
expansion of the game.

603
00:31:34,539 --> 00:31:38,199
And North Korea doing this the most
where they're violating international

604
00:31:38,199 --> 00:31:42,339
norms around espionage and now it's
monetization and it's pre-positioning

605
00:31:42,339 --> 00:31:43,869
for infrastructure disruption.

606
00:31:43,869 --> 00:31:48,199
And it's the weaponization of
intelligence and turning this, okay,

607
00:31:48,199 --> 00:31:50,359
we got in, we've got persistence.

608
00:31:50,389 --> 00:31:53,389
Okay, now we're gonna potentially
be able to sabotage and shut down

609
00:31:53,389 --> 00:31:54,589
critical infrastructure, et cetera.

610
00:31:54,859 --> 00:31:57,709
That's when we're crossing
a line now between the Great

611
00:31:57,709 --> 00:32:00,559
game and the House of Dynamite.

612
00:32:00,609 --> 00:32:03,219
I don't know how we have an adult
conversation 'cause I don't think

613
00:32:03,219 --> 00:32:06,969
we have functional multilateral
international organizations anymore.

614
00:32:07,309 --> 00:32:11,254
guys like we need a Geneva Convention
2.0 that says, No, you're not

615
00:32:11,254 --> 00:32:12,454
allowed to be in a hospital.

616
00:32:12,514 --> 00:32:14,134
You're not allowed to be in a power plant.

617
00:32:14,374 --> 00:32:15,994
You're not allowed to be in a water plant.

618
00:32:16,114 --> 00:32:16,534
Period.

619
00:32:16,534 --> 00:32:17,194
Full stop.

620
00:32:17,194 --> 00:32:21,334
that is a violation of international
norms and you're a pariah and

621
00:32:21,334 --> 00:32:24,364
sanctioned and cutoff or whatever
the hell we can do short of war.

622
00:32:24,414 --> 00:32:26,874
But we've gotta put some
boundaries on this stuff.

623
00:32:27,774 --> 00:32:30,144
I'll just go back to some of the stuff
that you guys were talking about.

624
00:32:30,144 --> 00:32:33,534
one of the biggest turning
points I think, just in the last

625
00:32:33,954 --> 00:32:36,294
25 years was Stuxnet, right?

626
00:32:36,384 --> 00:32:43,134
You're looking at, state, on state, attack
that happened through, cyber technology.

627
00:32:43,239 --> 00:32:47,954
And it was, it goes back to what
you were talking about too, is what

628
00:32:47,954 --> 00:32:51,744
are the motivations we talked about,
intelligence, getting close to a human

629
00:32:51,744 --> 00:32:55,314
source or recruiting someone because you
understand what their motivations are.

630
00:32:55,974 --> 00:32:59,604
And you guys both brought this up,
is that if you look at Israel's a

631
00:32:59,604 --> 00:33:01,434
good example, what is motivation?

632
00:33:01,874 --> 00:33:06,554
what is Israel's biggest motivation to
ensure that they can maintain what they

633
00:33:06,554 --> 00:33:11,504
have and they are basically surrounded in
their minds by enemies on all side, right?

634
00:33:12,164 --> 00:33:15,769
So they're gonna take technology
and they're gonna use it against.

635
00:33:16,529 --> 00:33:22,439
Anyone and everyone to try to ensure
that they maintain what they have and

636
00:33:22,439 --> 00:33:28,199
that they keep their military capacity
capable of the most capable as possible.

637
00:33:28,529 --> 00:33:31,109
So that means that if you're dealing
with them and you're a private industry

638
00:33:31,109 --> 00:33:35,849
co company, and you're dealing with a
company that's spaced out of Israel, more

639
00:33:35,849 --> 00:33:40,469
than likely anything that they provide
to you will somehow have malware on it.

640
00:33:40,469 --> 00:33:44,369
It's gonna infiltrate your system
like, this is what we have to do,

641
00:33:44,429 --> 00:33:48,239
this is what we have to do for our
companies as well as our governments,

642
00:33:48,299 --> 00:33:49,799
is come to the realization.

643
00:33:50,189 --> 00:33:51,929
You gotta know what the motivations are.

