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Think about all of the freedom

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technologies that would not

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be possible if every developer

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had to fully KYC themselves.

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I mean, just imagine, Bitcoin's

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creator, Satoshi Nakamoto having

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to KYC himself to Google in order

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to distribute Bitcoin to the world.

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Right?

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It's, it's laughable.

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It's the antithesis of freedom

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technology and the cypher punk ethos

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of write code, let people download

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it, let them run it, and, you know,

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run it outside or parallel to the

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existing centrally controlled system.

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Welcome to the Sovereign Computing

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Show, presented by ATL BitLab.

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I'm Jordan Bravo, and this is a

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podcast where we teach you how to

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take back control of your devices.

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Sovereign Computing means you own your

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technology, not the other way around.

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This episode is sponsored by ATL BitLab.

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ATL BitLab is Atlanta's

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freedom tech hacker space.

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We have co working desks,

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conference rooms, event space,

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maker tools, and tons of coffee.

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There is a very active

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community here in the lab.

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Every Wednesday night is

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Bitcoin night here in Atlanta.

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We also have meetups for cyber security,

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artificial intelligence, decentralized

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identity, product design, and more.

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We offer day passes and nomad passes

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for people who need to use the lab only

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occasionally, as well as memberships

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for people who plan to use the lab

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more regularly, such as myself.

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One of the best things about

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having a BitLab membership isn't

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the amenities, it's the people.

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Surrounding yourself with a

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community helps you learn faster

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and helps you build better.

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Your creativity becomes  amplified

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when you work in this space,

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that's what I think at least.

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If you're interested in becoming

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a member or supporting this space,

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please visit us at atlbitlab.

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com.

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That's A T L B I T L A B dot com.

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Alright, on to our show.

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Welcome to the Sovereign Computing Show.

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I'm Jordan Bravo, and today we have a

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little bit of a different show for you.

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first of all, I am solo, so Steven

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will not be joining us for this

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episode, and this is gonna be a

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little bit of a shorter episode.

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today was, or this week was a holiday

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week, and, I wanted to make sure we

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got something out rather than nothing.

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So.

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this will not be the typical

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length episode, but I do have some

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interesting stuff to talk about.

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We're gonna take a look at a article

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that came out, and for those of

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you watching the video, I'm gonna

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put it up on the screen here.

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But of course, all the links

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will be in the show notes as

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well, so you can check those out.

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Okay.

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The headline of this article is Google

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Will Block Side Loading of Unverified

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Android apps starting next year.

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Let's talk about this word

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side loading for a second.

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This word is a psyop by, I wanna say

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apple, but just anybody who wants to

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control you and your apps and psyop

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you into thinking that it's somehow.

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Abnormal to download an app from anywhere

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on the internet and install it yourself.

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So I think this goes back to Apple when

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they have the iPhone, they have the

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centrally controlled software distribution

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channel, which is the app store.

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So if you notice that you, you're on

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an iPhone, it's, you can't really,

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unless you jailbreak the phone and

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do stuff that kind of voids your

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warranty is not well supported.

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You can't put applications on there that

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you didn't download from the app store.

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Now, if you do, if you, if you jailbreak

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your phone and you route it or whatever.

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And you just drag and drop or load

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something on there that is, that

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you downloaded from somewhere else.

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That is called, they

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call that side loading.

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And I think this term is confusing because

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really what you're just doing is you are.

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Downloading it from a different source,

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but they wanted to give it this special

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term because it, it makes you think

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you're doing something different or

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wrong, like you're breaking the rules.

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And they, apple goes with the

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security over freedom model.

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Like if you have a spectrum of, security

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on one end and freedom on the other.

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Apple's all the way on the security

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side and with minimal freedom.

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Now, I would argue that they don't

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always have to be diametrically opposed.

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You can have some freedom

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and security as well.

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but let's just keep it simple for now.

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So Google is gonna be shifting to be more

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like iOS on the iPhone and starting next

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year, they're not going to allow stock.