644
00:33:52,079 --> 00:33:54,839
If you're dealing with any company
in China, that company is partially

645
00:33:54,839 --> 00:33:56,009
owned by the Chinese government.

646
00:33:56,784 --> 00:33:58,044
you've gotta keep that in mind.

647
00:33:58,704 --> 00:34:02,424
The thing that makes me crazy, and I'm
just gonna relate it back to corporate

648
00:34:02,604 --> 00:34:05,994
world work, there's a couple things
that make me crazy in this, but one

649
00:34:05,994 --> 00:34:10,704
of them is I've got a whole government
that I pay taxes to and there's a bigger

650
00:34:10,704 --> 00:34:14,034
government to the south of me where
a lot of people pay a lot of taxes

651
00:34:14,034 --> 00:34:18,594
to, and people tell me, we shouldn't
have Huawei equipment or we shouldn't

652
00:34:18,594 --> 00:34:19,914
have this equipment or all this stuff.

653
00:34:20,354 --> 00:34:24,554
Isn't there some lab somewhere where
they pull this stuff in and say, Hey,

654
00:34:24,554 --> 00:34:28,934
wait a minute, this stuff that's coming
to you from China, from it's always

655
00:34:28,934 --> 00:34:32,834
like we make these announcements on our
show that you are supposed to watch for

656
00:34:32,834 --> 00:34:36,944
this and you've got some guy, he's a
security officer for a company, maybe

657
00:34:36,944 --> 00:34:41,534
even a mid-sized one, four or five
people, or I don't know, a dozen people

658
00:34:41,534 --> 00:34:46,304
were reporting to him or her, and we're
supposed to defend you against China.

659
00:34:46,904 --> 00:34:48,344
This is insane.

660
00:34:48,514 --> 00:34:50,044
apocalypse Now, right?

661
00:34:50,044 --> 00:34:54,124
it's like we're all sitting on the beach
with Kilgore and it's like surf's up, man.

662
00:34:54,124 --> 00:34:55,344
I love the smell of cyber in the morning.

663
00:34:55,494 --> 00:34:57,124
so let's just be real for a second.

664
00:34:57,154 --> 00:34:58,324
It is insane.

665
00:34:58,774 --> 00:35:03,444
Part of it is, Neil talked about you
need to understand motivation, but

666
00:35:03,444 --> 00:35:06,294
the other part understanding what's
going on with bureaucracies, you need

667
00:35:06,294 --> 00:35:10,434
to understand what happens when you
have a critical lack of imagination.

668
00:35:11,564 --> 00:35:17,054
when people are just so focused on staying
in their lane, in their policy directive.

669
00:35:17,054 --> 00:35:21,584
So if your policy directive
as, CRTC and as, industry,

670
00:35:21,584 --> 00:35:23,534
Canada, and others is cheapest.

671
00:35:24,254 --> 00:35:27,464
Internet costs for Canadians as possible.

672
00:35:27,914 --> 00:35:31,374
Then when telecommunications providers
are working and negotiating with the

673
00:35:31,374 --> 00:35:34,974
regulator for, okay, we're gonna, we're
gonna buy the cheapest equipment available

674
00:35:35,184 --> 00:35:38,154
that's got the highest quality, which
China was turning out with Huawei.

675
00:35:38,454 --> 00:35:41,574
No one cared about the national
security implications of that

676
00:35:41,754 --> 00:35:42,894
to the extent they cared.

677
00:35:42,894 --> 00:35:45,564
They set up a little lab and they tried
to do some assurance and everything

678
00:35:45,564 --> 00:35:49,184
else, but they just tried to make
themselves feel okay about the decision,

679
00:35:49,214 --> 00:35:53,144
like the lack of imagination that
we could be in a hostile situation.

680
00:35:53,144 --> 00:35:56,894
Because when we were making those
decisions about Huawei, we were trying to

681
00:35:56,894 --> 00:35:58,964
orient more of our trade towards China.

682
00:35:58,994 --> 00:36:02,864
We were doing a great sort of warming
of all those things, and then for some

683
00:36:03,314 --> 00:36:09,494
absolutely insane reason, we decided to,
to grab the daughter of a senior executive

684
00:36:09,494 --> 00:36:12,314
for China's version of Apple, which okay.