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Google Android users to just si to

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quote unquote side load apps by, for

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example, if you were to download an

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a PK from a website, from GitHub or

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Foid or any of these alternative app

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stores that we talked about in previous

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episodes, they are going to make that.

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More difficult, starting next

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year for stock Google, Android.

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And the way that they're gonna do

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that is they will start requiring any

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developer, uh, let me back up right

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now, if you wanna load an A PK on your

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Google Android phone, you can do that.

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You might get a warning about it,

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but it will allow you to do that.

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Uh, and by that I mean.

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Putting an app on there, that's

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an A PK package, that's an Android

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package that you're not getting

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from the Google Play Store.

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So you might be getting it from another

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source such as Foid or Tanium, which

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you can pull directly from places

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like GitHub and GitLab to get it

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directly from developers or code bases.

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So.

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Right now you can do that with Google

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Android, but starting next year, you

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won't be able to, unless the developer

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Ky Cs themself and creates a, they have

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to create a Google account and basically

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they're developing it, to be the developer

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portal for Android will be through

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Google and all developers will have to.

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Register with them and submit their

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identity verification, and then they'll

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have their signing keys so that even

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if you want to, if a developer wants

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to distribute an app outside of the

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app store, they will still have to

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sign themselves up for this Google

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program and, identify themselves.

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So this means that, You won't be

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able to install an app unless it

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has gone through the Google, Google

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controlled process, which involves

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the developers KYC themselves.

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So again, this, this is gonna be

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more like Apple, but think about

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all of the freedom technologies

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that would not be possible if every

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developer had to fully KYC themselves.

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I mean, just imagine.

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Sat, Bitcoin's creator, Satoshi Nakamoto

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having to KYC himself to Google in order

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to distribute Bitcoin to the world.

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Right?

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It's, it's laughable.

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It's The antithesis of freedom technology

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and the cypher punk ethos of write code.

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Let people download it, let them

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run it, and, you know, run it

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outside or parallel to the existing

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centrally controlled system.

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So what's the good news of this?

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The good news is that this will not affect

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Degod versions of Android such as Graphos.

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calx Os is another one we've talked about

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that will not be affected Lineage os.

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However, it is likely that Google will

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continue tightening the screws until it's

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impossible for developers to create and

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maintain these nongo versions of Android.

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And I foresee that in time, Android will

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be closed, closed source in all, but

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name we saw earlier, a few months ago.

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earlier in 2025, we saw that Google

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started closing the source code

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of their releases on Android.

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So you can still get the, the, um,

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base source code is open, but we can

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no longer see the development process

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and getting those final binaries.

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It has become opaque and so,

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uh, we've seen on Twitter.

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Developers of Graphos and other

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projects that create other versions

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of Android, they, they have stated

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that this has made it harder for them

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to develop because they're unable

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to see the exact process by which

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Android is being developed at Google.

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So while each of these

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steps that Google's taking.

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Is not, a hundred percent

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locking it down immediately.

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It is this slow, gradual boiling of

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the frog that is continuing to make

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Android more like iOS in terms of being

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completely locked down, and it will

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essentially be closed source because no

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one will be able to develop on top of it.

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Even though that technically might have

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some source code that's available for

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view viewing online, so I, I'm hopeful

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that the Freedom Loving development

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community, the people of Graphene os

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and these other versions of Android

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that are degod, I'm hoping that there

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are enough people out there in a high

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enough demand that should something.

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B uh, should Google take further

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action that prevents development

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of these other versions?

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Somebody will, I don't know if forking

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is the right word, but somebody will

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take either the base Android and

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just start developing on top of it

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without Google's involvement at all.

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Or maybe we'll see a

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completely from the ground up.

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Mobile operating system written,

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that's open source and free.

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That's a, that's a big task, and I

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don't see that happening anytime soon.

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But however, I mean, on the other hand,

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look at Ladybird, the browser that's being

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built from scratch by first one developer,

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now a small handful on that team, not

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using any of the pre-existing code.