685
00:36:12,949 --> 00:36:16,519
Gotta remind you guys, China's really
sensitive about insults for reasons

686
00:36:16,549 --> 00:36:18,499
3000 years of history and other things.

687
00:36:18,709 --> 00:36:22,879
So when you insult the company, that
literally means Huawei China forward,

688
00:36:23,179 --> 00:36:26,959
and you throw her in detention in
Canada, you're gonna provoke a response.

689
00:36:27,259 --> 00:36:29,749
And so we get into a fight with
the world's largest economy

690
00:36:29,749 --> 00:36:32,929
and all of a sudden back into
or second largest economy.

691
00:36:33,629 --> 00:36:36,119
Back in our intelligence communities,
we're like, oh, maybe it's not such a

692
00:36:36,119 --> 00:36:40,769
good idea that all our telecommunications
equipment is now influenced by

693
00:36:40,769 --> 00:36:42,629
someone who's actively hostile to us.

694
00:36:42,879 --> 00:36:45,779
there was that aspect of it, but
there's also the aspect of it that all

695
00:36:45,779 --> 00:36:49,589
of our five Eyes partners had come to
the realization that using Huawei as

696
00:36:49,589 --> 00:36:54,039
a, backbone infrastructure for your
telecommunications is a bad idea.

697
00:36:54,049 --> 00:36:58,759
this is one of those things that, because
of the five eyes, if you're gonna go ahead

698
00:36:58,819 --> 00:37:02,759
and put yourself in a position where you
become the vulnerable point, then you.

699
00:37:03,199 --> 00:37:04,399
there's gonna be a major issue.

700
00:37:04,449 --> 00:37:07,599
you guys have talked about this on
the show time and time again, you have

701
00:37:07,599 --> 00:37:11,429
those individuals that are in place
that are talking about security, but

702
00:37:11,429 --> 00:37:16,779
they're always going to be trumped,
no pun intended, by those individuals

703
00:37:16,779 --> 00:37:18,489
that are more concerned about profit.

704
00:37:18,549 --> 00:37:23,099
just look at the Canadian government
and how we've gone from, okay, India

705
00:37:23,099 --> 00:37:25,319
is, affecting our diaspora community.

706
00:37:25,319 --> 00:37:27,409
There are, assassinations happening.

707
00:37:27,929 --> 00:37:31,199
the Indian government is
involved to, oh, the G seven,

708
00:37:31,199 --> 00:37:32,759
I'm going to invite Modi there.

709
00:37:33,149 --> 00:37:37,129
Or, all the issues that we had with the
two Michaels, as you mentioned with, the

710
00:37:37,279 --> 00:37:44,299
Huawei situation and how we know that on a
regular basis China is trying to influence

711
00:37:44,299 --> 00:37:47,449
and infiltrate, Canadian, cyberspace.

712
00:37:48,059 --> 00:37:50,909
but yet our prime minister still goes
there and says, Hey, listen, we want

713
00:37:50,909 --> 00:37:55,319
to turn a corner here because why
Economically Canada is looking at itself

714
00:37:55,319 --> 00:37:58,829
saying, what's more important that
we make sure that we get more money

715
00:37:59,309 --> 00:38:00,899
and that we start doing more trade?

716
00:38:01,109 --> 00:38:04,019
Or are we more concerned about
our national security issues?

717
00:38:04,019 --> 00:38:10,274
So these are always gonna be conflicting
if we were to lock out everyone who

718
00:38:10,274 --> 00:38:13,304
spied on us, there would be the G one.

719
00:38:13,904 --> 00:38:14,054
Yeah.

720
00:38:14,424 --> 00:38:18,174
north Korea's internet is perhaps not
the model that we're advocating for here.

721
00:38:18,174 --> 00:38:21,749
And again, I would go back and say I'm
cool with a certain amount of spying.

722
00:38:22,389 --> 00:38:22,799
I get it.

723
00:38:22,799 --> 00:38:23,309
It's the game.

724
00:38:23,529 --> 00:38:27,089
I am not cool when we cross the
line between spying and sabotage.