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So it is possible, an an operating

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system, even a mobile operating

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system is a. It is a huge, huge

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project, but, it is possible that one

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could be built from the ground up.

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And the other option is that we

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see further development of the

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mobile Linux, uh, operating system.

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Right now, the state of mobile

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Linux is such that most people are

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not gonna be able to use it as a

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daily driver just because it's.

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It doesn't have a huge ecosystem

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of both hardware and software, so

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there's a long way to go on that.

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But reeling it all back in, I don't

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00:11:29,584 --> 00:11:32,674
think Android is totally screwed today.

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00:11:32,674 --> 00:11:34,204
We still have graphene os we

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00:11:34,204 --> 00:11:36,710
still have, calx and lineage and.

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00:11:37,715 --> 00:11:38,855
As it is right now.

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00:11:39,065 --> 00:11:42,485
Graphing on the pixel is a very good

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00:11:42,665 --> 00:11:45,905
mobile operating system with no spyware

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00:11:45,905 --> 00:11:48,005
and completely free and open source.

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00:11:48,065 --> 00:11:51,635
So all in all, I, I think this is,

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00:11:51,695 --> 00:11:53,435
this is not the end of the world.

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00:11:54,065 --> 00:11:56,765
I just wanted to sound the alarm bells a

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00:11:56,765 --> 00:11:59,345
little bit and please keep an eye out for

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00:11:59,345 --> 00:12:01,955
that in case, uh, Google takes any further

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00:12:01,955 --> 00:12:03,635
measures to stop this in the future.

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00:12:07,565 --> 00:12:09,065
That's the end of that topic.

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00:12:09,065 --> 00:12:11,435
But before I move on to the next item,

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00:12:11,915 --> 00:12:14,315
uh, I want to remind everybody that you

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00:12:14,315 --> 00:12:17,675
can boost in on Fountain FM or other

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00:12:17,675 --> 00:12:20,825
podcasting 2.0 apps to the Sovereign

294
00:12:20,825 --> 00:12:23,675
Computing Show, and you can email

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00:12:23,675 --> 00:12:27,665
us as well sovereign@atlbitlab.com.

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00:12:28,055 --> 00:12:30,695
We will read your feedback and we will,

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00:12:31,025 --> 00:12:32,615
uh, respond to it here on the show.

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00:12:34,085 --> 00:12:36,005
The next item I have for you is.

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Something that is from 2014, and you

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00:12:40,250 --> 00:12:43,460
might wonder how is this relevant?

301
00:12:43,520 --> 00:12:46,670
Well, we talk a lot on the show

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00:12:46,670 --> 00:12:49,700
about metadata and how we want

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00:12:49,700 --> 00:12:52,280
to use apps, especially messaging

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00:12:52,280 --> 00:12:53,015
and, and things that are.

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00:12:53,840 --> 00:12:56,690
Use for communication that minimize the

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00:12:56,720 --> 00:12:58,790
possibility of collection of metadata.

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00:12:59,540 --> 00:13:02,300
We talked about how signal the, uh,

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00:13:02,330 --> 00:13:05,990
private messenger, for example, has a

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00:13:06,080 --> 00:13:08,300
very good metadata footprint because

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it's so small, they really can't see

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the, the signal servers cannot see

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00:13:12,560 --> 00:13:14,715
anything about their users except

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for when the account was created.

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The, and the, the phone number with

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00:13:20,510 --> 00:13:23,000
which it was created in the last.

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Time that the user was online.

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00:13:26,390 --> 00:13:27,710
So those are three pieces of

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00:13:27,710 --> 00:13:30,710
metadata and compared to most

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00:13:30,710 --> 00:13:31,910
other apps, that's really good.

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That's virtually nothing, uh, that you can

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00:13:34,460 --> 00:13:36,650
tell about the user from that metadata.

322
00:13:37,024 --> 00:13:38,974
Uh, contrast that with WhatsApp.