725
00:38:27,379 --> 00:38:31,069
and the problem is that the wires,
the digital infrastructure, the

726
00:38:31,069 --> 00:38:33,289
highway to do this is the same road.

727
00:38:33,659 --> 00:38:35,969
it's a matter of
intentionality at that point.

728
00:38:35,969 --> 00:38:37,109
And that's that.

729
00:38:37,139 --> 00:38:38,339
how do you control for that?

730
00:38:38,524 --> 00:38:42,424
the problem with that mindset though,
David, is that all intelligence is

731
00:38:42,424 --> 00:38:45,884
for the future purpose of potential
sabotage you can't differentiate

732
00:38:45,884 --> 00:38:49,754
between the two because the whole idea
of spying on another state, another

733
00:38:49,754 --> 00:38:53,114
individual, is that there may be a
point down the road that I need to

734
00:38:53,114 --> 00:38:57,824
take action and I wanna be able to be,
have the advantage to take that action.

735
00:38:57,824 --> 00:39:00,944
it's nice to think that, It's okay if
we spy on each other as long as we just,

736
00:39:00,944 --> 00:39:05,164
catch these little secrets Really, at the
end of the day, it's how do I ensure that

737
00:39:05,164 --> 00:39:10,589
my company, my group, my organization,
my country, has the advantage?

738
00:39:12,334 --> 00:39:12,484
Yeah, no.

739
00:39:12,544 --> 00:39:12,784
Yeah.

740
00:39:12,784 --> 00:39:16,519
And we make a big thing about the, the
fact that we have elections every four

741
00:39:16,519 --> 00:39:20,269
years and we can't plan, I'd be happy if
our government was looking a year out.

742
00:39:20,689 --> 00:39:25,869
honestly, right now I'd be thrilled right
now, if we went to that, we have to wrap

743
00:39:25,899 --> 00:39:28,829
unfortunately, because there's only so
much I can edit this down, but there's

744
00:39:28,829 --> 00:39:30,269
only so much i, I can do in an hour.

745
00:39:30,479 --> 00:39:32,489
I think we're gonna end up
with three episodes, because

746
00:39:32,489 --> 00:39:33,599
I think there's more to this.

747
00:39:33,839 --> 00:39:37,079
But I wanna leave our audience
who's listening to this with at

748
00:39:37,079 --> 00:39:40,779
least some ideas of, we've gone
into the air and we've talked about

749
00:39:40,839 --> 00:39:41,799
the groups that are out there.

750
00:39:41,799 --> 00:39:43,689
We've talked about some of the
threats that are out there.

751
00:39:44,019 --> 00:39:45,609
If I'm a person running.

752
00:39:46,124 --> 00:39:51,584
A cybersecurity area right now, I know
one of the things I should be doing,

753
00:39:51,584 --> 00:39:56,774
I should be watching who I'm hiring
and as a contractor, because that

754
00:39:56,954 --> 00:40:00,104
I failed to believe that the North
Koreans are the only people doing this.

755
00:40:00,104 --> 00:40:02,714
They're making money doing it,
but I think everybody's doing it.

756
00:40:02,954 --> 00:40:07,094
And David put a, a great, uh, piece
of advice out there for anyone.

757
00:40:07,304 --> 00:40:11,984
And that is if you can have a remote
contractor and it's worth that to you and

758
00:40:11,984 --> 00:40:16,814
you have any information worth anything,
you might wanna bring them in for their

759
00:40:16,814 --> 00:40:22,184
first week at least to meet with people
and work side by side with people.

760
00:40:22,244 --> 00:40:26,654
And if they ask what this key
does on the keyboard, you might

761
00:40:26,654 --> 00:40:28,304
not want to continue with them.

762
00:40:28,574 --> 00:40:32,084
Or if they have to make a phone
call every time you ask a question,

763
00:40:32,294 --> 00:40:35,534
you might wanna say, maybe this
person doesn't have these skills.

764
00:40:35,534 --> 00:40:36,434
And I'm being facetious.

765
00:40:36,644 --> 00:40:37,964
But I'm just saying get to know.

766
00:40:38,014 --> 00:40:40,204
we talk about know your
client, know your employee.

767
00:40:41,129 --> 00:40:44,629
What are the other things from a
cybersecurity point of view, that

768
00:40:44,719 --> 00:40:49,369
good intelligence thinking would
do for us in protecting ourselves?

769
00:40:49,519 --> 00:40:52,219
I think one of the most important
things is just paying more attention.

770
00:40:52,229 --> 00:40:55,349
The information that's coming at us
is coming at us at a fire hose pace,

771
00:40:55,859 --> 00:40:59,009
and you've got to have individuals
within your organization, whether

772
00:40:59,009 --> 00:41:02,729
you're a small, medium, or large
corporation that's dealing with ip.

773
00:41:02,729 --> 00:41:07,139
You have to have somebody in there who can
take the time to start pulling that apart.

774
00:41:07,139 --> 00:41:09,929
Because every vulnerability
that is discovered in another

775
00:41:09,929 --> 00:41:13,529
company, is a vulnerability that
your company itself might face.

776
00:41:14,039 --> 00:41:17,669
And what you want to do is you want
to have people that can recognize

777
00:41:17,669 --> 00:41:19,439
that and then they can apply it.

778
00:41:19,469 --> 00:41:24,129
What, like for me, when I do my global
intelligence knowledge, weekly wrap up, I

779
00:41:24,129 --> 00:41:28,759
go through, a week's worth of intelligence
information that's open and I try to.

780
00:41:29,509 --> 00:41:32,479
Explain this to people that why
does this affect your day-to-day?

781
00:41:32,479 --> 00:41:33,679
Why does it affect your career?

782
00:41:33,679 --> 00:41:35,639
Why does it accept your
affect, your, safety?

783
00:41:35,639 --> 00:41:37,379
Why does it affect the
sovereignty of your country?

784
00:41:38,009 --> 00:41:40,919
Because, states are like businesses.

785
00:41:41,069 --> 00:41:42,149
They have a business plan.

786
00:41:42,419 --> 00:41:43,829
Okay, we're gonna attack this way.

787
00:41:43,829 --> 00:41:45,119
We're gonna infiltrate this way.

788
00:41:45,119 --> 00:41:46,139
We're gonna do it this way.

789
00:41:46,169 --> 00:41:47,519
'cause that's what they're used to.

790
00:41:47,879 --> 00:41:48,809
It's human nature.

791
00:41:49,229 --> 00:41:52,889
And if you can become aware of
that, you can build the defenses

792
00:41:52,889 --> 00:41:54,179
you need to counteract it.

793
00:41:55,754 --> 00:41:59,644
I would add from my side, first of
all, to what Neil was saying, you

794
00:41:59,644 --> 00:42:03,904
may not believe in DPR K's interest
in your business, but they sure do

795
00:42:03,904 --> 00:42:05,704
have an interest in your business.

796
00:42:05,704 --> 00:42:10,534
and no one from Washington or Ottawa
is automatically magically waving a

797
00:42:10,684 --> 00:42:14,554
wand protecting you right now from all
the nation state threats that exist.

798
00:42:14,584 --> 00:42:15,724
No one's doing that for you.

799
00:42:16,174 --> 00:42:18,484
You have to protect yourself.

800
00:42:18,484 --> 00:42:19,714
we are in a new era.

801
00:42:19,954 --> 00:42:24,274
It's more akin to the feudal era
where, you know, those who are powerful

802
00:42:24,274 --> 00:42:26,884
governments, large corporations
live in the castles and the rest

803
00:42:26,884 --> 00:42:29,944
of us surfs out in the village,
getting rated by the Vikings.

804
00:42:29,974 --> 00:42:32,624
and, you've gotta build
up your own defenses.

805
00:42:32,654 --> 00:42:33,734
That being said.

806
00:42:34,214 --> 00:42:38,294
I'm seeing greater willingness and greater
interest from our intelligence agencies,

807
00:42:38,294 --> 00:42:40,214
not just in Canada, but also in the us.

808
00:42:40,214 --> 00:42:42,344
You've got, CISA for
critical infrastructure.