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00:13:39,004 --> 00:13:40,294
WhatsApp is a really good

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00:13:40,324 --> 00:13:43,444
comparison because it uses the same.

325
00:13:43,864 --> 00:13:45,904
Encryption protocol under the hood.

326
00:13:45,904 --> 00:13:48,544
It uses the signal protocol so that

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00:13:48,544 --> 00:13:50,644
the contents of your messages on

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00:13:50,644 --> 00:13:52,954
WhatsApp are end-to-end encrypted.

329
00:13:53,614 --> 00:13:55,834
So meta the owners of WhatsApp,

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00:13:56,237 --> 00:13:59,117
they can't actually see your

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00:13:59,627 --> 00:14:02,027
content in theory if it's not

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00:14:02,027 --> 00:14:03,707
leaked in other ways like backups.

333
00:14:04,097 --> 00:14:05,897
But let's just say in theory they

334
00:14:05,897 --> 00:14:07,757
can't see the content of your messages.

335
00:14:08,072 --> 00:14:11,702
However, they sure can see the metadata.

336
00:14:12,272 --> 00:14:13,952
They, in fact, they rely on that

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00:14:13,952 --> 00:14:15,602
metadata in order to be able to

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00:14:15,602 --> 00:14:18,092
monetize WhatsApp and be able to,

339
00:14:18,362 --> 00:14:21,185
uh, collect user data and ads and

340
00:14:21,215 --> 00:14:23,255
generate ads for that targeted ads.

341
00:14:23,855 --> 00:14:25,655
So what is that metadata

342
00:14:25,655 --> 00:14:26,495
they're collecting?

343
00:14:27,605 --> 00:14:30,185
Well, it's, we, we don't

344
00:14:30,185 --> 00:14:31,325
know exactly because they.

345
00:14:31,910 --> 00:14:33,860
Don't publish that information, but

346
00:14:33,860 --> 00:14:35,990
we can know based on other messaging

347
00:14:35,990 --> 00:14:38,240
apps and the kind of things that

348
00:14:38,240 --> 00:14:39,830
Facebook in general can collect.

349
00:14:40,220 --> 00:14:44,630
So you could think, um, your identity,

350
00:14:44,630 --> 00:14:48,170
the, the identity of your Facebook login,

351
00:14:48,170 --> 00:14:49,940
your real name, which you're probably

352
00:14:49,940 --> 00:14:52,697
using on Facebook, all of your photos.

353
00:14:53,402 --> 00:14:56,222
Your contact list, your contacts,

354
00:14:56,222 --> 00:14:58,832
names, email addresses, phone numbers,

355
00:14:59,222 --> 00:15:01,682
the time that you talked, the length

356
00:15:01,712 --> 00:15:04,022
of your messages, the duration, the

357
00:15:04,022 --> 00:15:08,042
size, so they can really build up a

358
00:15:08,042 --> 00:15:11,282
great picture of who you're talking to.

359
00:15:11,732 --> 00:15:13,682
They can see, um, any websites

360
00:15:13,682 --> 00:15:15,669
that you link in there, they can.

361
00:15:16,059 --> 00:15:17,799
Get your IP address so they know where

362
00:15:17,799 --> 00:15:20,349
you are roughly speaking, they can

363
00:15:20,349 --> 00:15:23,379
tell what, what, um, network you're

364
00:15:23,379 --> 00:15:26,019
on, if you're using your Verizon or

365
00:15:26,289 --> 00:15:28,599
at and t. So there's a lot of metadata

366
00:15:28,599 --> 00:15:29,859
that they can collect about you.

367
00:15:30,309 --> 00:15:34,509
And I want to share this clip from 2014.

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00:15:34,899 --> 00:15:37,899
This is a video clip of former

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00:15:37,899 --> 00:15:41,019
director of NSA of the NSA and the CIA.

370
00:15:41,709 --> 00:15:43,659
And he's got this famous quote here.

371
00:15:45,114 --> 00:15:47,034
We kill people based on metadata.