809
00:42:42,344 --> 00:42:45,464
You've got the FBI, secret
Service and others, there are

810
00:42:45,464 --> 00:42:47,144
folks who will pick up the phone.

811
00:42:47,254 --> 00:42:51,574
you see something weird happening
in your rural water utility, your,

812
00:42:51,634 --> 00:42:54,304
telecommunications company, your hospital.

813
00:42:54,394 --> 00:42:58,024
There are people who care and want to
know about this, and that's the only way

814
00:42:58,024 --> 00:43:02,074
we're gonna get a handle on it, is by
people talking about it and sharing it.

815
00:43:02,294 --> 00:43:04,664
you're not bad because you
get hacked by the Chinese.

816
00:43:04,664 --> 00:43:09,054
To Jim's point, like good luck offending
yourself against a cyber army that's

817
00:43:09,054 --> 00:43:11,664
larger than most countries military.

818
00:43:11,944 --> 00:43:13,864
we gotta get better at working together.

819
00:43:13,894 --> 00:43:16,924
And I think we gotta have these
conversations because, just

820
00:43:16,924 --> 00:43:20,074
to bring it all the way back,
if you're dealing with cyber.

821
00:43:20,764 --> 00:43:24,574
You don't take the time to think about
the motivations of why someone would

822
00:43:24,574 --> 00:43:27,934
attack you and how they're criminal
groups, nation states, and others.

823
00:43:28,174 --> 00:43:30,454
You're not defending,
you're just reacting.

824
00:43:30,554 --> 00:43:30,914
Great.

825
00:43:30,974 --> 00:43:34,454
and I wanna thank you, Neil, because I
think sometimes I think about this when we

826
00:43:34,454 --> 00:43:38,234
put the podcast shows together, trying to
get the information out there for people.

827
00:43:38,294 --> 00:43:40,784
And I sometimes wonder if
we're admiring the problem.

828
00:43:40,959 --> 00:43:45,599
I honestly do, we talk about these
things and I, my hope was that

829
00:43:45,659 --> 00:43:49,019
if it wasn't schadenfreude that
this happened to somebody else and

830
00:43:49,019 --> 00:43:53,639
not you, it was this idea that,
hey, this is happening out there.

831
00:43:53,879 --> 00:43:55,409
You might wanna start to think about it.

832
00:43:55,409 --> 00:43:56,969
'cause it may start you thinking about.

833
00:43:57,139 --> 00:43:58,759
How you protect yourself better.

834
00:43:58,819 --> 00:44:01,379
And I think that's, our
legitimate interest.

835
00:44:01,489 --> 00:44:06,039
we try to also cover specific attacks
when they're ones that people might

836
00:44:06,039 --> 00:44:09,429
have gone by them, but I think
we all drink through a fire hose.

837
00:44:09,429 --> 00:44:11,319
And I'm gonna do a little
bit of a commercial.

838
00:44:11,529 --> 00:44:14,019
Yours is called a Global
Intelligence Podcast, Neil.

839
00:44:14,499 --> 00:44:16,479
Yeah, it's a Global
Intelligence Weekly wrap up.

840
00:44:16,479 --> 00:44:20,529
So I do it every week, and I take
information from around, the world on

841
00:44:20,529 --> 00:44:24,349
headlines because the same way that
China's attacking the Philippines is

842
00:44:24,349 --> 00:44:28,099
also the same technique that they're
going to try to do for other countries.

843
00:44:28,099 --> 00:44:31,099
So it's trying to get it out
there to have people realize that,

844
00:44:32,099 --> 00:44:34,289
intelligence is a global business.

845
00:44:34,359 --> 00:44:38,379
it's good for you to be aware in
Canada or in United States or in

846
00:44:38,379 --> 00:44:42,069
Europe, these techniques that are
being done by the Russians, by the

847
00:44:42,069 --> 00:44:46,119
Chinese, by the Iranians, they're
also happening in your own backyard.

848
00:44:46,119 --> 00:44:49,089
You might not be cognizant of it
because it just hasn't hit the news

849
00:44:49,089 --> 00:44:50,689
yet, but you should be aware of it.

850
00:44:51,734 --> 00:44:54,024
So we'll put a link to Neil's, podcast.

851
00:44:54,024 --> 00:44:57,374
if you're listening to this show and you
want to just keep up on these things,

852
00:44:57,564 --> 00:44:59,754
it's a really accessible podcast.

853
00:44:59,904 --> 00:45:03,774
And, if you're in the US it's gonna
have more of a Canadian focus.

854
00:45:04,074 --> 00:45:06,294
Of course, if you're listening to this
show and you're in the US you'd realize

855
00:45:06,294 --> 00:45:07,914
it has a bit of a Canadian focus anyway.

856
00:45:08,334 --> 00:45:13,074
But these are universal themes across,
we have listeners across the globe

857
00:45:13,074 --> 00:45:14,634
who come in and tune in because

858
00:45:14,684 --> 00:45:17,894
there are no borders in
cybersecurity, unfortunately.

859
00:45:18,494 --> 00:45:19,534
No, there're not, Yeah.

860
00:45:19,924 --> 00:45:20,914
thank you very much.

861
00:45:21,034 --> 00:45:23,594
My guest today has been, David Shipley.

862
00:45:23,594 --> 00:45:24,914
Of course, he is not really a guest.

863
00:45:24,914 --> 00:45:26,474
he'll be back with the news on Monday.

864
00:45:26,694 --> 00:45:30,704
Neil Bisson, who has the Global
Intelligence Podcast, and a, and

865
00:45:30,704 --> 00:45:33,644
I'm getting, I'm botching the name,
but you know what I'm talking about.

866
00:45:33,644 --> 00:45:36,984
There'll be a link, I call it the Global
Intelligence Podcast when I'm watching it.

867
00:45:37,034 --> 00:45:37,424
good enough.

868
00:45:37,664 --> 00:45:39,014
thank you guys, appreciate it.

869
00:45:39,044 --> 00:45:42,324
And, we're on for another episode
at least, and we're gonna talk

870
00:45:42,324 --> 00:45:47,264
about some of the things next week
that Neil will bring to us as an

871
00:45:47,264 --> 00:45:53,024
intelligence officer and how those
things contribute to, our psychological

872
00:45:53,024 --> 00:45:54,854
attacks and social engineering.

873
00:45:55,064 --> 00:45:58,124
And David will be back for that
too, who's our resident social

874
00:45:58,244 --> 00:46:00,174
engineering, expert and phishing expert.

875
00:46:00,484 --> 00:46:01,594
so we're looking forward to that.

876
00:46:01,854 --> 00:46:02,814
we'll catch you next week.

877
00:46:02,814 --> 00:46:05,064
And David, you're back on
the news on Monday morning.

878
00:46:05,184 --> 00:46:05,754
Thanks guys.

879
00:46:06,714 --> 00:46:07,104
Thanks.

880
00:46:07,569 --> 00:46:07,959
Awesome.

881
00:46:08,568 --> 00:46:11,688
And finally, once again, we'd like
to thank Meter for their support

882
00:46:11,688 --> 00:46:13,128
in bringing you this podcast.

883
00:46:13,668 --> 00:46:17,748
, Meter delivers full stack networking
infrastructure, wired, wireless,

884
00:46:17,748 --> 00:46:21,888
and cellular to leading enterprises
and working with their partners.

885
00:46:22,248 --> 00:46:27,108
Meter designs, deploys and manages
everything required to get performant,

886
00:46:27,288 --> 00:46:32,328
reliable and secure connectivity in
a space they design the hardware.

887
00:46:32,703 --> 00:46:36,933
The firmware, build the software,
manage deployments and run support.

888
00:46:37,477 --> 00:46:41,257
It's a single integrated solution
that scales from branch offices,

889
00:46:41,257 --> 00:46:45,007
warehouses, and large campuses,
all the way to data centers.

890
00:46:45,367 --> 00:46:50,077
You can book a demo at me.com/cst.

891
00:46:50,287 --> 00:46:56,197
That's METE r.com/cst.

892
00:46:57,187 --> 00:46:58,327
I'm your host, Jim Love.

893
00:46:59,317 --> 00:47:00,157
Thanks for listening.