372
00:15:47,424 --> 00:15:49,119
So I'm gonna let this clip play right now.

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00:15:49,389 --> 00:15:50,799
It's a, it's 45 seconds.

374
00:15:52,251 --> 00:15:54,801
General Hayden, you can find out all these

375
00:15:54,801 --> 00:15:56,691
things David just said about me, about

376
00:15:56,691 --> 00:15:59,991
David, about anyone in this audience that

377
00:15:59,991 --> 00:16:02,841
is a function of operational capability.

378
00:16:03,231 --> 00:16:04,671
I'd like you to talk about

379
00:16:04,761 --> 00:16:05,991
whether you're comfortable with

380
00:16:05,991 --> 00:16:07,281
that operational capability.

381
00:16:07,281 --> 00:16:09,981
If so, why and how often is it used

382
00:16:09,981 --> 00:16:11,421
in the ways that David described?

383
00:16:11,481 --> 00:16:11,931
Yeah.

384
00:16:11,936 --> 00:16:13,551
First, first of all, David's

385
00:16:13,551 --> 00:16:15,681
description of what you can do with

386
00:16:15,681 --> 00:16:17,841
metadata and quoting a mutual friend,

387
00:16:17,841 --> 00:16:20,031
Stuart Baker is absolutely correct.

388
00:16:20,616 --> 00:16:20,826
Okay.

389
00:16:21,096 --> 00:16:23,076
We kill people based on metadata,

390
00:16:25,536 --> 00:16:26,436
but that's not what we

391
00:16:26,436 --> 00:16:27,666
do with this metadata.

392
00:16:29,316 --> 00:16:29,466
Okay.

393
00:16:30,216 --> 00:16:30,936
Thankfully.

394
00:16:33,036 --> 00:16:33,306
Wow.

395
00:16:33,306 --> 00:16:34,356
I was working up a sweat

396
00:16:34,356 --> 00:16:34,931
there for a second.

397
00:16:36,174 --> 00:16:37,314
So in case you didn't catch

398
00:16:37,314 --> 00:16:39,894
that, you have Michael Hayden.

399
00:16:39,894 --> 00:16:41,904
That's the guy who says we

400
00:16:41,904 --> 00:16:43,434
kill people based on metadata.

401
00:16:43,434 --> 00:16:44,514
And who is the former

402
00:16:44,514 --> 00:16:46,254
director of the NSA and CIA.

403
00:16:46,824 --> 00:16:50,064
He's, he's saying, metadata tells

404
00:16:50,064 --> 00:16:51,804
us everything we need to do, we need

405
00:16:51,804 --> 00:16:53,874
to know in order to take action.

406
00:16:53,967 --> 00:16:54,222
he was.

407
00:16:55,337 --> 00:16:57,207
Referring to, somebody else had

408
00:16:57,207 --> 00:17:00,327
quoted the former NSA general

409
00:17:00,327 --> 00:17:02,727
counsel, Stuart Baker, saying that

410
00:17:02,727 --> 00:17:05,067
quote, metadata absolutely tells you

411
00:17:05,067 --> 00:17:06,537
everything about somebody's life.

412
00:17:06,867 --> 00:17:08,847
If you have enough metadata, you

413
00:17:08,847 --> 00:17:10,797
don't really need content, end quote.

414
00:17:11,367 --> 00:17:14,067
And so he's, he's referring to that and

415
00:17:14,067 --> 00:17:16,317
saying, we can, we don't need the content.

416
00:17:16,347 --> 00:17:17,637
We have enough with metadata.

417
00:17:18,147 --> 00:17:19,557
And then he makes a little cheeky joke.

418
00:17:20,262 --> 00:17:21,912
About how, oh, we're not ac we're

419
00:17:21,912 --> 00:17:23,442
not gonna do that with this metadata.

420
00:17:23,442 --> 00:17:25,902
And everybody laughs because it's so

421
00:17:25,902 --> 00:17:27,702
funny that we're all being surveilled.

422
00:17:27,702 --> 00:17:28,542
Ha ha ha.

423
00:17:29,262 --> 00:17:32,082
But the reason I bring this up, I

424
00:17:32,082 --> 00:17:34,302
wanted to emphasize the importance

425
00:17:34,302 --> 00:17:36,852
of not leaking your data in

426
00:17:36,852 --> 00:17:38,832
general and metadata in particular.

427
00:17:39,252 --> 00:17:41,382
And so everything that we talk

428
00:17:41,382 --> 00:17:43,976
about on this show is it is.

429
00:17:44,251 --> 00:17:45,271
pulling in that direction.

430
00:17:45,271 --> 00:17:49,814
So, I'm proud to be helping everybody else

431
00:17:49,814 --> 00:17:52,154
out, and I'm proud to be going on this

432
00:17:52,154 --> 00:17:54,974
journey myself of minimizing my leakage

433
00:17:55,004 --> 00:17:57,884
of metadata and other data in general.

434
00:17:58,304 --> 00:18:00,371
And, it feels good to be giving the

435
00:18:00,371 --> 00:18:02,891
finger to people like this who think that.

436
00:18:03,491 --> 00:18:05,951
It's, um, not only do they kill

437
00:18:05,951 --> 00:18:07,841
people based on the metadata, but

438
00:18:07,841 --> 00:18:09,821
they just do blanket surveillance on

439
00:18:09,821 --> 00:18:12,401
all of us, guilty and innocent alike.

440
00:18:12,851 --> 00:18:15,761
And then on top of that, they laugh about

441
00:18:15,761 --> 00:18:17,321
it and think it's a, it is a big joke.

442
00:18:17,501 --> 00:18:20,231
So with that, I'm gonna

443
00:18:20,231 --> 00:18:21,221
leave you for today.

444
00:18:21,821 --> 00:18:23,921
We will see you pretty soon.

445
00:18:24,071 --> 00:18:25,181
We're gonna have another episode

446
00:18:25,181 --> 00:18:27,041
coming out here in just a few days.

447
00:18:27,431 --> 00:18:29,051
And it'll be back to our

448
00:18:29,051 --> 00:18:30,881
regularly scheduled program.

449
00:18:31,481 --> 00:18:33,221
We'd love to hear from you if you boost

450
00:18:33,221 --> 00:18:35,531
in to the Sovereign Computing Show

451
00:18:35,531 --> 00:18:38,681
or email us sovereign@atlbitlab.com.

452
00:18:39,041 --> 00:18:41,884
We will read it and respond and, can't

453
00:18:41,884 --> 00:18:43,444
wait to hear some more of your feedback.

454
00:18:43,714 --> 00:18:45,019
So thanks everybody, and

455
00:18:45,019 --> 00:18:45,634
we'll see you next time.

456
00:18:47,433 --> 00:18:48,573
Hey, thanks for listening.

457
00:18:48,713 --> 00:18:50,083
I hope you enjoyed this episode.

458
00:18:50,353 --> 00:18:51,483
If you want to learn more about

459
00:18:51,483 --> 00:18:53,183
anything that we discussed, you can

460
00:18:53,183 --> 00:18:54,943
look for links in the show notes

461
00:18:55,143 --> 00:18:56,443
that should be in your podcast

462
00:18:56,453 --> 00:18:59,223
player, or you can go to atlbitlab.

463
00:18:59,223 --> 00:19:00,963
com slash podcast.

464
00:19:01,563 --> 00:19:02,883
On a final note, if you found

465
00:19:02,883 --> 00:19:04,673
this information useful and you

466
00:19:04,673 --> 00:19:06,403
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467
00:19:06,403 --> 00:19:08,393
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468
00:19:08,773 --> 00:19:10,603
Your support really helps us so that we

469
00:19:10,603 --> 00:19:12,733
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470
00:19:13,063 --> 00:19:13,623
All right.

471
00:19:13,703 --> 00:19:14,353
Catch you later.